Bank Resolution and Creditor Distribution: The Tension Shaping Global Banking – Part I: “External and Intra-Group Funding” and “Ex Ante planning v. Ex Post Execution” Dimensions*

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Bank Resolution and Creditor Distribution: The Tension Shaping Global Banking – Part I: “External and Intra-Group Funding” and “Ex Ante planning v. Ex Post Execution” Dimensions*

David Ramos*

Javier Solana*

Banking has drastically changed since the 2007-2009 financial crisis and its aftermath. Of all the reforms that impinge upon the ability of global banks to run their business, none is more consequential than the new frameworks on bank resolution, which try to end “too-big-to-fail.” Yet bank resolution’s “macro” goals, such as systemic stability, limitation of contagion, and avoidance of moral hazard, run in the face of insolvency law and the more “micro” principles underpinning it. Among the latter, none is more pervasive than the need for fairness between creditors, and between (and within) creditor classes, enshrined in the ranking and priorities’ systems under insolvency law. At first glance, these demands could set bank resolution and insolvency laws on a collision course with each other. On closer examination, however, the picture is much more

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complex, for the tension between bank resolution and insolvency law is giving rise to a series of equilibria that are giving shape to the modern face of global banking. This and a succeeding article provide an analytical framework to aid in grasping the full picture, which is a difficult, and often overwhelming, enterprise. The proposed analytical framework breaks down the complexity of international banking into three different layers: the “individual bank v. group” dimension, the duality of crisis-management (ex post) and crisis-prevention (ex ante) tools, and the cross-border dimension. We explore each of these three layers incrementally, drawing from precedent analysis as we progress. Part II of this article provides a general analysis of the tensions between bank resolution and insolvency law and introduces the analytical framework. It then moves on to explore the first two layers within that framework: the group dimension, and the duality of crisis-prevention and crisis-management tools. A separate article will address the cross-border dimension.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of numerous financial institutions since the outbreak of the 2007 financial crisis evidenced the inadequacy of insolvency law to manage the resolution of complex financial institutions. In the years that followed many of these collapses, new bank resolution frameworks have been put in place that aim to address the shortcomings of insolvency law; most notably, the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) in the United States (US),\(^1\) and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in the European Union (EU).\(^2\)

But even if these new frameworks try to take bank resolution out of the scope of insolvency law, questions about how losses will be

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\(^1\) Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, § 12 USC 5380.

distributed among creditors remain. These distributional questions are at the heart of insolvency law, and, to the extent that priority rules in insolvency represent a legislature’s basic benchmark of fairness, they cannot be ignored. The potential for conflict between how each of these frameworks addresses those distributional questions is a serious concern if we are to rely on new resolution frameworks to help us weather the next financial crisis.

At first sight, this potential conflict seems to recall an old paradox: what happens when an unstoppable force (a new resolution framework that will prevent the next financial crisis) meets an immovable object (a standard of fairness that is reflected in insolvency law)? Or perhaps the question is not so much a paradox but a mind trick: if the force prevails, the object was not immovable; if the object does not move, then the force was not unstoppable.

Our goal in this paper is to explore this seemingly intractable problem. First, we provide a general description of banks’ funding and structure, and of the origins and justification of bank resolution. We also explore the frictions that bank resolution rules create with insolvency at the level of policy goals, interpretative principles and decision-making procedures, and we present an analytical framework to examine how those frictions will give rise to practical problems when resolution authorities apply the new bank resolution rules. This analytical framework is comprised of three layers that reflect the main sources of complexity in bank resolution: the bank-group dimension, the coexistence of ex-ante and ex-post resolution mechanisms, and the cross-border dimension of bank resolution. We examine each of these layers in turn and we do so in an incremental manner, the analysis of each layer building on the analysis of any preceding layers.

In Section III we examine the first layer. We discuss how frictions of policy and principle can increase uncertainty about the treatment of key categories of bank liabilities in the context of bank resolution, including those liabilities held by third parties and those held within the group. We examine the second layer in Section IV. Here, we discuss how the rules on ex-ante planning try to sidestep the uncertainty identified in the first layer by changing the nature of liabilities that are external to the banking group and that are subject to bail-in, and by changing the very structure of banking groups. We also explore how these changes might affect ex-post crisis-management.

The third layer, which encapsulates the cross-border dimension of bank resolution, adds yet another level of complexity to the problems

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3 The formulation of the paradox is attributed to a Chinese proverb found in a philosophical book written in the 3rd century, entitled Han Feizi.
identified in the first two layers. We examine this third layer in the second part of this paper, where we also reflect on how the attempts of financial regulators to deal with these problems are effectively reshaping the face of global banks. In the second part of the paper, we also draw some conclusions about what bank resolution was supposed to achieve, the obstacles it encountered, and the direction it, and global banking, are taking as a result.

II. BANK RESOLUTION: A (LAYERED) ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This section presents the analytical framework that we will use to conduct our analysis of bank resolution frameworks in this and the succeeding article. We first provide a brief description of the complex bank structures that introduces key concepts that will be relevant for the ensuing analysis. We also provide a brief description of bank resolution frameworks worldwide (A). Then we describe how differences between bank resolution and insolvency law at the level of policies (B) and principles (C) can give rise to interpretative problems in cases where some creditors will have to be protected at the expense of other creditors. We conclude this section with a description of the analytical framework that we will use to examine these problems (D).

A. Context

i. Banks’ Funding and Structure

To gauge the impact of different resolution and insolvency rules, one needs, first, to know the type of claims arising from banks’ funding structures to which those rules would be applicable. It is possible to distinguish three explanatory dimensions among these funding structures: i) the transnational dimension, ii) the external-internal dimension, and iii) the institutional dimension.

The transnational dimension distinguishes between domestic and cross-border banks, especially the different models within the latter class. In addition to the problems that domestic banks pose for resolution and insolvency rules, cross-border banks pose unique problems that stem from their transnational dimension. We focus our analysis on cross-border banks.

Banks’ corporate and funding structures are not uniform, but they tend to move around stable choices, which, in the transnational context, tend to be influenced by macroeconomic, financial, and regulatory
conditions. Using banks’ “business models” as a criterion for classification, we can distinguish between “multinational banks”, which maintain sizeable foreign branches and subsidiaries in multiple jurisdictions, and “international banks”, which, despite their important international presence, generally conduct their cross-border activities from the jurisdiction of their headquarters. A second criterion uses “funding models”, and distinguishes between “centralized” funding, where banks borrow in international interbank markets, raise funds from non-bank investors through international deposits, or issue debt in international capital markets, and then use intragroup funding to distribute those funds; and “decentralized” funding, where banks fund their operations locally and each subsidiary enjoys a high degree of autonomy raising funds in its own name.

Business and funding models can vary across jurisdictions, with Spanish banks being an example of multinational banks with decentralised funding; Spanish banks, an example of international banks with centralised funding; and US or UK banks, a mixed case. Models can also vary with time, in response to macroeconomic or financial conditions. The post-crisis environment has signalled a retreat of global banking and of banks’ international activities and exposures in response to the perception that cross-border links were a source of contagion, leading banks to pivot from international to multi-national business models. In terms of the banks themselves, the impact was less

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4 This allowed banking institutions not only to change their investment profile, but also to diversify their sources of funding, by resorting to international interbank markets, including wholesale funding markets. See Leonardo Gambacorta, Adrian van Rixtel & Stefano Schiaffi Changing Business Models in International Bank Funding5-6 (Bank for Int’l Settlements BIS Working Papers No. 614, 2017) https://www.bis.org/publ/work614.pdf.


6 See Gambarcorta, supra note 7, at 4.


8 See Gambarcorta, supra note 7, at 5.

9 See id.

10 Id. For example, some US banks use UK subsidiaries for managing European operations and funding, and UK banks use US subsidiaries for the same purpose.


13 See McCauley et al, supra note 8, at 8.
significant for US and Japanese banks, whereas European banks retreated more.\(^{14}\) In terms of markets, interbank funding markets suffered the most,\(^{15}\) while local funding of operations remained stable or increased after the crisis.\(^{16}\)

The external-internal dimension hearkens to the importance of banks’ intra-group structures. Intra-group financial flows are critical for transnational banks; they are used to allocate resources across borders and thus stabilize lending in some countries,\(^{17}\) to limit dependency on the availability of domestic funds, and to subject subsidiaries’ funding to the competition with other subsidiaries.\(^{18}\) Intra-group funding may compensate funding gaps in “normal” years, but it can also create funding gaps in intra-group positions during a liquidity crisis, thereby becoming a source of cross-border contagion.\(^{19}\)

Surveys have shown that bank groups tend to assiduously resort to committed facilities (senior loans), subordinated loans (which are preferred to equity injections due to tax and dilution reasons), and guarantees as the main mechanisms of intra-group support.\(^{20}\) Yet more


\(^{15}\) See id. at 56.

\(^{16}\) IMF, *International Banking after the Crisis: Increasingly Local and Safer?*, at 55-91, Global Financial Stability Report, (Apr. 2010); Muñoz De La Peña and Van Rixtel, 2015; ECB, Report on Financial Structures, at 33 (Oct. 2016) (explaining that within the euro area, banks have experienced a general ‘rebalancing’ in funding, away from wholesale funding, and towards deposit funding).

\(^{17}\) Intragroup funding tends to increase in times of uncertainty as banks use internal capital markets to adjust for liquidity risk. Buch and Goldberg (2015). Indeed, studies of banks’ cross-border liabilities show that after the crisis liabilities from related banks increased as a proportion of foreign liabilities, unlike cross-border liabilities from unrelated banks and non-banks. The proportion of liabilities from related banks increased by 2.7% (from 24.7% to 27.4% of foreign liabilities), whereas those from unrelated banks and non-banks decreased by 3.7% and 5.7%. This means that cross-border groups rely more on intragroup transfers, and less on private sector sources. See Gambacorta, van Rixtel, Schiaffi *supra* note 7 at 19.


\(^{20}\) Bank for International Settlements, *The Joint Forum: Report on Intra-group Support Measures*, at 10-13 (Feb. 2012) (explaining that Other mechanisms of intra-group support are letters of credit, equity injections, bond swaps, and bond lending, or repo agreements, although they were less frequent).
references to “funding” do not fully capture the relevance of intra-group financial flows for the group’s structure and organization, which is better captured by concepts such as “internal capital markets”. Most large banking groups have centralized capital management (globally or regionally), either keeping excess capital at a centralized level, or even raising capital at the parent level, which is then allocated across subsidiaries, which compete between them for resources.

Most banking groups also have centralized liquidity management. They rely on different mechanisms of liquidity monitoring and they keep liquidity pools at a global or regional level that can be used as needed. In the US resolution plans filed in 2015, for example, with few exceptions, bank groups used a specialist entity or other type of structural arrangement to coordinate liquidity management. There is

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23 Ibid at 8.

24 See FDIC, Banco Santander SA. Resolution Plan for US Operations. Public section at 16 (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/santander-165-1512.pdf (explaining that there are some exceptions, such as Santander, which indicates that subsidiaries are generally self-funded, although it also states that most wholesale borrowing (in the US) is conducted through SHUSA (the US holding company), and SBNA (the major operating Company)); See also FDIC, HSBC Holdings plc HSBC Bank USA, National Association US Resolution Plan Section I – Public Section, at 2 (July 1, 2014), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/hsbc-idi-1807.pdf (stating that banking entities manage their own liquidity pursuant to parameters set centrally).


26 FDIC, Credit Suisse Global Recovery and Resolution Plan, Public section, at 22 (does not clarify how the liquidity is managed); Deutsche Bank Resolution Plan, Public Section, at 8, 11, 12, 21 (2015) (references to a Pool Funding and Global Liquidity
less clarity about the extent to which the emphasis is placed on the “management” component of liquidity management, which means that the system is “notional”, meaning based on internal accounting with no intra-group transfer of funds, or placed in the accumulation of “assets”, in which case the cash pooling is “real”, with intra-group transfer of resources. The description of Lehman Brothers’ “Global Cash and Collateral Management” (GCCM) system in the Examiner’s Report illustrates the complexity of intra-group liquidity management systems. Lastly, the institutional dimension emphasizes how business or funding models respond to regulatory conditions, as well as to macroeconomic and financial conditions. US banking groups, for example, are organized around a Financial Holding Company (FHC). Management business units, but it is unclear how the responsibilities are distributed across the group; Goldman Sachs Group, Inc Global Resolution Plan, Public Filing, at 23 (June 30, 2015); Morgan Stanley 2015 Resolution Plan, at 8, 26 (July 1, 2015) (indicating that it has a ‘Global Liquidity Reserve’ held between parent and subsidiaries, but not specifying how it is allocated, or managed); JP Morgan Chase Resolution Plan Public Filing, at 16 (July 1, 2015).

See, e.g. Jochen Vetter; Christian Schwandner, Cash Pooling Under the revised German Private Limited Companies Act (GmbHG), GERMAN LAW JOURNAL VOL. 9, at 1156 (2008) (explaining that the distinction is used in the law of countries that have theorized about these intra-group arrangements, although the literature is not bank-specific). In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, No. 08-13555 Report of Anton R Valukas, Examiner, March 11, 2010, Volume 5 of 9. Section III.B: Avoidance Actions; Section III.C Barclays Transaction, p. 1549 (hereafter: Examiner Report). The report largely relied on Lehman’s Motion to continue using its Global Cash and Collateral Management (GCCM) system. Motion 669 In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, No. 08-13555 10 October 2008. The report provides an excellent description of (i) the parent holding company’s role as “central banker” and the intra-group Treasury Group’s role in managing the firm’s liquidity pool, or its subdivision in groups, including the Cash and Collateral Management Group; (ii) the categories of intra-group transfers, including the daily transfers from affiliate accounts to a consolidation account, not automatically but upon demand, the cash transfers between group entities’ accounts, and the recording with no cash transfer of other intra-group transactions between such entities as “payables” and “receivables”, plus the cash management transactions that took place outside the GCCM; or (iii) the role of in-house and external bank accounts. See Examiner Report at 1549-1562. The Glass – Steagall Act imposed the separation between ‘banking’ and ‘investment’ activities. This was followed by the Bank Holding Company Act, which tried to ensure that the Glass – Steagall prohibition was not circumvented by using a bank holding company to put seemingly incompatible activities under the same corporate roof. Still, by then the use of holding companies was popular, and the Federal Reserve gradually changed its view on the Glass – Steagall prohibition, with the support of the Supreme Court. Thus, large, diversified groups presided over by a holding company became even more widespread. The death – knell for the Glass – Steagall was the Financial Services Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999) Pub.L. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338, but
sitting atop the operating subsidiaries because the rules traditionally required separating commercial and investment banking or insurance, a separation gradually eroded by banking groups.\textsuperscript{31} Banking groups in Continental Europe have traditionally been characterized by “universal banking” models with diversified but strongly coordinated groups presided over by a credit institution, i.e. not a holding company.\textsuperscript{32} This is due, in part, to an institutional environment not conducive to strong decentralized capital markets but to markets dependent on major banks, which enjoyed a closer relationship with the State.\textsuperscript{33}

After the 2007/08 financial crisis, regulatory conditions have become an even more important factor in the determination of banking groups’ funding structures and business models. For example, in functional terms, “structural” measures have mandated the separation between deposit-taking and loan origination activities, on the one hand, and riskier capital markets activities, on the other, although there has been no uniformity about the kind of “risky” activities encompassed by the

\textsuperscript{31} Naturally, corporate structures would not have sufficed to erode the mandatory separation of banking and investment included in the Glass-Steagall Act. It was accompanied by a growing consensus that the prohibition was ineffective, and constrained competition without clear benefits in return. In light of legislative deadlock, the evolution of the prohibition was marked by a gradual reinterpretation of the provisions by the Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) sanctioned by the Supreme Court and federal courts. See e.g. George G. Kaufman, Larry R. Mote, “Glass-Steagall: Repeal by Regulatory and Judicial Reinterpretation,” \textit{BANKING LAW JOURNAL}, at 388-421(1990) (explaining that post-crisis mergers have left few systemically important institutions predominantly engaged in investment banking). That is the case of Goldman Sachs, or Morgan Stanley. Bear Stearns was bought by JP Morgan Chase, Lehman Brothers entered bankruptcy, and some of its assets were acquired by Barclays, and Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America.

\textsuperscript{32} Opinions vary as to the causes. Some would argue that this was due to a competitive advantage in mobilizing vast financial resources in aid of industrialization See Alexander Gerschenkron, \textit{Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective}, Harvard Univ. Press (1962)(stating that others would emphasize the pro – commercial bank institutional framework, which made it easy for politically connected banks to tighten their grip on the still incipient capital markets); See Caroline Fohlin, \textit{Universal Banking in Pre-World War I Germany: Model or Myth?}, Explorations in Economic History Vol. 36, at 305-343 (1999).

prohibition, the strategy of separation, and its application at the group level. In addition, different countries have tended to favour their own banking models.34

In geographical terms, regulators have used the new liquidity rules under the Basel framework on bank capital adequacy, which includes the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), to push forward the idea of “self – sufficiency”, i.e. that every subsidiary, or even every branch, of international banks must be capable of fulfilling its own liquidity requirements without group assistance, something that favours “multinational banks” with decentralised funding.35 Other measures have restricted cross-border funding even further, such as the “Foreign Bank Organizations” (FBO) rule in the US, which requires separately capitalized US Intermediate Holding Companies (IHC) to structure the US operations of foreign banks,36 the “subsidiarisation” approach of the UK Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA),37 or the limitation of intra-bank group exposures by Swiss rules.38

34 The US “Volcker rule” prohibited banking groups from engaging in proprietary trading and the sponsoring of hedge funds. See also High-Level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector, chaired by Erkki Liikanen, Final Report (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf. The proposal included a grandfathering provision for UK banks (article 21), although Britain will soon cease to be part of the EU.


36 Infra 5.3.2. The rules also place restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to use US – raised dollar funding to fund their global activities. See H. S. Shin “Global banking glut and loan risk premium” Mundell-Fleming Lecture at the 2011 IMF Annual Research Conference, IMF Economic Review, 60, at 155-92.


38 See L. Goldberg; A. Gupta, “Ring-fencing and “financial protectionism” in international banking,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics,
The result has been an important change in emphasis on the factors considered relevant in intra-group arrangements. For example, in the more recent US resolution plans for major banking groups, there is less emphasis on the regular management of liquidity needs (often by a specialized entity) and more on the arrangements to pre-position liquidity resources on material entities, and on the availability of liquidity support, typically provided by the parent or holding company. These initiatives can protect against certain risks, but they can also trap capital and liquidity where they are not needed, and make it more difficult for bank groups to smooth liquidity needs across borders or to exploit business opportunities.

ii. Bank Resolution Frameworks

Before we explore in greater detail how the complexity of banks’ funding and structure may give rise to tensions between the goals of insolvency law and bank resolution, we need to briefly describe how resolution frameworks and tools work in different jurisdictions. Like the preceding introduction to banks’ funding and structure, this overview of bank resolution frameworks will introduce basic concepts of our analysis.


39 These are being determined by regulatory agencies’ guidance. See, e.g. Federal reserve System - FDIC Final Guidance for the 2019 and subsequent resolution plan submissions by the eight largest, complex U.S. banking organizations. FRB Docket No. OP-1644; and also Guidance for 2018 §165(d) Annual Resolution Plan Submissions By Foreign-based Covered Companies that Submitted Resolution Plans in July 2015, March 24, 2017.

40 See, e.g. Bank of America Corporation 2019 Resolution Plan, 31 July 2019, pp. 15-17, 23, 43 (emphasis on liquidity support by NB Holdings); Citigroup Resolution Plan Public Section, 31 July 2019, pp. 3, 16. BNP Paribas Resolution Plan Public Section 2018, pp. 13-14 although stating that the holding company (BNPP USA Inc) and the broker-dealer (BNP Paribas Securities Corp.) provide funding and services to other group companies, also emphasizes that material entities are self-funded. In Barclays US Resolution Plan 31 July 2018, there is still a reference to the centralized “management” through its Treasury function of capital and liquidity needs (pp. 39, 44), but the emphasis is on the pre-positioning of resources at each material entity (pp. 19-21), and on the existence of a Secured Support Agreement (SSA) whereby liquidity would be provided by the holding companies (BUSLLC, the IHC, and BGUS, the holding company below it) (pp. 11, 15-17, 28). Credit Suisse 2018 US Resolution Plan Public Section emphasizes the structural changes undertaken to improve resolvability, including a Support Agreement, involving the holding company and the Material Legal Entities dependent on its funding (pp. 5, 10, 13).
The Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes prepared by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) have guided many of the regulatory initiatives to improve the resolution of banks. Yet as the FSB reports and peer reviews show, complete resolution frameworks are only in place in areas that were hit harder by the financial crisis, notably the US and the EU, as well as other jurisdictions like Switzerland or Japan, but progress is patchy elsewhere. By way of summary:

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
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<td>Yes. Resolution</td>
<td>Yes. Receivership</td>
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<td>Yes. FINMA</td>
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<td>under DIA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SIFIs (OLA)</td>
<td>Firms</td>
<td>liquidation)</td>
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<td><strong>Tools</strong></td>
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<td>Sale of business</td>
<td>P&amp;A</td>
<td>Implementation of resolution plan.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Bridge bank</td>
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<td>Transfer of business</td>
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<td>Asset</td>
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<td>SIFIs bridge bank</td>
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<td>Yes (explicit)</td>
<td>Not explicit</td>
<td>Yes (implied)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Priorities</strong></td>
<td>Separate rules</td>
<td>Insolvency</td>
<td>No separate rules</td>
<td>Yes (reorganization plan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OLA)</td>
<td>(with carve-outs)</td>
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<td>Yes (OLA: discretion)</td>
<td>Yes (exceptional)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>treatment</td>
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<td>(I) Privileges</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unequal</strong></td>
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<td>treatment</td>
<td>Insolvency as baseline</td>
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<td>Insolvency</td>
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<td>(II) Prejudice</td>
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<td>No Creditor Worse-Off (NCWO)</td>
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The first difference is the existence and scope of a separate regime to deal with bank crises. Regulators in some jurisdictions, like the US or Japan, had already vested their deposit insurers with receivership powers and, after the 2007/08 financial crisis, decided to supplement those powers with a specific regime for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). In the EU, regulators have introduced a whole new

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41 FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, 15 October 2014.
43 See 12 USC sections §§ 1818, and 1819 (a) Ninth (FDIC authority), supplemented by §§ 5384 et seq (Orderly Liquidation Authority). For Japan, see the Deposit Insurance
framework for all banks (and investment firms), regardless of the systemic importance.44 In Switzerland, there is a regime for banks and investment firms, and regulators permit an extension to other firms subject to a public interest test.45 Lastly, while China seems to have supplemented the existing framework of powers of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) with new powers for the Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the deposit insurer (DIFMA), China still lacks a complete framework.46

The second set of differences relates to resolution tools. All systems contemplate purchase and assumption (P&A) or sale of business.47 Nevertheless, China does not seem to have fully developed these tools, while the US and Japan rely on the bridge bank as the preferred tool for orderly liquidation, generally restricted to SIFIs.48 The EU lists the sale of business, bridge bank, asset segregation (or “bad bank”) and bail-in as key tools,49 while Switzerland regulates bankruptcy and reorganisation separately, and tools such as the bridge bank and bail-in are contemplated under the latter.50

These choices determine which forms of interference with the rights of creditors, and, generally, investors, are more likely. In the US or Japan, it would be in a transfer to a bridge bank to preserve critical functions, while shareholders and creditors are left behind, while in the EU it would be through the use of bail-in powers.51 This results in a great divergence of approaches towards bail-in powers. While they are the

Act of 1971, chapters IV-VII, articles 70-126, which deal with the purchase of deposits and other claims, management of business by an administrator, the transfer of business of failed institutions, the purchase of claims that are difficult to collect, or the responses to financial crises, and articles 126-2 et seq. (Chapter VII-2) on orderly resolution.

44 Article 1 BRRD (see the previous section).

45 FINMA Banking Insolvency Ordinance, Art. 2 (August 30, 2012) (hereafter: BIO-FINMA), provides that the rules apply to Banks, securities dealers, and central mortgage bond institutions. Section (2) states that the reorganisation provisions do not apply to firms or persons without the requisite license, but that FINMA may declare them applicable when there is sufficient public interest.


47 See id. at 12-13.

48 In the US, see 12 USC §§ 5384 (a) (3) and § 5390 (h). In Japan the bridge bank is already a central tool to deal with the succession of business of failed financial institutions under Chapter VI of the DIA, articles 91 et seq., and it is again introduced as an orderly liquidation tool in Chapter VII-2, in article 126-34 of the DIA.

49 Article 37 BRRD.

50 BIO-FINMA chapter 2 (bankruptcy) and 3 (reorganization), the latter of which includes bail-in (articles 47-50) and the bridge bank (articles 51-52).

51 Article 43 BRRD.
central tool of the EU framework, they are absent from the Chinese framework, implicit in the US and Japan, and, in the case of Switzerland, they are restricted to cases where a reorganization plan is implemented.

Finally, there are important differences in the degree of detail with which the different frameworks regulate the interference with creditors’ rights, and the system of insolvency ranking and priorities. In some cases, like Japan, there are either no express provisions, or the rules only apply to equity or contractual bail-in instruments, so there should not be any interference with pre-existing rights. In contrast, the US, the EU and Switzerland have attempted to enhance the credibility of burden-sharing by introducing express provisions to deal with ranking and priorities. These attempts open the door to potential conflicts between the policy goals of insolvency law and bank resolution. The remainder of this article will focus on these three jurisdictions: the US, the EU, and Switzerland.

B. Bank Resolution and Insolvency Law: Tensions at the Policy Level

i. General Considerations

To analyse the tensions at the level of policy, consider, first, insolvency law. Its policies and principles aim at dealing with failed debtors and protecting creditors. This focus can be seen in international best practice from the World Bank and the United Nations in the form

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53 In Japan Arts. 102 and 126-2 cover, respectively, the situations of financial crisis and resolution, and although the rules make no express mention of write-down and conversion, they state that the Prime Minister will “decide on the treatment” of the equity, capital treatment and subordinated debt (Art. 102(3) and 126-2(4)). See Ignacio Tirado, “Banking Crisis and the Japanese Legal Framework,” Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies – Bank of Japan. Discussion Paper No. 2017-E-2, at 55.
54 Articles 47-50 FINMA Banking Insolvency Ordinance.
57 International initiatives have sought to identify and promote best insolvency law practices to foster access to credit and economic development, under the aegis of both the United Nations and the World Bank. The World Bank’s efforts have focused on the principles for effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes. These were originally developed in 2001 as part of international efforts to provide sound solutions to the problems arisen with the (Latin American, Asian, and Russian) crises of the 90s, and revised in 2005, 2011 and 2015. World Bank, The World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes, Washington (2016), available at
of the Insolvency and Creditor Rights Standard (ICR), which has received the endorsement of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as one of the key standards for sound financial systems. Insolvency ranking and priorities are critical elements of such best practices.

In relatively recent times, different legal systems have combined those two goals (dealing with failed debtors and protecting creditors) in different ways, sometimes resulting in proceedings of a different nature: “insolvency” and “pre-insolvency” proceedings. In essence, legislators may prioritize minimizing destruction of value by rescuing the debtor’s business or securing a prompt repayment to creditors through quick liquidation. Thus, if insolvency rules are designated as a point of reference to solve difficult cases in the context of bank resolution, it is unclear whether “insolvency” or “pre-insolvency” proceedings will serve as an actual reference.

In a 2011 amendment, the Bank’s principles were modified to incorporate the UNCITRAL Guide’s updates. This was the case with new principles C16 and C17, regarding enterprise groups. Since then, the relationship between the two sets deepened, resulting in the ICR, which was formed by the Bank’s Principles and the UNCITRAL Guide, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGILD/Resources/ICRStandard_Jan2011_withC1617.pdf

See http://www.fsb.org/2011/01/cos_051201/.


EU resolution rules, when relying on sources outside resolution rules themselves, refer to “normal insolvency proceedings”, which are defined as “collective insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment
In practice, the similarities between the two proceedings mitigate this problem. In particular, the rules that determine the hierarchy of claims are normally placed within the rules on “liquidation” but are common to both proceedings. Existing principles and goals applicable to insolvency priorities include the following: (i) insolvency law needs to uphold the priorities of claims established prior to insolvency under commercial or other laws to protect legitimate expectations and encourage predictability; (ii) the priority of secured creditors over their collateral needs to be upheld; (iii) the payment of claims related to the costs and expenses of administration has to be prioritized; (iv) once secured creditors and insolvency expenses have been satisfied, the law has to promote pari passu distribution of proceeds, which also means the need to restrict priority debt to a minimum; and (v) public interests, e.g. tax liabilities, should not be prioritized, whereas the importance of workers to the enterprise should be acknowledged by giving them priority status.

This could still leave some interpretive difficulties in the limited cases where priority rules can differ between reorganisation proceedings and liquidation proceedings. More importantly for our purposes,
however, is whether the goals of a specific proceeding can affect priority rules. Resolution frameworks, for example, have a different inspiration from insolvency law. They were meant to address insolvency’s shortcomings. In the wake of the 2007/08 financial crisis, insolvency tools turned out to lack expediency, and insolvency courts lacked the expertise to handle complex banks’ crises more swiftly and to avoid contagion.\(^{70}\) New rules were needed to preserve banks’ key role of liquidity creation while at the same time protecting the public interest by avoiding the use of taxpayers’ money to support distressed banks deemed too-big-to-fail.\(^{71}\) In addition, existing insolvency rules were not capable of dealing with the operational complexity of some banks. For example, the “centralized” management of functions\(^{72}\) required a greater emphasis on the “group” as the relevant resolution unit\(^{73}\) and greater cross-border coordination.

Before the crisis, the US already had in place specific procedures for failing banks. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), which had been created through the Banking Act of 1933,\(^{74}\) had preventive capabilities, such as the power to level cease-and-desist orders,\(^{75}\) and the power to act as a receiver for a failing bank.\(^{76}\) In addition, its extensive practice helped develop new resolution tools such as the sale of business or the “bad bank”.\(^{77}\) What it lacked, however, were specific tools to deal with systemic risk. Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act aimed at bridging that gap.\(^{78}\) It introduced a new proceeding for financial companies whose failure would have an adverse impact on financial stability,\(^{79}\) and it vested the FDIC with new (and vast) powers.\(^{80}\)

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\(^{71}\) FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Systems for Financial Institutions at 1 (October 15, 2014).


\(^{73}\) Articles 7-8, 12-13, 16, 18, 19-26, 30,


\(^{76}\) 12 USC sections §§ 1818, and 1819 (a) Ninth.


\(^{78}\) Title II, Sections §§ 201-217 Dodd-Frank Act, 12 USC §§ 5381 et seq.

\(^{79}\) Section 203 (b) Dodd-Frank Act, 12 USC §§ 5383 (b).
Unlike in the US, in the EU the legislator introduced both specific procedures for failing banks and specific tools to deal with systemic risk simultaneously, and it only did so in response to the 2007/08 financial crisis. In so doing, EU legislators drew inspiration from the FDIC to vest its own resolution authorities with extensive crisis-management powers and specific resolution tools. In order to solve cross-border coordination problems, the EU legislator introduced “colleges” of resolution authorities. Yet, unlike under US law, under EU law the goal of tackling systemic risk pervades the whole framework and applies to all banks regardless of their significance for systemic stability. Moreover, in the EU, a bank resolution framework was seen as a key to pursue an EU-specific goal: the enhancement of coordination in the Eurozone through a Banking Union to sever the link between banks and sovereigns, which included (i) supervision through a centralized Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), (ii) regulation through the Single Rulebook, (iii) resolution through the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), with centralized decision-making in the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and (iv) funding through the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), and (v) a single system of deposit insurance.

Section 210 Dodd-Frank Act, 12 USC §§ 5390.

In the BRRD Directive 2014/59/EU, recital (1) describes the “significant lack of adequate tools to deal effectively with unsound or failing credit institutions”, while recital (2) discusses systemic risk.

Articles 3, 61, 63-72, 81-84 BRRD.

Articles 37-42 BRRD.

Article 1 (1) BRRD.


Articles 42-56 SRMR.

Articles 67-79 SRMR.

Article 1 SRMR; Intergovernmental Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of Contributions to the Single Resolution Fund 8457/14 Brussels (May 14, 2014).
In addition to protecting financial stability, the new rules on bank resolution needed to protect taxpayers and address the problem of moral hazard.\(^\text{93}\) This resulted in rules for the write down and conversion of equity and debt instruments, i.e. the bail-in, as opposed to bail-out, tool.\(^\text{94}\) In the US, bail-in rules were accompanied by the prohibition for the central bank to supply liquidity to individual institutions unless it was in the framework of a broader liquidity program.\(^\text{95}\) In the EU, the specific aim of severing the link between banks and their sovereigns under the Banking Union had led the Commission to insist on burden-sharing by investors as a precondition to approve rescue packages under state-aid rules,\(^\text{96}\) a complementarity that was reinforced in the resolution framework.\(^\text{97}\)

This background resulted in a framework of policies quite different from that of insolvency law. First, the bank resolution framework is characterized by a more ‘macro’ perspective focused on the avoidance of contagion, the mitigation of moral hazard, and the protection of public funds, as well as the continuity of critical functions,\(^\text{98}\) rather than the

\(^{93}\) R. de Weijs, *Too Big to Fail as a game of chicken with the state: What insolvency law theory has to say about TBTF and vice versa*, 14 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 201, 207-215 (2013).


\(^{96}\) Article 107 TFEU declares state aids illegal unless they are included within the exceptions under section (3), whose letter (b) authorizes such state aid to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission issued Guidelines stating that holders of equity and junior debt in a failed institution had to share in the losses in order for the rescue package not to be considered an illegal state aid. See Communication from the Commission of 30 July 2013 on the application from 1 August 2013 of State aid rules to support measures in favour of Banks in the context of the financial crisis O.J. 2013, C 216/1.

\(^{97}\) Thus, bail-in would act as the primary mechanism for loss absorption and recovery, and resolution funding to cover the gaps left. See e.g. Recitals (73) and (74) and articles 37 (10), 44 (4) – (12) BRRD.

\(^{98}\) *Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (“FSB”),* 3-4 (15 Oct. 2014). See Article 31 BRRD (stating the objectives of resolution, which include ensuring the continuity of critical functions, avoiding contagion, imposing market discipline, protecting public funds, protecting depositors and client assets. In the US, one of the goals of the Dodd-Frank Act itself is “to end too big to fail”; and protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts”. This is completed by Section § 204 Dodd Frank Act, 12 USC §5384, which refers to systemic risk, and moral hazard. Preserving key operations was already a goal of in 12 U.S.C. 1821(d) and 1823(c). New Orderly Liquidation Authority provisions reinforce this by the use of the bridge bank as a tool.). See 76 Fed. Reg. 41639 (July 15, 2011).
‘micro’ perspective of creditor protection, which ceases to be an end in itself, and becomes a means to achieve other goals.

Second, in contrast to insolvency law, where pari passu treatment was the background policy and priorities and privileges were only exceptions, in bank resolution, background policies try to protect certain liabilities such as deposits or clients’ funds and assets. The interests of other creditors are secondary and can only be justified in terms of resolution goals as the means to minimize resolution costs and the avoidance of “unnecessary” destruction of value.

ii. Specific Examples

These differences at the policy level between insolvency law and bank resolution can give rise to frictions. Resolution frameworks in the US, the EU and Switzerland approach these frictions in different ways.

The US framework for the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) is a high-stakes system, which tries to eliminate interpretative friction by relying on (i) FDIC discretion, (ii) separate rules, and (iii) legally-sanctioned discrimination (with limits). It provides that the FDIC, as receiver, shall terminate all rights arising from status as stockholder or creditor, except for the rights permitted under the specific OLA rules, and ensure that stockholders and creditors bear losses in accordance with the priority of claims under those rules. The transfer of assets and liabilities to bridge companies is subject to what the FDIC, in its discretion, deems to be appropriate, with the exception of equity claims, which are not transferred as a matter of law. There are separate rules that rank unsecured claims in the following order: post-receivership financing, administrative expenses of the receiver, amounts owed to the United States, wages, salaries and commissions to employees, contributions to employee benefit plans, other senior liabilities, subordinated liabilities, wages salaries and commissions of senior

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100 Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) 3, 6 (15 Oct. 2014) (specifically preamble (iv) and no. 2.3(iii)). See also BRRD Article 34(2) [para. 2].


102 12 USC § 5390 (h) (1) (B).

103 12 USC § 5390 (h) (3) (A)-(B).
executives and directors, and obligations to shareholders.104 Other provisions deal with secured creditors105 and prior contracts, including the transfer of qualified financial contracts.106 Thus, the approach is not dissimilar from the one that could result from insolvency law, but regulated independently, and much more subject to discretion. Add the fact that there is very limited court intervention,107 and the risks are clear: (i) arbitrary conduct, (ii) an all-or-nothing constitutional challenge,108 and (iii) drastic legislative upheaval.109

Even if the system stands, it is unclear how its self-contained rules should be interpreted. If, say, there is disagreement as to whether liabilities under a complex contract that is not repudiated after appointment by the FDIC relate to a “services” agreement and should be treated as an “administrative expense of the receiver”, or are post-receivership financing and should be preferential to it, or are considered to be left behind after transfer to the bridge bank,110 it is unclear which principles should be used for interpretation.

The EU, for its part, exemplifies a deceivingly accommodating system. For EU rules, bail-in is the central resolution tool, encompassing the power to write down or convert equity or debt instruments (i) as a resolution tool used in isolation (“open bank” bail-in), (ii) as a resolution tool used in conjunction with the sale of business, bridge bank, etc (“closed bank” bail-in),111 and (iii) independently, i.e. before resolution takes place.112 Bail-in is anchored in an expert valuation, which determines the sufficiency/insufficiency of resources, and serves to determine the extent of the bail-in,113 but this will normally offer a range

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104 12 USC § 5390 (b) (1), and (2).
105 12 USC § 5390 (b) (5).
106 12 USC § 5390 (c). Sub-sections (8) and (9) deal with qualified financial contracts.
107 12 USC § 5390 (a) (9) (D) and (e).
108 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority: Too Big for the Constitution?, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 165, 247 (2014), (examining the framework on procedural grounds (e.g. the strict time-limits, or the secrecy of proceedings), but also the discrimination against creditors).
109 Department of Treasury, Orderly Liquidation Authority and Bankruptcy Reform (February 21, 2018).
110 12 USC 5390 (b) (7) (B) (post-receivership services), (b)(2) (post-receivership financing).
111 Respectively, article 43 (2) (a) and (b) BRRD. See Emilios Avgouleas, Charles Goodhart, “Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins,” 1 J. Fin. Reg. 3, 8 (2015).
112 Articles 37 (3) and 43-55 BRRD (resolution tool), and 37 (2) and 59-62 (tool independent of resolution) BRRD. In any event, the use of the pre-resolution bail-in tool is conditional to a state of financial distress, which makes bail-in the alternative to a formal resolution process. See, e.g. Article 59 (3) (b)-(d) and (4) BRRD. Karl-Philipp Wojcik, Bail-in in the Banking Union, 53 Common Mkt. L. R. 91, 106 (2016).
113 Articles 36, 46, 73-74 BRRD.
of values, and will not state the amount of instruments that need to be bailed-in to restore confidence.

In contrast, at first glance, EU resolution provisions accommodate insolvency law quite well by requiring bail-in to be exercised “in accordance with the hierarchy of claims in normal insolvency proceedings.”\(^{114}\) Yet this seamless transition between rules is only apparent. BRRD provisions regulate the ranking between equity, hybrid, and debt instruments,\(^{115}\) introduce an express priority for eligible (retail) bank deposits,\(^{116}\) and, more importantly, provide a (long) list of liabilities excluded from bail-in.\(^{117}\) The exclusions comprise secured liabilities, liabilities arising from holding client money or instruments, or by virtue of a fiduciary relationship,\(^{118}\) which are also protected by insolvency law. However, they also exclude short-term debt, or liabilities to providers of services critical to the daily functioning of operations,\(^{119}\) an exclusion inspired by resolution goals. In short, while pretending to accommodate insolvency law, EU resolution rules force insolvency law’s ranking, where liabilities are “up” or “down” the ladder, to coexist with a parallel system, where liabilities are “in” or “out” of bail-in, thereby creating an incentive for arbitrage: creditors will tend to plead that their right is “out” rather than “up”.

Thus, classification problems are bound to arise. It is not difficult to imagine cases where it may be difficult to determine whether a liability is “secured” or arises from “holding client assets or money”, or from a “fiduciary relationship”.\(^{120}\) In such cases, it is unclear whether one should rely on insolvency law principles or resolution principles as a tie-breaker. In principle, bail-in exclusions must be determined before the bail-in sequence,\(^{121}\) and thus one must determine that a liability is “in” before determining whether it is “up”. However, some liabilities, such as client money or securities, or wages, are excluded “provided that” they are

\(^{114}\) Article 48 (1) (d) and (e) BRRD.

\(^{115}\) Article 48 (1) (a) – (c) BRRD.

\(^{116}\) Article 108 BRRD. In addition to this, the rules also indicate the first instruments that will be subject to bail-in, including CET1, Tier 1 or Tier 2 instruments, regardless of what would be the result under insolvency rules. See article 48 (1) (a) – (c).

\(^{117}\) Article 44 (2) and (3) BRRD.

\(^{118}\) Article 44 (2) (b)-(d) BRRD.

\(^{119}\) Article 44 (e), (f), (g) (ii) BRRD.

\(^{120}\) Infra 3.1.2.

\(^{121}\) Article 2 (1) (71) BRRD states that “eligible liabilities” means the liabilities and capital instruments that do not qualify as Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 instruments of an institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) that are not excluded from the scope of the bail-in tool by virtue of Article 44(2).”
protected under insolvency law,122 which reverses the order, i.e. insolvency rules must be considered first, resolution rules second. Other liabilities, such as those arising from fiduciary relationships, are excluded from bail-in if they are protected “under the applicable insolvency law or civil law”.123 This requires analyzing insolvency law, then private law, then resolution, but with an interpretative gap, because resolution provisions require the liabilities to be “protected”, but do not specify the level of protection.

In other cases, liabilities are excluded without any reference to other laws, as in the case of “secured liabilities”, but one may need to refer to private law or insolvency law to circumscribe the concept.124 Then, some cases may be susceptible to classification under more than one category, e.g. short-term liabilities “secured” by collateral arrangements under a trust (i.e. fiduciary) agreement. In other cases, courts may have protected certain creditors “under insolvency law,” yet by using as interpretative tools policies such as investor protection to determine the scope of rights,125 which scope may be more limited in a resolution context, where considerations of stability and moral hazard are more important. Finally, in some cases, resolution authorities may be unable to state whether a liability is, or is not, protected under insolvency law, since there are no precedents on the issue. The case is similar for exclusions that do not rely on insolvency law:126 a self-referenced interpretation of concepts like the short-term “commercial or trade creditor” may be difficult if, say, the case concerns services by a group entity (not excluded from bail-in).127

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122 Id. art. 43(2)(c), (g)(iii) (resulting, in the case of liabilities, from the holding of client assets or money, or tax and social security liabilities).
123 Article 44 (2) (d) BRRD.
124 Article 44 (2) (b) BRRD includes among the excluded liabilities “secured liabilities including covered bonds and liabilities in the form of financial instruments used for hedging purposes which form an integral part of the cover pool and which according to national law are secured in a way similar to covered bonds;” Thus, a reference is made to ‘national law’ for the specific case of financial instruments similar to covered bonds, but not for the general category of ‘secured liabilities’; yet a secured liability cannot exist unless it is given that category under some national law. Which law, and how this may be enforced in other jurisdiction, is another matter.
125 The need to provide clients holding money or instruments with a “high level of protection” weighed heavily in the UK courts decision in the Lehman Brothers (Client Money) cases to provide insolvency protection. See infra III.A.2.
126 This is the case of “covered deposits,” deposit guarantee schemes, short-term liabilities, liabilities for employee fixed remuneration, and to trade creditors supplying goods or services critical to the daily functioning. Article 43 (2) (a), (e), (f), (g)-(i), (ii), (iv) BRRD.
127 Article 44 (3) (e) BRRD.
that is nonetheless critical to the daily functioning of the entity’s operations.128

The Swiss system is two-tracked, with rules on bank bankruptcy, which regulate assets, liabilities realization, and distribution, including priorities;129 and rules on reorganization that involve the proposal and adoption of a restructuring plan, which can apply only if (i) creditors are likely to fare better, and (ii) the plan is feasible in terms of time and scope.130 Swiss reorganization rules resemble EU resolution rules since (i) they rely on the insolvency hierarchy and private law,131 but, (ii) like EU rules, they expressly regulate the bail-in ranking between equity instruments and debt instruments,132 and provide a list of exclusions from bail-in.133 However, Swiss resolution rules simply cross-reference the list of preferential creditors under that insolvency law, and preferred deposits, as regulated under the Banking Act.134 Resolution rules only add the exclusion of “secured claims” and claims subject to set-off,135 where, again, insolvency law may be used for interpretation. It is arguably the approach most in line with pre-existing creditor rights,136 although this is easier when there is only one insolvency law to accommodate, rather than twenty-eight, as in the case of the EU.

C. Bank Resolution and Insolvency Law: the Role of Principles

The picture that arises from these policy tensions is clear yet unsettling. From a system (insolvency law) where creditor protection is a, if not the, primary goal, we move to a two-track system (bank resolution) with winners, i.e. the creditors whose individual interests are

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128 Article 44 (2) (g) (ii) BRRD.
129 BIO-FINMA, articles 11 et seq, including 16-23 (assets), 24-29 (liabilities), 31-34 (realisation), and 35-39 (distribution). Priorities are regulated in article 35, in favor of bank deposits and administration expenses, and expenses incurred after the opening of the proceedings.
130 CC Aug. 30, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 40 (BIO-FINMA).
131 CC Aug. 30, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 47 (“If the restructuring plan allows corporate actions in accordance with this Section, it is necessary to ensure that: a) the creditors’ interests take precedence over the interests of the owners and the hierarchy of creditors is respected; b) the provisions of the Swiss Code of Obligations apply mutatis mutandis.”).
132 CC Aug. 30, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 48(1)(b)-(d).
133 CC Aug. 30, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 49.
134 CC Aug. 30, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 47(1)(a), with reference to article 219 of the Loi fédérale sur la poursuite pour dettes et la faillite (LP), and article 37ª of the Bank Act. See also CC Aug. 20, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 25.
135 CC Aug. 30, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 49(1)(b).
136 To the mandatory limits to the exercise of bail-in we must add the procedural safeguard of allowing creditors’ objection to the reorganization plan. See CC Aug. 30, 2012, CC 952.05 art. 46.
connected with the “macro” goals of bank resolution (e.g. stability, contagion), and losers, i.e. the creditors (and shareholders) whose interests must be sacrificed to further other goals (e.g. avoidance of moral hazard). In this context of clearly diverging policies, a key element is the configuration of principles. We consider principles as legal propositions, which, like policies, have a dimension of weight and importance, i.e. they do not apply in an all-or-nothing fashion, like rules do; but, unlike policies, they establish rights and obligations rather than formulate goals.

This distinction is useful since, while policies set the goals to be achieved, principles determine the means that are admissible to achieve them, in terms of the parties’ rights, duties and responsibilities. Resolution goals can widely diverge from insolvency goals, but resolution principles need to take into account pre-existing rights established by private law and insolvency law if the system is not to become arbitrary. Exactly how resolution principles will take those pre-existing rights into account will depend on our conception of rights. For a conception that characterizes rights as “trumps”, those rights, by the fact of being “rights to” something, would trump policy considerations and constitute absolute limits. For views that see rights as “optimization mandates”, rights can project themselves ad infinitum until they encounter another right, or the public interest, in which case they are “balanced” against the colliding policy or right. Thus, those rights could be interfered with by policy considerations as long as a proper exercise of balancing and proportionality is present. In our view, the conflict between these two views is partly a product of viewing rights as either “abstract” rights, with a content that is not predetermined ex ante, or “concrete” rights, which are rights in a specific institutional context and normally entail a right “to” something in that particular context. The former encompass rights such as “freedom of contract”, “property”, or “equal treatment”; the latter encompass the right to receive compensation in a specific case of contract breach.

In this light, it is not difficult to see why the task of resolution principles is hard: they need to further resolution’s distinct goals while connecting it to the legal system as a whole, where resolution cannot

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138 For a general discussion of “goals” or “policies,” compared to “principles,” and the contrast of the two with “rules,” see Dworkin, supra note 140.
140 Robert Alexy Teoria de los derechos fundamentales (transl.) CEPC, 2007.
blatantly ignore rights that form part of that system’s notions of fairness, such as “property” or “equal treatment”.142

The principle of equal treatment is particularly relevant for our purposes. In general, in the context of insolvency law, there is a commitment to treat ordinary creditors pari passu.143 When there is a need to deviate from a pari passu treatment, many legal regimes provide for a compensation to those creditors who have been treated differently. This principle is often referred to as the “no-creditor-worse-off” (“NCWO”) principle, which, in essence, requires that no creditor be left worse than under insolvency liquidation.144

Different jurisdictions have adopted the NCWO principle at varying degrees. For example, in the US, the FDIC shall, in principle, treat “similarly situated” creditors in a “similar manner”.145 However, it may depart from this principle, if (i) such departure will achieve certain goals, e.g. the maximization of asset value or present value return from sale, the minimization of losses, or the continuity of key operations,146 and (ii) all creditors receive no less than the value that they would have received in case of bankruptcy liquidation.147 The latter is also the FDIC’s maximum liability against the failing bank creditors.148 However, additional payments or credits are permitted if ‘such payments or credits are necessary or appropriate to minimize losses’, i.e. typically if they affect key functions. Payments cannot exceed the face value of the claims, and this privilege does not entail an obligation to pay other creditors.149

FDIC rules tried to limit uncertainty by excluding the use of discretion to favour holders of equity, subordinated debt, and long-term senior debt.150 Yet Treasury proposals have emphasized that discretion is still too large and a source of uncertainty and unfairness, and they

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142 For an in-depth analysis of the potential conflicts between the application of the bail-in tool and the right to property and the principle against discrimination, among other fundamental rights, see Ramos and Solana, “Fundamental rights: a limit to bail-in?” (forthcoming 2019).
143 FSB Key Attributes no. 5.1 (commitment to pari passu and respect for insolvency hierarchy).
144 FSB Key Attributes no. 5.2 (compensation under the NCWO principle).
145 12 USC § 5390 (b) (4).
146 12 USC § 5390 (b) (4) (A).
147 12 USC § 5390 (b) (4) (B).
148 12 USC § 5390 (d) (2).
149 12 USC § 5390 (d) (4).
150 12 C.F.R. § 380.27.
recommend the elimination of discretionary disparate creditor treatment.\textsuperscript{151}

The EU rules have created a comparable system, where no creditor can incur greater losses than under insolvency.\textsuperscript{152} Procedurally speaking, the NCWO principle generally requires \textit{ex post} valuation that compares the situation of creditors in resolution with a \textit{hypothetical} valuation of their situation under insolvency.\textsuperscript{153} That valuation gives rise to a right to compensation from the resolution fund,\textsuperscript{154} but creditors do not have a right to a certain loss allocation during the resolution process itself.

In the EU, creditors of the same class must be treated \textit{equitably}, but not equally.\textsuperscript{155} Such equitable treatment, as well as the priority ranking under insolvency law, are taken as reference points, and apply \textit{unless} resolution provisions state otherwise.\textsuperscript{156} Thus, there is a weak commitment to equality as a matter of principle. Resolution authorities have the power to exclude “certain liabilities” (\textit{ad hoc} exclusion),\textsuperscript{157} but unlike the US case, the power is restricted to “exceptional circumstances”, and subject to strict requirements.\textsuperscript{158} One possibility is to exclude a liability where the exclusion is “strictly necessary” and “proportionate” to achieve the continuity of critical functions and core business lines, or avoid widespread contagion;\textsuperscript{159} or when “it is not possible to bail-in that liability within a reasonable time notwithstanding the good faith efforts of the resolution authority”.\textsuperscript{160} Many of these concepts, however, are open-textured. Clear principles would help solve the interpretation issues that could arise, but the weak commitment to equal treatment makes the solution more uncertain.

Swiss rules are less controversial. The NCWO is a test to simply set reorganization proceedings in motion.\textsuperscript{161} Then, bail-in relies on insolvency ranking, and resolution authorities lack the power to exclude liabilities other than those stipulated under the law.\textsuperscript{162} FINMA’s has certain discretion on whether to order a write-down or conversion of

\textsuperscript{151} Department of Treasury \textit{Orderly Liquidation Authority and Bankruptcy Reform}, 32-33 (2018).
\textsuperscript{152} See article 73 BRRD, and also article 34 (1) (b), (f), (g) BRRD.
\textsuperscript{153} Article 74 BRRD.
\textsuperscript{154} Recital (73), article 75 BRRD.
\textsuperscript{155} This may increase the burden for liabilities that remain subject to bail-in. \textit{Id.} art. 43(3) \textsuperscript{2} BRRD.
\textsuperscript{156} Article 44 (3) BRRD.
\textsuperscript{157} Article 44 (3) (b) and (c) BRRD.
\textsuperscript{158} Article 44 (3) (a) BRRD.
\textsuperscript{159} Article 40 81) (a) BIO-FINMA.
\textsuperscript{160} Articles 48-49 BIO-FINMA.
claims, but it is always subject to the same rules. It does not seem to be able to privilege certain classes of liabilities.

The NCWO principle tends to be associated with fundamental rights: if NCWO is not respected, there is a clear risk of a fundamental rights violation. We have explored this risk in greater detail in another paper. Suffice it to say here that, in cases where the correct balance between principles and policies may result in *prima facie* violations of the principle of equal treatment, procedural safeguards become particularly relevant and, when reviewing administrative decisions, courts will put a great emphasis on the justification of those decisions.

The above shows that the problem of classification and application of rules has less to do with the complexity of facts, and more with the tension between different policies and principles. Classifying a liability as a deposit, secured liability, or essential to preserve critical functions is not a mere semantic problem. It is a hard case of legal interpretation, a pivotal problem that confronts competing policies and principles, and it needs to be solved by adequately identifying those principles and goals, finding the best “fit”, and determining its consequences for the parties’ rights and obligations.

**D. A Layered Analytical Framework**

Banks’ funding structures are complex, and they fall in the midst of an unresolved tension between the policies and principles enshrined in insolvency law and bank resolution. That tension will have to be partly addressed on a case-by-case basis, and will, in our view, depend on the process’ legitimacy. To address the different angles of this problem in a constructive way, we need a proper explanatory plan. We propose a “layered” approach that takes the “core” tension between insolvency and resolution policies and principles in the context of key types of bank funding, and lets it unfold across the different dimensions of the problems.
problem. Choosing the layers is as important as choosing the order in which they will be addressed.

In our view, Layer 1 needs to address (i) the dimension of the basic principle/policy conflict, i.e. between ensuring a fair and equal treatment of creditors, and avoiding systemic risk and moral hazard, in relation with key categories of bank funding to see where problems may arise. We have identified four such key categories: deposits, liabilities resulting from the management of money and instruments as collateral, derivatives, and contractually subordinated debt. (ii) Layer 1 also needs to consider these key categories not only in the context of individual banks, but also of bank groups. This external versus intra-group dimension will also inform our analysis in subsequent layers.

The uncertainty resulting from the principle/policy conflict in Layer 1 leads to regulatory attempts to plan in advance in order to sidestep potential problems were the crisis to erupt, thereby eliminating the principle/policy conflict before it arises. Yet such rules can also create tensions between “prudential” and “crisis management” rules, in both external and intragroup funding. Thus, Layer 2 will explore the tension between insolvency and bank resolution in the context of prevention regulation (or ex-ante resolution mechanisms) and crisis management regulation (or ex-post resolution mechanisms).

Finally, Layer 3 will explore the cross-border dimension of the problem. The frictions between resolution and insolvency rules at the level of bank and intra-group funding are difficult to comprehend. Adding the tensions between crisis-management and preventive rules on top of that further increases the complexity of the challenge. When we add yet another level of analysis by exploring cross-border recognition and coordination, the problem becomes truly daunting. Yet we attempt to identify the sources of conflict and suggest avenues to mitigate existing problems, both from a perspective of external and intragroup funding. We explore Layer 3 in a succeeding article.

III. LAYER 1: THE EXTERNAL FUNDING V. THE INTRA-GROUP FUNDING DIMENSION

A. Operational Liabilities

i. Deposits and Claims Against Deposit Guarantee Schemes

Enhancing the protection of retail deposits has become a matter of public policy. Indeed, the FSB has identified this matter as one of the
goals of bank resolution in its recommendations.168 There are two clear objectives behind this policy: i) to foster confidence in the system, and ii) to guarantee that depositors will continue to have access to their deposits despite any resolution action.169

Nevertheless, bank resolution frameworks treat different types of deposits differently. For example, deposits covered under a Deposit Guarantee Scheme (“DGS”), i.e. “covered deposits”,170 are given priority “up” the insolvency ladder and are left “out” of bail-in.171 “Eligible deposits”, however, i.e. deposits that fall under the scope of DGS but may not necessarily be “covered”, or at least not in full, are also “up” in the insolvency ladder (yet below “covered deposits”) but are not excluded from bail-in.172 In other words, “eligible (yet uncovered)” deposits are “up” (although not as high as “covered deposits”) and “in. Claims that the DGS may have against the insolvent institution when subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors will rank just as high as “covered deposits” in the insolvency ladder,173 but they are not excluded from bail-in:174 they are also “up-and-in”. Deposits that do not fall under the scope of DGS, i.e. “ineligible deposits”, rank pari passu with ordinary liabilities: they are “down” and “in”.

The different treatment of all these claims can create frictions between bank resolution frameworks and insolvency law. For example, covered deposits and DGS claims resulting from subrogation are both “up” in the insolvency ladder but only the former are “out” (i.e. excluded from bail-in).

More complicated scenarios can be envisaged in cases where, in order to avoid a panic, a DGS decides to extend their coverage level beyond the amount specified in article 6 of the DGS Directive, i.e.

168 See, e.g. FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions 15 October 2014. See also art. 31(2)(d) BRRD.
169 See e.g. BRRD, art 69(4)(a). This second objective contributes to the first objective.
170 This is the term used in EU legislation. See e.g. Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 of April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (“DGS Directive”), article 2(1)(5). Art 6(1) of the DGS Directive stipulates that, if deposits are unavailable, ‘the coverage level for the aggregate deposits of each depositor is EUR 100 000’. The second paragraph of this article requires Member States to provide a higher coverage for specific deposits that can last between three and twelve months.
171 See e.g. article 108 (b)(i) (insolvency priority) and article 44(2)(a) (bail-in) BRRD.
172 See article 108(a)(i) BRRD. Letter (ii) of that provision extends the same protection to deposits made through third-country branches of EU institutions.
173 See article 44(2), fourth paragraph, BRRD.
174 See article 44(2) BRRD. On the other hand, liabilities to “deposit guarantee schemes arising from contributions” due in accordance with Directive 2014/49/EU” are excluded from bail-in. See article 44 (2) (g) (iv) BRRD.
€100,000. Bank resolution provisions use the definition of “covered deposits” under the DGS Directive to define the scope of the privileged treatments in insolvency. If the DGS of any Member State raised the coverage level to €250,000, for example, it is unclear whether the privileged treatment that article 108(B)(i) BRRD recognises to “covered deposits” would only cover the first €100,000, i.e. the coverage level defined in article 6 DGS Directive, or whether it would cover the €150,000 extension as well. The same doubts would arise in relation to DGS claims in insolvency that arose from subrogation of “covered depositors”.¹⁷⁶ In our opinion, the underlying policy rationale would dictate that the privilege be extended to the full amount, but this would also raise questions about how DGS in different Member States might respond to a looming crisis. Different coverage levels in different Member States could introduce additional frictions in the application of the bank resolution framework if, for example, one bank goes into resolution and its depositors are treated differently depending on the bank’s subsidiary with which they entered into the deposit.

Another problem might arise where a “host” DGS covers the deposits of a branch within its jurisdiction because the “home” DGS is insufficiently funded. The host DGS can make the payment “on behalf of” and “under instructions from” the home DGS, and it is stipulated that the home DGS “shall provide the necessary funding prior to payout.”¹⁷⁷ Yet nothing is said about those cases where a host DGS decides to cover the liabilities of the home DGS before receiving the funding. Problems may arise because the right of subrogation and the right of priority are provided to “the DGS that makes payments under guarantee within a national framework,” but it is unclear whether a host DGS filing in for the home DGS without having received prior funding would be making payments “within a national framework.”¹⁷⁸

In addition, it is important to note that short-term debt is excluded from bail-in.¹⁷⁹ This could give creditors whose deposits could be bailed-

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¹⁷⁶ See article 108(b)(ii) BRRD.
¹⁷⁷ Article 14 (2) DGS Directive (emphasis added.)
¹⁷⁸ The host DGS can make the payment “on behalf of” and “under instructions from” the home DGS, and it is stipulated that the home DGS “shall provide the necessary funding prior to payout”. Article 14 (2) DGS Directive. (Emphasis added.). Yet nothing is said about those cases where a host DGS decides to cover the liabilities of the home DGS before receiving the funding. Problems may arise because the right of subrogation and the right of priority are provided to “the DGS that makes payments under guarantee within a national framework”, but it is unclear whether a host DGS filing in for the home DGS without having received prior funding would be making payments “within a national framework”.
¹⁷⁹ Liabilities with less than 7-days maturity are excluded from bail-in Article 44 (2) (e) BRRD.
in, i.e. “eligible (yet uncovered)” and “ineligible” deposits, an incentive to replace their deposits with short-term debt. But if the entity is not put into resolution but enters insolvency, DGS claims will rank higher than short-term debt despite the former not being excluded from bail-in.

In our opinion, these problems arise because resolution rules have blurred the rationale for the protection of DGS claims. In principle, the protection of DGS claims is grounded in a “right of subrogation,” yet resolution rules deal with the issue as a matter of insolvency “privileges,” which means that they *de facto* take the “right” of subrogation away. This also contradicts the constant references to their “equal treatment,” which is referred to in insolvency law, while resolution rules introduce an additional privilege for covered deposits by excluding them from bail-in. It is as if a bullseye were moved after the shot had been fired.

ii. Liabilities Resulting from the Management of Client Money and Client Assets

In principle, liabilities arising from managing client money and client assets are expressly excluded from bail-in as long as “[the] client is protected under the applicable insolvency law.”\(^{180}\) Liabilities that may arise from holding assets for the benefit of another person, e.g. as a result of a fiduciary relationship, are also excluded from bail-in provided that “[the] beneficiary is protected under the applicable insolvency or civil law.”\(^{181}\) These cases raise several concerns.

First, the protection of the client or the beneficiary under the applicable law may itself be unclear. For example, in the *Lehman Brothers (Client Money)* cases, it took three lengthy decisions by the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in the UK to clarify that investors’ rights over “client money” were protected despite Lehman’s breach of its duty to place that money in segregated accounts.\(^{182}\) A constructive trust\(^{183}\) was held to exist;\(^{184}\) clients were

\(^{180}\) Article 44(2)(c) BRRD.

\(^{181}\) Article 44(2)(d) BRRD.

\(^{182}\) Instead, Lehman commingled its clients’ money with its own funds in its house accounts. In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2009] EWHC (Ch) 3228; In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2010] EWCA (Civ) 917; In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2012] UKSC 6, (appeal taken from Eng.).

\(^{183}\) For the purposes of this paper, we regard trusts as an example of “fiduciary agreements” as the term is used in Article 44(2)(d) BRRD, supra note 5. Unfortunately, however, the BRRD does not provide a specific definition of the term “fiduciary agreement”. In reality, trusts are a creature of the English common law and they may present some differences with fiduciary agreements as understood, for example, in civil
given protection because their money should have been placed in segregated accounts. Still, different facts could alter the policy/principle considerations at stake.\(^{185}\)

In another Lehman case, *Lomas v RAB Market Cycles*,\(^{186}\) the difficulty was whether the Prime Broker Agreement (Charge version) (the “PB Agreement”) that was concluded by LBIE, Lehman’s parent

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184  The High Court concluded that there was a constructive trust, a conclusion accepted by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Yet, the High Court considered that clients’ money were excluded from the specific reimbursement procedure envisaged by regulatory rules on “client money”, while the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court concluded that they were protected by it. In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2009] EWHC (Ch) 3228; In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2010] EWCA (Civ) 917; In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2012] UKSC 6, (appeal taken from Eng.). Furthermore, the courts’ holding was partly based on the fact that the custody mechanisms available at that time left a protection gap. The “alternative approach” sanctioned by UK regulatory rules permitted the firm to not segregate the moneys immediately, but to deposit the money in house accounts and effect a daily reconciliation procedure. This, together with the lack of internal controls, resulted in a failure ‘on a truly spectacular scale’. See *In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2009] EWHC (Ch) 3228; In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2010] EWCA (Civ) 917; In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2012] UKSC 6, (appeal taken from Eng.).

185  The conclusion that the specific protection procedure should apply to all clients, regardless of whether their moneys were commingled or not, was based strictly on insolvency law, but on a finalistic reading of MiFID rules, specifically article 16 of Directive 2006/73/EC (MiFID Implementation Directive), which required States to dispense a ‘high level of protection’. The High Court held that, since property law was not harmonized, each State should achieve the level of protection ‘taking its property law as given’. According to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, however, the ‘high level of protection’ required that the specific restitution procedure arising from the CMP should be available to all clients. See *In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2009] EWHC (Ch) 3228; In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2010] EWCA (Civ) 917; In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2012] UKSC 6, (appeal taken from Eng.).

entity for the EU, was a trust that would make LBIE a trustee and thus give its clients proprietary protection in the event of LBIE’s insolvency. Unsecured creditors objected on grounds that, although the PB Agreement described LBIE as trustee of the assets for the benefit of its clients, it gave LBIE rights to substitute and use its clients’ assets, which, unsecured creditors alleged, was incompatible with a trust and should have deprived clients of any proprietary rights in the assets in insolvency.187 Despite recognising certain anomalies,188 the court concluded that, taken as a whole, the PB Agreement did disclose a sufficient intention to make LBIE the trustee over the client’s assets or their substitute.189

A second concern is how clients are actually protected. Going back to the Lehman (Client Money) saga, it was clear that clients’ rights were protected under a fiduciary arrangement, i.e. a trust. Yet the trust itself would have merely given them the remedy of “tracing”, which is extremely difficult to enforce over money commingled in house accounts.190 The real question was whether clients, in addition to “tracing”, were also protected under a specific restitution procedure envisaged by regulatory rules, with the High Court saying they were not, and the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court saying they were.191 In the context of bail-in, the question thus becomes whether the protection offered by a trust would suffice to exclude the resulting liabilities from bail-in despite the practical difficulties associated with the enforcement of the trust.

The problem is worse in civil law countries due to the limited admissibility of fiduciary arrangements.192 Otherwise, this figure could help fill any gaps in the attempts to determine the specific rights over

187 Id at 20.
188 Ibid at 49-52.
189 Ibid at 53-63. The court found the existence of a trust “notwithstanding the conferral of rights on LBIE in relation to it which would have made a 19th century trust lawyer turn in his grave.” See Justice Briggs, “Has English law coped with the Lehman collapse?” at 132, Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law (March 2013).
190 Tracing requires the beneficiary to identify “his” property, which is extremely difficult to do in case of money assets commingled in different accounts. See In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2009] EWHC 3228 (Ch) at 172 et seq.
191 In other words, if clients simply had had a constructive trust, whereas the specific procedure envisaged in regulatory rules, which consisted in the forming of a Client Money Pool (CMP) to be promptly restituted, was reserved only for clients whose moneys were effectively segregated, there would be a clear difference in treatment. Thus, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court considered that the CMP should encompass all clients, regardless of whether their moneys had been effectively segregated. See In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2010] EWCA Civ 917; and [2012] UKSC 6.
client assets. As a result, jurisdictions that admit fiduciary arrangements would effectively grant clients a better protection. The difference may be particularly acute when the insolvency law and the law of the fiduciary arrangement differ, since, to be excluded from bail-in, liabilities from client money or instruments must be protected under insolvency law, whereas liabilities arising from fiduciary arrangements can be protected under insolvency law or civil law.

In short, the same liabilities arising in relation to client money and client assets may be treated differently under the EU bank resolution framework depending on the classification of those liabilities, on the level of protection granted by the applicable insolvency law, and on elements, such as the recognition of fiduciary arrangements, that are deeply embedded in legal culture. Whether such differences are arbitrary (and thus potentially illegal) will depend on whether they are backed by the principles and policies underpinning resolution rules.

iii. Liabilities Arising from Derivative Contracts

Derivatives are financial instruments the value of which is derived from the value of an underlying asset. Derivatives can be traded in a regulated market ("exchange–traded") or over-the-counter ("OTC"), and they can be cleared on the books of each counterparty i.e. “bilaterally cleared,” or on the books of a central counterparty (“CCP”), i.e. “centrally cleared.” Exchange-traded derivatives are always centrally cleared.

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193 In the case of Spain, for example, recent clearing and settlement rules provide for the possibility of settlement using special accounts opened by CSD participants on behalf of financial intermediaries, who, in turn, use the accounts for their clients. This gives rise to complex issues if the financial intermediary goes insolvent, and there are securities deposited in those accounts. There are strong arguments, partly based on the law of mandate, partly based on insolvency law, to support that those securities do not belong to the intermediary’s estate, but admit that this remains an open issue. See David Ramos, Ignacio Tirado, “El Procedimiento Alternativo de Liquidación a Través de Intermediario Financiero” 693-749 (2017).

194 Articles 44 (2) (c) or (d) BRRD.

195 Commodities, securities, currencies, and interest rates or yields are the most common underlying assets, but the scope is much broader. See e.g. Directive 2014/65 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (hereinafter, “MiFID II”), Annex I, Section C (4) to (10).

Liabilities arising from derivative contracts are, in principle, eligible for bail-in, but only for the amount that results from the application of any close-out netting agreement between the parties, and only if that amount is not covered by a “financial collateral arrangement” that the parties might have entered into to support the derivative transactions. Thus, in practice, only the part of the derivatives liability that is unsecured, for example because it is “under-collateralised,” will be eligible for bail-in.

It is important to note, however, that crisis prevention or crisis management measures will not necessarily trigger the application of a close-out netting agreement nor the enforceability of a financial collateral arrangement, provided that the substantive obligations under the derivative contract continue to be performed. In addition, bank resolution frameworks vest resolution authorities with the necessary powers to suspend payment and delivery obligations, to restrict the enforcement of security interests, and to suspend termination rights, all for a very short period of time: one day after the publication by the resolution authority of a notice summarising the effects of the resolution action. The scope of these powers, however, is restricted to bilaterally cleared derivatives.

Despite the clear intention of financial regulators to design a uniform framework that would make liabilities arising from derivative contracts potentially eligible for bail-in, the divergences in the treatment of these liabilities under insolvency law could give rise to potential frictions in the application of bank resolution frameworks. For example, in the EU, the Financial Collateral Directive does not require any privileged treatment of these liabilities in insolvency beyond the enforceability of financial collateral arrangements and close-out netting agreements. Indeed, most Member States appear to rank claims arising from derivatives as general unsecured claims. Spain, however, is an exception. To incentivize parties to maintain derivatives contracts despite

197 These liabilities are not in the list of liabilities expressly excluded from bail-in. See arts 44(1) and (2), BRRD.
199 See BRRD, art 44(2), third sub-paragraph. An “under-collateralised” amount defines the part of a liability that is not covered by the value of the collateral assets that secure the liability.
200 See art 68(1) and (3), BRRD.
201 See e.g. art 69 BRRD.
202 See e.g. art 70(1) BRRD.
203 See e.g. art 71 BRRD.
204 See arts. 69(4)(b), 70(2) and 71(3) BRRD, respectively.
205 See e.g. the Financial Collateral Arrangements, No.2 (U.K. 2003).
the opening of insolvency proceedings, Spanish law makes the claim resulting from the early termination of derivatives transactions payable against the insolvent estate (i.e. privileged) ahead of all unsecured creditors if the early termination event occurs after the filing for insolvency, whereas the claim will be ordinary and non-privileged if such an event is concurrent with, or prior to, the filing for insolvency.206

In principle, the privileged treatment that claims arising from derivatives receive under Spanish law need not be problematic in the context of bank resolution. For example, resolution authorities could exercise their right to suspend early termination rights under the derivatives in accordance with article 71(1) BRRD. This would allow resolution authorities to block any attempt from derivatives counterparties to behave opportunistically. Nevertheless, the privileged treatment may be upheld if resolution authorities decide not to transfer those liabilities to another entity or if they decide not to write down or convert those liabilities on the application of the bail-in tool for recapitalisation purposes.207 They may also be upheld if resolution authorities decide to exclude those liabilities from bail-in due to extraordinary circumstances, including the possibility of spreading contagion.208 In these cases, the place of incorporation of the derivatives counterparty would matter: if the counterparty is a bank incorporated in Spain, a derivatives creditor would have a better treatment in insolvency than a derivatives creditor whose counterparty is incorporated in another Member State.

In these cases, the privileged treatment of derivatives creditors could pose challenges to the resolution of Spanish banks. In addition, it could also give participants in derivatives markets an incentive to structure their transactions in a way that would allow them to benefit from the privileged insolvency treatment under Spanish law, thereby potentially challenging the effective resolution of banks incorporated in other Member States. We consider that privilege to be unjustified and have

206 Art. 16 (2) second sub – paragraph, of Royal Decree – Law 5/2005, which transposes FCD in Spain. At the end of 2015, the Spanish Supreme Court excluded this preferential treatment in cases where a bank had entered into one derivative transaction with one of its retail customers. The Court did not examine the applicability of such privileged insolvency treatment where the counterparty was another sophisticated participant nor where the parties had entered into several derivative transactions under the same master agreement. For a critical commentary of the decision, see Javier Solana, ‘Swaps y Concurso: Reflexiones a Propósito de La Sentencia Del Tribunal Supremo Núm. 629/2015, de 17 de Noviembre’ [2016] La Ley mercantil 2.

207 See article 71(4) BRRD.

208 See article 44(3) BRRD.
advocated for legislative reform elsewhere. Until that happens, the diverse treatment of liabilities arising from derivatives contracts across the different insolvency laws of the EU Member States could introduce frictions in the effective application of the EU bank resolution framework. These frictions further support our call for legislative reform.

iv. Contractual Subordination

If bank resolution, and bail-in in particular, is about ensuring that losses are absorbed by the bank, holders of “subordinated” instruments, broadly conceived to encompass subordinated debt and equity, play a determinant role. It is therefore necessary to discuss the role of subordination provisions under insolvency law.

Debts may be subordinated as a result of contractual agreement (“contractual subordination”), the application of statutory provisions (“statutory subordination”) or court order to avoid unfair results (“equitable subordination”). In the specific context of banking groups, we may also see structural subordination as a reflection of the group’s corporate structure. Here we refer to contractual subordination issues, dealing with statutory, equitable, and structural subordination in the next sub-section.

The terms “contractual subordination” and “subordination agreements” can refer both to agreements that subordinate the payment of a certain (typically unsecured) debt to the payment of another debt, and to agreements amongst secured creditors that establish the order of priority of their security rights. In the US, each of these two types of subordination agreements are referred to as “payment subordination” and “lien subordination”, respectively. In civil law countries, the second type tends to be seen as an agreement that is circumscribed to the specific security or collateral, not as a subordination agreement. Our concern here is thus with the first type, i.e. payment subordination.

Contractual subordination is admissible in jurisdictions like England, Germany, Spain, and France as well as in the United

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210 In fact, in the bail-in sequence envisaged in article 43 (2) BRRD, letters (a), (b) and (c) are dedicated to Tier 1, Tier 2 capital, and subordinated debt.
212 In Re Maxwell Communications Corp PLC (No 2) ChD [1993] 1 WLR 1402.
213 § 39 para. 2 Insolvency Statute.
214 Insolvency Act art. 92.
States. Despite the widespread admissibility of subordination agreements, their enforceability can be problematic, particularly if it would alter the priority ranking laid down in insolvency law and the *pari passu* principle. Generally, agreements that affect priorities and ranking (i) cannot impose additional burdens on the insolvent estate; and (ii) need to be consented by the parties whose rights are at stake.

Yet subordination agreements offer variations. We can distinguish at least between (i) agreements for “full” and “partial” subordination, depending on whether a creditor agrees to be subordinated to all ordinary creditors or only to specific creditors; and (ii) “agreements between creditors” and “agreements with the debtor”. It makes sense for “full” subordination agreements to be concluded with the debtor, but this may be also desirable in partial subordination agreements.

With these basic categories in mind, jurisdictions vary in their approach to the validity and enforceability of subordination agreements. Countries like France have no general doctrine of contract subordination, and subordinated securities or loans are often based on specific statutory provisions. Others, like Germany or Spain, have explicit provisions that render enforceable full subordination agreements, but say nothing of partial subordination ones.

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216 Section § 510 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 510(a), stipulates that “A subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law,” which means that a two-step test will be needed to establish enforceability.

217 Christoph G Paulus & Matthias Berberich, *National Report for Germany*, in *Ranking and Priority of Creditors*, 300 (Dennis Faber, Niels Vermunt, Jason Kilborn, Tomas Richter & Ignacio Tirado, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (2016)).


219 Although subordination agreements are allowed, for example between creditors secured by a same asset, there is no general doctrine of contractual subordination. Gilles Cumberti & Isabelle Rueda, *National Report for France in Ranking and Priority of Creditors*, 260-61 (Dennis Faber, Niels Vermunt, Jason Kilborn, Tomas Richter & Ignacio Tirado, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (2016)).

220 Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [Insolvency Statute], Oct. 5, 1994, BGB1 §39(1) (Ger.). In Germany, the debt subject to such agreements does not count for purposes of determining a balance sheet insolvency.
Let us illustrate the specific problems that might arise from contractual subordination in the context of bank resolution with an example.

**Example. Categories of debt and interpretative problems**
A1 and A2 are two banks that partly fund themselves with deposits: A1’s deposits are mostly retail, while A2 has a base of large corporate deposits. The two also have interbank deposits between them, and with other entities, A3 and A4. Besides this, both banks provide custody services to clients, and A2 to counterparties such as hedge funds (together with prime brokerage services). A2 uses the same clearing and settlement accounts to clear and settle proprietary trades, and trades on behalf of clients, and for its own transactions it uses counterparties’ money and instruments as collateral, many of which are pooled in omnibus accounts held by A3. To fund their expansion in, respectively, the retail and corporate markets, A2 has obtained a loan facility from a syndicate of several banks (B1-B3) which includes a loan agreement and an inter-creditor agreement that organizes the rights from more senior (B1) to more junior (B3). A1 for its part has issued subordinated and non-subordinated bonds, the majority of which (but not all) are held by A3. To hedge against FX and interest rate risk, the entities have concluded hedging agreements with A3, although A2 has also hedged the FX risk of the syndicated loan facility through a derivative with B1.

In this example, the status of subordinated bonds would be less problematic, but the laws of France, Germany or Spain could pose problems for the loan facility with B1-B3, or in reconciling it with the other subordination clauses if A1 and A2 entered insolvency.

In England, although subordination agreements are valid, they are typically enforced between creditors, not vis-à-vis the insolvency administration, and they are often structured through a trust, where insolvency proceeds are received by the junior creditor on trust for the senior creditor. This could spell trouble if, for example, A1 and A2 entered insolvency, D were an English creditor and senior over B, but the latter was located outside England (say, France) and entered insolvency as well. In this case, the trust would have to be enforced against A1-A2 and/or B.

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221 In Re Maxwell Communications Corp PLC (No 2) ChD [1993] 1 WLR 1402.
222 See Re SSSL Realisations (2002) Ltd [2005] 1 BCLC (where the court also had to decide whether the trust agreed upon by the parties had to be re-characterized as a charge subject to registration (the court decided in the negative)).
In the United States, the trust device operates as a matter of law if the debtor were a party to the agreement, but the situation is more complicated if it were not. Furthermore, the agreement will only be enforceable if it is enforceable under the applicable non-bankruptcy law. This can be a source of uncertainty if A1-A2 are located in the United States but one of the loan facilities is subject to French law, for example, which has no general doctrine of subordination.

B. Intra-group Funding

The previous section has illustrated the tension at the level of policy and principle that may crystalize in bank resolution if the bail-in tool is deployed over a bank’s complex funding structure. To have a complete picture of that funding structure, we need to add the dimension that compares “external” with “intra-group” funding. The last category of debt analysed above provides a smooth transition, since intra-group funding is, to a large extent, characterized by subordination issues (III.B.1). We then discuss the relevance of the intra-group dimension beyond subordination (III.B.2).

i. Subordinated Debt in Bank Groups

If the discussion of contractual subordination above showed an important level of uncertainty over the enforceability of the agreements, the picture is even more uncertain for statutory subordination due to the significant differences between jurisdictions and categories of debt, although intra-group debt remains the more relevant category for our purposes. In Germany, the country that first provided for a doctrine of subordination of shareholder loans, that doctrine stems from corporate

224 Ibid. In that case, the junior creditor must transfer the money to the senior creditor, who nonetheless has not been satisfied by the debtor himself, which means that he can fully recover the amounts owed by the debtor. The junior creditor, however, has a right of “subrogation”, which is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment. See also Michael S. Quinn, “Subrogation, Restitution and Indemnity,” 74 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1388-90 (1996).
226 Categories of subordinated debt include debt for interests and penalties in Germany and Spain, claims filed late in Spain, claims for deferred unsecured provable debts and non-provable liabilities in England, costs incurred by creditors due to participation in the proceedings, and claims for which no consideration is due by the debtor in Germany, claims by bad faith counterparts in transactions subject to avoidance, or under executory contracts when the court is satisfied that the counterpart is obstructing the execution of the contract in the interest of the insolvency proceedings in Spain. See Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [Insolvency Statute], Oct. 5, 1994, BGB1 §39(1) (Ger.).
law principles of capital raising (Kapitalaufbringung) and capital maintenance (Kapitalerhaltung). The doctrine of “equity-replacing loans” tried to dissuade shareholders from supplying funds via loans instead of equity by subordinating the loans granted in circumstances where a shareholder with the diligence of a prudent businessperson would have granted equity, typically in times of crisis; a rule whose scope was broadened once it was incorporated into insolvency law. The foundation of the rule lies in the “equity-replacing” character of the loans, and in the shareholders’ responsibility for funding a company in times of crisis.

The logic of preventing opportunistic behaviour by shareholders also inspired Spanish rule-making in the same domain, but the risk of using of open-textured concepts like “equity-replacing” or “prudent”, and case-by-case variations, led to a stricter rule that automatically subordinates loans by “especially related” parties. Despite criticism, this approach has inspired more recent German rules that omit the “equity-replacing” requirement for the loan and subordinate all shareholder loans, thus sacrificing flexibility for certainty. Italian law also subordinates shareholder loans; although it uses the German original approach and makes subordination conditional on the existence of a situation of a debt “imbalance” or a financial situation where an equity contribution would have been “reasonable”.

The United States makes these adjustments through the use of equitable subordination, which normally requires that a creditor’s “inequitable conduct” results in an “unfair advantage”. Alternatively, a

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227 Id. at §39(1), (4), (5), (135). Spanish Insolvency Act art. 92(5) and 93 (R.D.L. 2014, 1664) (Spain).
228 BGH, NJW (1995) pp. 326, 329. The principles of capital raising and maintenance require shareholders to raise the registered capital in full, and subsequently maintain and protect it, and encourage them to provide additional equity capital in times of crisis.
230 See e.g., Carmen Alonso Ledesma, El automatismo en la subordinación de créditos y la posición de las entidades de crédito in IMPLICACIONES FINANCIERAS DE LA LEY CONCURSAL, 175-83 (Alberto Alonso Ureba & Juana Pulgar Ezquerra, LA LEY, 2009).
232 Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [Insolvency Statute], Oct. 5, 1994, BGBI §39(1)(5), (4-5) (Ger.). The rules exempt only non-managing shareholders holding less than 10% of shares, and creditors who acquire shares in the company as a rescue attempt in case of illiquidity or balance sheet insolvency.
233 Article 2467 Italian Civil Code.
234 See Section § 510 (c) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 510 (c).
235 As a final condition, equitable subordination must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
bankruptcy court may use its equitable powers\textsuperscript{236} to re-characterise a debt claim as an equity claim\textsuperscript{237} although some courts have not clarified whether they consider re-characterization admissible under equitable powers.\textsuperscript{238} Being procedural powers, however, they are deployed on a case-by-case basis, which is a source of uncertainty. In addition, their use is not limited to debt claims by “insiders”,\textsuperscript{239} which means that they provide no firm basis to determine the status of intra-group funding, i.e. there is no “law of shareholder/intra-group loans” nor can precedents be easily extrapolated to the resolution context, where the procedure and powers are different.

A final point of US Law that connects with the issues that will be revisited below is the “source-of-strength” doctrine, which is not part of


\textsuperscript{237} See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 749 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding an authoritative 11-point test, which emphasizes the insufficiency of funds of the subsidiary through undercapitalization or otherwise). The possibility to recharacterize a debt claim as an equity claim under the court’s general powers is also admitted by courts in the Third Circuit, In re SubMicron Sys., 432 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2006), the Fourth Circuit, Dornier Aviation (North America), Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Dornier Aviation), 453 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2006), and the Tenth Circuit, Sender v. Bronze Group, Ltd. (In re Hedged Investments Assocs., Inc.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004).

\textsuperscript{238} This is the case of the Seventh Circuit. See FCC v. Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc. (In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc.), 616 F.3d 642, 657 n. 11 (7th Cir. 2010). Furthermore, other courts, notably those of the Fifth Circuit, have not used the more general powers of Section § 105, but Section § 502 (b) (1) of the Code, which provides for the power to object to, or disallow, claims based on the applicable laws and rules. See In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 542–43 (5th Cir. 2011), or In re Fitness Holdings International, Inc., 2013 WL 1800000, *1 (9th Cir. April 30, 2013).

\textsuperscript{239} The definition of “insider” is found in Section § 101 (31) of the Bankruptcy Code, and it includes directors and controlling parties. The standard of review is more exacting in case of “insiders”, but subordination is also possible in case of non-insiders, although “gross and egregious conduct will be required before a court [can] equitably subordinate a claim”. See Waslow v. MNC Commercial Corp. (In re Paolella & Sons, Inc.), 161 B.R.107, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993). Then, subordination in case of insiders may be denied in case there has been no harm to creditors as a result of the funding by insiders, because subordination is remedial, not punitive. See Wooley v Faulkner, In re SI restructuring, Inc., 532 F. 3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008). In a recharacterization case, such as In re Lothian Oil, Inc., 650 F.3d 539, 542–43 (5th Cir. 2011) the court held that the powers could be exercised beyond loans by insiders.
insolvency law, but of the law of bank group supervision.\textsuperscript{240} Grounded in the broad language of the Bank Holding Company Act section granting powers to the Federal Reserve Board (the “Fed”) as a supervisor,\textsuperscript{241} the latter used the said doctrine to demand parent holding companies to be a “source of strength” for their subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{242} This doctrine was considered valid by the courts,\textsuperscript{243} but the actual scope of the Board’s powers to force a parent holding company to contribute funds to its subsidiary remained unclear.\textsuperscript{244} Yet the Fed or the FDIC could use the


\textsuperscript{241} Section 3 (c) (2) required the Board to take into consideration “the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the Company or companies” before deciding on a transaction subject to its approval, including the authorization for a company to become a holding company.

\textsuperscript{242} The more specific formulation by the Board was made in Regulation Y, of 1984, where it expressly stated that “bank holding company shall serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks and shall not conduct its operations in an unsafe or unsound manner” (Section 225.4(a)(1) of Regulation Y, 49 Fed. Reg. 794 (1984)), and, in 1987, where the Board published a policy statement stating that a bank holding company “should stand ready to use available resources to provide adequate capital funds to its subsidiary banks during periods of financial stress”, and it would be considered “unsafe and unsound” in the absence of this. However, the Board’s refused to authorize bank holding companies on that basis, a policy that was challenged, and reviewed judicially, during the 70s.

\textsuperscript{243} First Lincolnwood bank challenged the Board’s power to refuse authorization of a holding company on the sole grounds of an absence of “source of strength”. The 7\textsuperscript{th} Circuit Court considered that the Board had exceeded its powers, because its powers allowed it to restrict unsafe practice, such as the increase of debt, but not to impose new requirements if the transaction itself (the creation of a parent holding company) would represent no change in the group’s financial profile. See First Lincolnwood Corp. v. Board of Governors, 560 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1977). However, the Supreme Court reversed the 7\textsuperscript{th} Circuit decision, holding that this was a legitimate use of the Board’s powers. See First Lincolnwood Corp. v. Board of Governors 439 U.S. 234 (1978).

\textsuperscript{244} In 1988 the Board issued a cease-and-desist order against MCorp, a multibank holding company, as engaging in “unsafe and unsound practices”, and required it to use all available assets to recapitalize the subsidiary banks suffering capital deficiencies. This was followed by a declaration of insolvency and receivership by the FDIC, and a bankruptcy petition. MCorp sought, and obtained, a court order enjoining the Board from supervisory action based on the source-of-strength doctrine. In re MCorp, 101 B. R. 483 (S.D. Tex. 1989). The order was appealed by the Board. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the
doctrine to force the parent holding companies’ commitment to recapitalize subsidiaries. As a result of a modification of the Bankruptcy Code, parent’s “commitments” made to a regulatory agency to cure any deficit or to maintain the capital of the subsidiary now have priority, which means that the agency can obtain the payment as a precondition for restructuring. This shows that subordinating a parent’s loans can be equivalent to forcing it to make fresh contributions.

The relevance of parent-subsidiary, especially the holding-subsidiary relationship in the banking context, justifies distinguishing structural subordination as a fourth category. Here, subordination does not result from agreement, law, or court powers, but from the very structure of the banking group. Once the assets are held by operating subsidiaries (the parent holding’s assets being mostly the subsidiaries’ shares), third-party funding to the parent will necessarily be subordinated to subsidiaries’ funding vis-à-vis the subsidiaries’ assets. This operation is an example of resolution planning and will be analysed in section IV.B.

ii. Intra-group Operational Debt

As seen above, the law generally tries to dissuade groups from adopting strategies that replace equity or subordinated funding with ordinary liabilities. The ultimate tool to accomplish this is subordination; but, as we will see now, subordination is combined with the exclusion of intra-group debt from categories of debt that receive preferential treatment from the law. Although this principle is generally sound, in light of the absence of arm’s length conditions, it can disrupt banks’ intra-group funding structures, which involve “sensitive” types of operational debt. Following the order of section III.A, we will discuss intra-group deposits and short-term funding, management of client money and client assets, and derivatives.

Starting with deposits, these are generally excluded from bail-in and protected by insolvency rules, but this does not encompass interbank
deposits or deposits with other financial institutions, which include intra-group bank deposits.\textsuperscript{245} Considering short-term debt more broadly, claims from short-term loans are “out” of bail-in. Therefore, there is an incentive to use these loans to replace corporate or interbank deposits, which are “in.” Yet this strategy is not available in intra-group situations since intra-group short-term liabilities are not left “out” of bail-in.\textsuperscript{246}

The problem of intra-group deposits is not only that they are “in” bail-in; they may also be subordinated to ordinary creditors in countries with specific statutory subordination rules (e.g., Spain or Germany) or countries that use equitable subordination (e.g., the United States) if a court sees them as part of a strategy to defraud ordinary creditors. This can raise interpretative issues.

If rules subordinate “hidden equity contributions” posing as shareholder loans, like traditional German rules did, this creates important classification problems. If rules are simpler and subordinate all intra-group loans, they may still not subordinate liabilities ‘different from loans or acts with analogous finality’, like the Spanish rules do,\textsuperscript{247} which raises the question of whether an inter-bank deposit has an “analogous finality” to a loan.\textsuperscript{248} This would largely depend on whether the relevant authority or court accepts a finalistic construction of the rule that sees it as a provision dissuading from opportunistic behaviour but not from managing intra-group liquidity. If bail-in were deployed over some liabilities but not others it would be contrary to resolution policies, which try to preserve “critical functions”.\textsuperscript{249} In countries where “equitable

\textsuperscript{245} They are excluded from the definition of “covered deposits”, under Directive 2014/49/EU Article 5(1)(a), (d) and (e), and do not fall within any of the categories under Directive 2014/59/EU Article 108(a)(i) or (ii).

\textsuperscript{246} Directive 2014/59/EU Article 44(2)(e) excludes from bail-in “liabilities to institutions, excluding entities that are part of the same group, with an original maturity of less than seven days.”

\textsuperscript{247} Article 92. 5\textsuperscript{o} Spanish Insolvency Act.

\textsuperscript{248} Here we are weighing different interpretations, which always consider the intention of the agreement, relying on the reference to ‘finality’, and leaving out a strict and formal reading of the agreement’s typified, or objective, causa. For a discussion of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ or finalistic causa, see L. Diez Picazo Fundamentos del Derecho Civil Patrimonial Vol. I. 2007. Even considering the ‘objective legal nature’ of the agreement, the bank deposit, as an ‘irregular deposit’, lacks a specific regulation in the Civil code, which means that its regime is assimilated to that of the loan. The significant difference would be that, under this assumption, each deposit should invariably be the subject of separate treatment, and the treatment of the intra-group liquidity management arrangement as a whole should cease to be an option.

\textsuperscript{249} Against this, one could still argue that resolution rules try to incentivize groups to clarify their internal arrangements, corporate and otherwise, and that carving-out an exception to the subordination rules for intra-group deposits on grounds that the arrangement has a different “finality” to a loan weakens that incentive.
subordination” is used, like the United States, it seems less likely that an authority or court would consider intra-group deposits as an instance of fraud or harm to creditors.

In light of these difficulties, bank groups will continue to place intra-group deposits in the context of broader schemes for the management of liquidity and instruments, backed by collateral arrangements and set-off or netting clauses, which benefit from protections for financial collateral. Yet this can give rise to other interpretative problems. For example, resolution rules exclude from bail-in those liabilities arising from holding client money or client assets. In the Lehman Brothers (Client Money) case discussed earlier, courts determined that “clients” enjoyed proprietary protection despite the commingling of their funds; but the commingling was due to the intra-group funding structure, where clients’ balances were used to cover the liquidity needs of group entities, with a “reconciliation” being operated later. This would raise the question whether, in such a case, liabilities incurred with clients could be effectively separated from liabilities incurred with group entities.

Even if intra-group arrangements are not protected as liabilities arising from ‘client money or instruments’, the liabilities resulting from those intra-group arrangements may be protected as liabilities arising from a ‘fiduciary arrangement’ or as “secured liabilities”. Yet the complexity of intra-group arrangement can give rise to important classification problems, which raises the question of how much certainty is needed from the private law of credit and security, and insolvency law before a certain class of liabilities is excluded.

Consider the category of liabilities arising from “fiduciary arrangements”. In another Lehman case, Pearson v Lehman Brothers Finance, generally known by the acronym RASCALS, the group had a system for the acquisition of securities: every time a group company would acquire securities, the “hub” company (i.e. LBIE, the parent company for Europe) would hold all the securities for the account of the

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250 For example, Directive 2002/47/EC Articles 4, 6 and 7 protect the enforcement of financial collateral arrangements, the recognition of title transfer financial collateral arrangements, and that of close-out netting provisions, respectively.


252 Supra section III.A.2.


254 We must also remember that courts also granted protection to counterparties, such as hedge funds, as ‘clients’ under Primer Brokerage arrangements. See Lomas v RAB Market Cycles (Master Fund) Limited [2009] EWHC 2545 (Ch).

255 Article 44 (2) (b) and (d) BRRD.

group affiliate and would use the securities for its own purposes, e.g. lending them for liquidity management, selling them to meet short positions within the group, etc., while crediting the affiliate for whom it held the securities with the securities’ value and any income accruing from it, e.g. interest or dividend. The securities would be repo-ed on a daily basis to LBIE, using an automated system for the period during which securities would be held inside the group. After Lehman entered insolvency and the automated transfer system was stopped, the question before the court eventually was the identity of the beneficial owner of the securities. Against the objections of LBIE’s administrators, the court held that the automated system only made sense if the parties assumed that the beneficial ownership had been transferred to the affiliates,257 which could only happen if LBIE was a trustee for the securities, which revealed a sufficient intention to create a trust.258

Consider now the category of “secured liabilities” in the context of yet another case in the Lehman Brother’s saga, the so-called Lehman Brothers ’Extended Liens’ case.259 In that case, the European parent company (LBIE) held securities for group entities, including Lehman Brothers Finance (LBF), as part of a Master Custody Agreement (“MCA”), signed between LBIE and LBF, which was instrumental for the intra-group management of financial instruments. Pursuant to that agreement, LBIE, as custodian, held a “lien” over those assets, which secured not only the debts of affiliates to LBIE, the parent company, but also the debts of affiliates to any other affiliate within the Lehman group (hence the term “extended liens”260). LBIE’s “lien” was subject to a sui generis clause, copied from client custody agreements, and pasted on an intra-group agreement for cash and instruments management.261

This posed important characterization problems. Under English law, a “lien” is a possessory security interest, which cannot be perfected over non-movables, which meant that the security interest had to be re-characterized as a charge,262 and, more specifically, as a floating charge.263 The ruling also discussed whether EU financial collateral rules

257 Ibid.
259 In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch).
261 The clause was initially developed for client custody agreements. It is reproduced in In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at 32.
262 Ibid at 34-48.
263 Ibid at 70. Ever since Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41, English courts look at the substance of the security interest to characterize a charge as fixed or floating.
could apply to the arrangement. Justice Briggs held that, although a floating charge compliant with the FCD was possible in theory, the FCD introduced a requirement of “possession or control,” which was not satisfied, given that, in the accounts LBIE held for LBF as custodian, LBF retained uncontrolled rights of recall and disposal. Finally, Justice Briggs held that any security right held by LBIE was not held under an implied fiduciary arrangement for the benefit of the other group companies, which meant that, in deciding whether and how to exercise the security right, LBIE would take into account its own business judgment, and would not be constrained by a fiduciary duty towards its affiliates. Although the conclusion was quite well reasoned, some might find it surprising that the potential opportunism of the parent within a group would not be contained by fiduciary duties or a similar kind of constraint.

Therefore, if a group uses some kind of “floating” right for its intra-group cash and collateral management arrangements to be operational,

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264 *In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe*, [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at 135.


266 *Ibid* at 147. Another point was whether the FCD imposed a requirement for collateral arrangements to be ‘bilateral’ in order for FCD rules to apply, which Briggs J concluded, it did not. The court did so in spite of references to ‘bilateral collateral arrangements’ in recital (3) of the Directive, which it took more as a reference to mark the contrast with Directive 98/26/EC, on Settlement and Finality Systems.

267 *In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe*, [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at 205-211.

268 As an example: “[T]he Lehman group’s business was not generally managed on a company by company basis, but on a product by product basis, so that the interests of the group would be in the forefront of the minds of relevant business managers when deciding whether, and if so to what extent, to exercise rights over the property of street clients,” In that context, “the very existence of ill-defined fiduciary obligations would be an impediment to the sensible and practical making of business decisions in relation to the exercise of the rights in clause 13 [the general lien].” Thus, subjecting LBIE to a fiduciary duty “would require LBIE to maintain a constant watch upon the day to day account balances between each of its clients (the subject of an MCA in this standard form) and each of its many affiliates. It would enable an affiliate with a modest debt to demand enforcement in circumstances where to do so would gravely prejudice a continuing business relationship between LBIE and the client in question, or between some other affiliate and the same client”. In the matter of *Lehman Brothers International Europe*, [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at 208-210.

269 See n. 268, supra. Indeed, in Justice Briggs’ reasoning, it was the particular dynamics of the Lehman group that justified LBIE’s decisions based on its business judgment.
such arrangements may be mired in uncertainty. Floating securities are valid in several countries; but UK rules, for example, rank creditors under floating securities behind creditors with fixed security and other preferred creditors (e.g. for winding-up or administration expenses, pension contributions, or wages), and carve-out a percentage of the assets subject to the floating charge (“net assets”) for the satisfaction of ordinary, unsecured, creditors. Other countries, like Sweden, have rules that characterize the charge as a mere privilege over 55% of the debtor’s assets, ranking after all special priorities. Other countries, like Italy, consider “floating securities” valid, but have no specific insolvency rules. Some, like Germany, do not contemplate floating securities, while others, like Spain, may allow things similar to a floating security but with a restricted scope.

270 See s. 176ZA (winding-up expenses); Schedule B1 para. 99 (3) (administration expenses); and s. 175(2) (b) in relation to s. 386 and Schedule 6 paras. 8-9 Insolvency Act 1986. The resulting ranking upon insolvency was thus stated by Lord Neuberger in Re Nortel GmbH [2014] AC 209 (SC) at [39]. The order set out in that decision is (1) creditors with a fixed security; (2) expenses of insolvency proceedings; (3) preferential creditors; (4) floating charge creditors; (5) unsecured probable debts; (6) statutory interests in probable debts; (7) deferred, unsecured, probable debts; (8) non-provable liabilities; (9) shareholders’ return on capital and (10) shareholders’ distribution of surplus.

271 The prescribed part is a 50% of the first £10,000 of assets subject to the floating charge, and 20% of the remaining part, with a limit of £600,000. See article 3 Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003 SI 2003/2097. Since the amount of assets carved out for unsecured creditors is capped at £600,000, the impact should presumably be lesser in case of banks.

272 Priority Rights Act, s. 4 and 5.

273 In Italy, the Decree Law n. 59 of 3 May 2016, later transformed into Act 119/2016, introduced the pledge without dispossession, which also admitted the possibility for the debtor to dispose of the assets, in which case the pledge would fall over the proceeds/assets that replaced the original collateral. See article 1 (2) Decree Law 59 of 2016. According to article 1 (8), however, in order for the creditor to enforce its security over the collateral it would have to be recognized, first, as creditor with privilege. Article 1 (6) states that the creditor protected by a non-possessory pledge could not be used against a creditor who funds the acquisition of a specific asset with a reservation of title or pledge over that asset. The provisions do not expressly address the relationship with other secured creditors, or with creditors with general privilege, e.g. workers.

274 Articles 21-22 of the Act of 16 December 1964, on Mortgages over Movable and Non-Possessory Pledge provides for the extension of the mortgage right over commercial establishments over the goods that are part of the trade, which, by definition, are constantly purchased and sold, and article 54 of the same act permits a non-possessory pledge over receivables. In combination, they could provide some basis to something close to a floating security, but the basis is too narrow to give rise to a full-fledge version of it. See David Ramos Munoz, ‘Transacciones Trascendentes. Operaciones Fuera de Balance, Disociación de la Propiedad y Problemas Regulatorios, Patrimoniales y de Gobierno’, 125 REVISTA DE DERECHO BANCARIO Y BURSÁTIL 216, 231 (2012).
Financial collateral rules that pre-empted traditional law of credit and security, like the FCD does, were the way to sidestep this uncertainty: they created specific security rights with relatively few formal requirements which could be recognizable and enforced across borders. The Extended Liens case, however, cast a long shadow of doubt over the ability to “fit” a floating security as a financial collateral arrangement subject to a “possession or control” requirement.

To top it all, resolution rules completely exclude from bail-in “secured liabilities” and “liabilities arising from fiduciary arrangements” without making any distinction. Thus, resolution authorities would have to first decide whether the security qualifies as a protected financial collateral arrangement; and, if so, they would most likely exclude the liability from bail-in. Yet, if they could not classify it as a protected financial collateral arrangement, they would have to classify it under the applicable private law, and determine whether, under that law, it is a secured liability or not. This could create friction between (i) the private law of security interests and secured transactions; (ii) the insolvency law hypothetically applicable; and (iii) resolution rules, if they are susceptible of a self-referenced interpretation.

Presumably, resolution authorities would decide, first, whether the security qualifies as a “financial collateral arrangement” under the FCD, because that would automatically exclude it. The difficulty would arise if the arrangement were considered to fall outside the FCD. In that case, the second step would be for resolution authorities to decide which is the law (or laws) applicable to the arrangement, a task for which there are no uniform conflict rules. Simultaneously, resolution authorities would need to determine which assets are subject to which law. If the authority manages to find a suitable conflicts-of-laws rule, the third step would be

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275 In the case MJA and others c. Bank of London and The Middle East PLC decided with Arrêt n° 627 of 7 December 2015 (14-18.435) ECLI:FR:CCASS:2015:AP00627, the French Civil chamber of the Cour de cassation in plenary session applied the FCD to a non-possessory pledge over stocks, and in so doing it overruled the finding of the court of appeal, which had decided that, despite the existence of FCD rules, the parties had chosen to regulate the relationship through the rules of the Civil code (the issue concerned the validity of the pacte commissoire, by which the secured creditor can seize the asset and obtain its ownership in case of default).

276 See e.g. article 3 of the FCD.

277 In relation to the suitability of floating security interests over cash collateral kept in bank accounts to qualify as “financial collateral arrangements” under the FCD, see Case C 156/15 Private Equity Insurance Group SIA v. Swedbank AS.

278 Article 44 (2) (b) BRRD.

279 Article 21 of Directive 2001/24/EC on the Reorganisation and Winding Up of Credit Institutions (the Bank Winding Up Directive) does not provide a conflicts-of-laws rule but a mutual recognition rule, which requires, first, to determine which is the law applicable to the rights in re.
to determine whether the type of security arrangement is admissible and enforceable for a specific asset pool under the applicable national law.

Even if the law confirms the validity and enforceability of the arrangement, it leaves one final doubt as to whether the conditions and exceptions imposed by that law may raise doubts regarding whether the liability qualifies as a “secured liability” under resolution rules, and thus must be excluded. In principle, the definition of “secured liability” is very broad and relies on the classification under domestic laws. However, resolution authorities may be reluctant to grant full exclusion to something that looks like a mere “general preferential right” rather than a secured liability.

This leaves the final issue of intra-group derivatives exposures, where classification problems look no less daunting. In the same way that groups adopt liquidity management strategies, they may adopt group-level hedging strategies to reduce the overall cost by using internal hedges between group entities to minimize the (more expensive) external hedges, and then using investment-grade parties for external hedging purposes.

Let us illustrate complexity with an example.

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**Example. Categories of debt and interpretative problems**

A1 and A2 are two banks that partly fund themselves with deposits: A1’s deposits are mostly retail, while A2 has a base of large corporate deposits. The two also have interbank deposits between them, and with other entities, A3 and A4. Besides this, both banks provide custody services to clients, and A2 to counterparties such as hedge funds (together with prime brokerage services). A2 uses the same clearing and settlement accounts to clear and settle proprietary trades, and trades on behalf of clients, and for its own transactions it uses counterparties’ money and instruments as collateral, many of which are pooled in omnibus accounts held by A3. To fund their expansion in, respectively, the retail and corporate markets, A2 has obtained a loan facility from a syndicate of several banks (B1-B3) which includes a loan agreement and an inter-creditor agreement that organizes the rights from more senior (B1) to more junior (B3). A1 for its part has issued subordinated and non-subordinated bonds, the majority of which (but not all) are held by A3. To hedge against FX and interest rate risk, the entities have concluded hedging agreements with A3, although A2 has also hedged the FX risk of the syndicated loan facility through a derivative with B1.

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280 Article 2 (1) (67) BRRD states that: “’secured liability’ means a liability where the right of the creditor to payment or other form of performance is secured by a charge, pledge or lien, or collateral arrangements including liabilities arising from repurchase transactions and other title transfer collateral arrangements;”
Here, save for isolated cases, such as A2’s specific derivative agreement with B1, A3 acts as group treasurer, with two types of strategies: A3 either concludes specific hedging agreements with counterparties, e.g. for specific credit risks, and then concludes back-to-back hedging agreements with the corresponding group entity; or, for broader risks, such as FX, it concludes “macro/portfolio” hedging agreements with counterparties, and then concludes multiple intra-group hedges subject to netting agreements. To lower the cost, A3 receives a guarantee from A4, its own parent.

Intra-group derivatives can be a source of uncertainty if their treatment varies across jurisdictions, especially in the case of non-collateralized derivatives, where the counterparty merely holds a personal right. The first problem is the risk of subordination in jurisdictions that provide so for intra-group loans. This depends on whether a derivative can be characterized as a “loan” or a “funding” agreement (see above). The fact that derivatives are used for “hedging” purposes should exclude subordination. Likewise, the enforcement of the netting agreements that typically accompany the conclusion of multiple derivatives (including between group entities) should not encounter any exception in intra-group agreements, nor should the preferential treatment enjoyed by the netted debt in some jurisdictions like Spain be excepted in intra-group cases.

Having said that, the picture of intra-group hedging strategies is bound to be complex and varied, and one cannot exclude that a specific structure of derivatives is used, or at least is seen by resolution authorities or courts as being used, for purposes of funding subsidiaries, or, conversely, for drawing resources from them. In such extreme cases, characterization and subordination, and the resulting risk of avoidance, would remain a possibility.

IV. LAYER 2: THE EX-ANTE (CRISIS PREVENTION) V. EX-POST (CRISIS MANAGEMENT) DIMENSION

The previous section has shown the tensions at the level of policy and principle between bank resolution, specifically the bail-in of debt instruments, and insolvency priorities at the intra-group dimension. This


282 Neither article 7 of the FCD, nor articles 76 (2) (d), or 77 make an express exception for cases where the ‘counterparty’ to the netting agreement is a group entity.

283 Supra 3.1.3.
section adds one more layer to the problem. This considers the relationship between the *ex post* crisis management rules, such as bail-in, which present the problems outlined before, and the regulatory rules that try to plan ahead and *ex ante* avoid those problems. The first sub-section discusses how the planning and prevention perspective has acquired an increasing importance under resolution rules, and how this has influenced additional changes in insolvency ranking (A). The second section discusses the interplay of the *ex-ante* prevention with the ‘external v. intra-group’ dimension (B).

### A. Ex-Ante Resolution Planning, TLAC/MREL Standards, and Tensions in Policy and Principle

Rules on *ex ante* resolution planning anticipate the problems arising from insolvency law and try to sidestep them by creating a new type of instrument that can guarantee loss absorbency (1). At a regional (that is, within the EU) level, this gives rise to implementation frictions due to the presence of diverging criteria in different countries (2). In general, however, this creates tensions at the level of policy, between financial stability and investor protection, and at the level of principle, due to considerations of proportionality (3).

#### i. TLAC and MREL Standards: Sidestepping the Problem of Insolvency Ranking?

Resolution rules include *ex post* tools, such as bail-in, which are deployed once the entity enters a critical stage, but also include rules to plan *ex ante* for the entity’s “recovery”284 and potential “resolution”.285 In these “living wills”, resolution authorities must anticipate any major obstacles to resolution (arising, *inter alia*, from complex corporate structures and financial arrangements), remove them, and devise a clear resolution strategy, including the use of one or more resolution tools. If bail-in is the chosen strategy, as it is in many large groups, the entity must have an adequate layer of capital and debt instruments to absorb losses and be recapitalized quickly.

This idea of “ear-marking” a layer of capital and debt has been the subject of harmonization efforts at a global and regional, i.e. EU level. At a global level, the key concept is Total Loss-Absorbency Capital (TLAC), espoused by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for Global

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284 Articles 5-9 BRRD.
285 Articles 10-18 BRRD.
Systemically Important Banks/Institutions (“G-SIBs/G-SIIs”). At an EU-level, the key concept is Minimum Requirements for Own Funds (MREL), which applies to all banks. In both cases, the idea is to use TLAC/MREL-eligible debt and equity to absorb losses and recapitalize the bank through conversion into equity, to ensure continuity of critical functions without taxpayer support (TLAC), or to leave a Core Equity Tier 1 (CET1) level compliant with prudential rules (MREL). TLAC and MREL standards, however, present some differences. These include their scope of application (G-SIIs v. all banks); level of uniformity (single common requirement v. case-by-case assessment); calculation; relationship with prudential requirements (TLAC is integrated with them, whilst MREL was initially conceived separately under the resolution framework); and the size of debt-to-equity,

286 See, e.g. FSB Total Loss-Absorbency Capacity Standard, 6 November 2014; and also its Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet 9 November 2015 (hereafter: TLAC Term Sheet). See also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Global systemically important banks: updated assessment methodology and the higher loss absorbency requirement July 2013.

287 Article 45 and recital (80) BRRD.

288 Article 45 (6) BRRD. That is, the entity needs to keep a capital level to keep the authorization under CRD (Directive 2013/36/EU) and CRR (Regulation 575/2013). This means “the need to ensure that, if the resolution plan anticipates that certain classes of eligible liabilities might be excluded from bail-in under Article 44(3) or that certain classes of eligible liabilities might be transferred to a recipient in full under a partial transfer, that the institution has sufficient other eligible liabilities to ensure that losses could be absorbed”.

289 TLAC requirements are the greater between a 16% of risk-weighted assets (from 1 January 2019, 18% from 1 January 2022) and the 6% of the assets used to calculate the leverage ratio under Basel rules (from 1 January 2019, 6,75% from 1 January 2022). See FSB TLAC Term Sheet no. 4, p. 10. Since MREL levels need to ensure a compliant CET1, and this is a risk-weighted ratio, MREL levels will vary depending on the specific circumstances of the entity. In addition to the achievement of resolution objectives, and the need to be compliant with CRD/CRR requirements after resolution, the elements to be considered include the size, business model, funding model and risk profile of the institution, the potential contribution of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme, and the adverse impact of the institution’s failure on financial stability. See article 45 (6) BRRD.

290 There are some differences regarding eligibility of debt, which affect the numerator, while, in the denominator, TLAC uses risk-weighted assets (RWA) and the assets used to calculate the leverage ratio, whereas MREL uses total liabilities and own funds (article 45 (1) BRRD) which may cause a problem of double counting.

291 See Financial Stability Board, Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution, Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet 5-6 (2015). Integration makes it easier, in the case of TLAC, to ensure that the calculation of firm-specific requirements is aligned for capital and MREL requirements.
“expected” to be at least 33% of TLAC, whereas there is no minimum expectation in the case of MREL. Yet, the potential frictions created by these differences led EU authorities to consider reforming MREL rules to ensure a better alignment with TLAC. This led to new rules in the resolution framework, but also in the prudential regulation framework (see below).

It is important to note that not all liabilities that are subject to bail-in will be TLAC/MREL-eligible. Insolvency laws vary across jurisdictions. Moreover, bail-in can also be disruptive if applied to “operational” liabilities. Thus, TLAC/MREL rules try to use planning to impose the duty to have enough “clean” liabilities to sidestep ranking and priority issues.

TLAC and MREL standards try to ensure the “cleanliness” or susceptibility to bail-in through a series of requirements, consisting of:

(i) a list of eligibility criteria; i.e. debt fully paid-in, unsecured and not subject to set-off/netting, 1-year remaining maturity, not redeemable, and not directly or indirectly funded by the resolution entity or related party;

(ii) a list of excluded liabilities, comprised of deposits, derivatives, non-contractual liabilities, including taxes, preferred liabilities, including secured liabilities, and other bail-in-excluded liabilities; and

(iii) (this one only for TLAC:) a requirement of “subordination” of TLAC-eligible instruments to TLAC-excluded liabilities,

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292 TLAC Term Sheet no. 6 para. 4, p. 12.
295 Regulation 2019/876 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit risk, market risk, exposures to central counterparties, exposures to collective investment undertakings, large exposures, reporting and disclosure requirements, and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (hereafter we will refer to the reformed provisions as CRR 5).
296 Entities subject to the FSB TLAC framework may use non-subordinated instruments to satisfy TLAC requirements only up to a limit of 2.5% of Risk-Weighted Assets. FSB TLAC Term Sheet no. 11, p. 16. See also article 72b (3) CRR 5, which allows non-subordinated instruments to qualify as TLAC up to a 3.5% of total risk exposures.
with some allowance for cases where there is no subordination or where the subordination is not full.\textsuperscript{297} Since MREL is calculated case-by-case, it depends on each entity and resolution strategy.\textsuperscript{298} Thus, the new TLAC rules modified this aspect to comply with the TLAC standard.\textsuperscript{299}

Another important difference is that the TLAC standard demanded TLAC instruments to be subordinated to non-TLAC liabilities, while expressly allowing entities to comply with that requirement using “contractual subordination,” “statutory subordination” (i.e. ear-marking debt that is junior in the insolvency ranking), or “structural subordination” (i.e. using debt issued by a “clean” holding company).\textsuperscript{300} The latter explicitly deals with the case of banking groups, an essential aspect that will be discussed in section III.B.1, and which, originally, MREL rules did not address. MREL rules, initially conceived as an extension of resolution rules rather than as a “semi-prudential” requirement, were less detailed. They did not require subordination beyond allowing statutory subordination, contractual subordination and “contractual bail-in”, which is similar, but not equivalent, to contractual subordination.\textsuperscript{301}

Reformed EU rules try to align MREL rules with TLAC approach, but not fully. They differentiate between G-SIs, and other banks subject to resolution, with a gradation of TLAC/MREL cushions (higher for the former, lower for the latter\textsuperscript{302}) subject to a phase-in.\textsuperscript{303} Furthermore, the

\textsuperscript{297} Subordination is not required if (i) the amount of excluded liabilities that rank \textit{pari passu} or junior to TLAC-eligible liabilities does not exceed 5% of the entity’s eligible external TLAC, (ii) the resolution authority has the authority to differentiate among \textit{pari passu} creditors in resolution, (iii) such differentiation would not give rise to a material risk of successful legal challenge or compensation claims, and (iv) this does not have a material impact on resolvability. See TLAC Term Sheet no. 11. Article 45 (4) BRRD includes the requirements for MREL-eligible debt
\textsuperscript{299} See Article 45d BRRD II, with reference to new Article 92a CRR 5.
\textsuperscript{300} TLAC Term Sheet nos. 9 (eligibility criteria), 10 (liabilities excluded from TLAC) and 11 (priority) pp. 14-15.
\textsuperscript{301} This means that the contract clauses need to explicitly state that, in case of bail-in, the debt will be written down or converted, and that, in case of insolvency, the debt will be subordinated. Article 45 (13) and (14) BRRD. Resolution authorities can, in the same decision where they set MREL levels, determine which part of MREL shall be met through contractual bail-in instruments.
\textsuperscript{302} See Articles 45d BRRD II and 92a CRR (G-SIs), and article 45c (3) BRRD II (other banks).
\textsuperscript{303} See, \textit{e.g.} Article 494 CRR (G-SIs) or 45m BRRD II (other banks).
calculation of MREL for GSIs is based on TLAC rules. However, EU rules also apply TLAC-based requirements to a new category of “top-tier banks” (more than 100 billion euros, or those “fished-in” by the authorities\textsuperscript{304}). Furthermore, MREL is still considered institution-specific, which means that it is calculated individually for other (i.e. non-GSIs, non-top-tier) banks, while GSIs and top-tier banks can be hit with additional requirements if justified by the situation of the bank.\textsuperscript{305} More important for present purposes, however, is the nature of the instruments that can be used to comply with TLAC/MREL (including subordination), which we discuss in the next section.

ii. What kind of (TLAC) Instruments? Regional Challenges to employ MREL in the EU, and the Risk of Fragmentation

The basic idea underpinning TLAC is simple: make bail-in easier to deploy. Yet due to the cost it imposes on banks, countries may have different priorities on how to allocate that cost. Indeed, the move from TLAC to MREL in the EU has broadened the scope of the concept to smaller banks, which, in turn, has made some adjustments necessary, e.g. the possibility to use non-subordinated debt to comply with MREL. Then, as EU law left some leeway to comply with MREL to Member States, they initially pursued different legislative strategies. The UK, like the US, adopted a strategy of “structural subordination”. Germany and Italy, on the other hand, followed a “statutory subordination” strategy, where they amended the insolvency ranking of existing debt instruments. Germany established that, in case of insolvency, subordinated senior unsecured bonds and similar debt instruments would be subordinated to other senior liabilities.\textsuperscript{306} Italy chose the opposite way, and simply gave

\textsuperscript{304} Article 45c (5) and (6) BRRD II (top-tier banks). Article 45m BRRD II applies to transitional arrangements.

\textsuperscript{305} Article 45d (1) (b) BRRD II. In addition to this, EU rules prevent resolution funds from making contributions unless an 8\% of Total Liabilities including Own Funds (TLOF) has been bailed-in (see, e.g. article 44 (5) (a) BRRD). Thus, in practice this 8\% TLOF provides an extra “floor” or minimum level of MREL.

\textsuperscript{306} See Section § 46f (5) et seq. of the German Banking Act \textit{(Kreditwesengesetz}, or KWG), and Section § 97 (1) para. 3rd. of the German Act on Recovery and Resolution, as introduced by the Resolution Mechanism Act \textit{(Abwicklungsmechanismusgesetz}, AbwMechG) of November 2015. The subordinated instruments included were bearer bonds, order bonds, and similar rights tradable in capital markets, as well as promissory note loans and registered bonds, with the express exclusion of debt instruments where the payment of principal or interest is subject to the occurrence/non-occurrence of an uncertain event, e.g. derivatives in securitised form. Section § 46f (7) German Banking Act.
preferential status to all bank deposits, including large corporate deposits and interbank deposits.\textsuperscript{307} Thus, this was more a statutory privilege than statutory subordination, strategy.

The advantage of this approach is that German and Italian banks could comply with MREL with their long-term non-operational debt without making any new issuance. The ECB concluded that German rules made senior debt TLAC/MREL compliant, but ineligible for ECB operations,\textsuperscript{308} but was more cautious about TLAC-eligibility of Italian banks’ senior debt: some operational liabilities, such as derivatives, still ranked \textit{pari passu} with senior unsecured bank debt.\textsuperscript{309}

Interestingly, both Italy and Germany chose to subordinate senior debt’s position under insolvency law. This would result in its subordination under resolution rules, while avoiding any issues concerning the No Creditor Worse-Off principle,\textsuperscript{310} or discriminatory treatment, since creditors would not be treated “worse” than under insolvency rules (they would be treated worse than they were under the preceding insolvency rules). Still, since both types of measures apply to existing rights, they could be challenged as a retroactive interference with property.\textsuperscript{311} By interfering with an ongoing process, the rules are not a case of strict retroactivity (\textit{echte Rückwirkung}), but of “not real retroactivity” (\textit{unechte Rückwirkung}) and are backed by German Supreme Court case law, validating, for example, the 2014 incorporation via statute of collective action clauses (CACs) in bonds outstanding at the time the measure was adopted.\textsuperscript{312}

Spain and France (especially the latter) introduced a new type of “Tier 3 debt”, which, in case of resolution, would be senior to Tier 2 debt

\begin{NB}
\textsuperscript{307} See the modifications to article 91 of the Legislative Decree No. 385 of 1 September 1993, Consolidated Law of Banking (TUB).
\textsuperscript{308} In the ECB’s view, they facilitated the implementation of the bail-in tool, and carried a lower contagion risk, by postponing financial liabilities to operational liabilities. Opinion of the ECB of 2 September 2015 on bank resolution (CON/2015/31), at 3.2.2-3.3 pp. 5-6 (and reference to articles 64 and 141 of the ECB Guideline (EU) 2015/510 (ECB/2014/60) on the Eurosystem operations on the issue of (in)eligibility.
\textsuperscript{309} Opinion of the ECB of 16 October 2015 on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (CON/2015/35), no. 3.7.1-3.7.2, pp. 13-14. TLAC-eligible debt must be subordinated to \textit{all} TLAC-excluded liabilities, i.e. not only deposits.
\textsuperscript{310} Opinion of the ECB of 2 September 2015 on bank resolution (CON/2015/31), at 3.2.2, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{311} Admittedly less likely so in Italy, where the rules establish a new privilege, than in Germany, where they subordinate senior debt.
\textsuperscript{312} Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 1, 2014, II ZR 381/13 (Ger.).
\end{NB}
but rank below other senior debt,313 such as derivatives, non-covered deposits, and other operational liabilities. This approach can be seen either as “contractual subordination”, since the debt must include specific contract clauses; or as “statutory subordination”, since specific legislative provisions regulate the debt’s insolvency or resolution ranking.314 The advantage of a Tier-3 approach is its legal certainty and “fairness,” as investors can know their status from the moment they subscribe the debt. Its disadvantage is the greater cost for banks to raise new TLAC/MREL-compliant debt.315

Even if each strategy may respond to each State’s perceived priorities, there may be trouble in cross-border cases. Suppose that an entity issues bonds subject to a clause providing their subordination and/or debt indicating its non-preferred status in case of insolvency and/or bail-in (i.e. the French/Spanish approach), but the applicable insolvency law is that of a “statutory subordination” country, such as Germany: Should the order be (1) subordinated bonds, (2) non-preferred bonds, (3) other senior bonds, and (4) other senior debt? Should subordinated and non-preferred bonds rank pari passu since German law makes no express allowance for “non-preferred” debt? Should they rank pari passu with senior bonds issued under German law, since the latter subordinates all senior bonds? If the applicable insolvency law is France’s, should the bonds with a subordination clause be deemed subordinated or “equivalent” to Tier-3 bonds? Would there be a difference if the clauses make reference to the bonds’ status in “insolvency,” “resolution,” or both?

The risk of uncertainty led to new legislative efforts to further harmonize the rules on insolvency hierarchy.316 To the already existing

313 See, e.g. Article L 613-30-3 French Financial and Monetary Code, articles 48 (1) (d) and (3). In Spain, see Additional Provision 14th of the Spanish Act 11/2015 on the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms. The Spanish provision is drafted in ‘subordination’ terms, but the broad language could be used to issue something similar to Tier-3 debt. Spanish banks, however, are not making much use of debt to comply with MREL.

314 Article 151 II and III of LOI n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique, JORF n°0287 10 December 2016, which modifies article L-613-30-3 in the French Monetary and Financial Code states that the provision applies to instruments issued, and to liquidation procedures opened, after the act’s entry into force. They do not apply retroactively to existing types of debt.


316 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on a roadmap to complete the Banking Union (June 17, 2016) (underlining the effort to “put forward a proposal on a common approach to the bank creditor hierarchy, to enhance legal certainty in case of
deposit preference, the new rules add a provision regulating a new kind
of senior debt with ‘non-preferred’ status, i.e. an EU-wide Tier-3 debt
with the following characteristics: (i) maturity of at least 1 year; (ii) no
features typical of derivatives; and (iii) explicit reference in contractual
documentation to the (lower) insolvency ranking. In line with the
French approach, the rules introduced a ranking for EU-Tier-3 debt
below ordinary unsecured debt, and above the CET1, Tier 1 and Tier 2
instruments. This was accompanied by transitional provisions, and
“grandfathering” provisions that protected different States’ previous
choices. Thus, (i) insolvency law shall apply to debt issued before the
new provisions entered into force; (ii) debt issued under the domestic
laws of Tier-3 countries, like France, shall have the same ranking as
Tier-3 debt under the new (EU-harmonized) rules, and (iii) for debt
issued under the laws of “statutory subordination” countries like
Germany or Italy, which split unsecured debt into two or more rankings,
or changed the ranking of some instruments in relation to others, the
rules say that those States may give the lowest ranking category of
ordinary debt the same ranking as “EU Tier-3 debt.” Thus, doubts
would arise only if a State in that situation decided otherwise, or simply
did not clarify the matter, in which case there would be a lack of
guidance about the hierarchy between “harmonized” debt (i.e. Tier-3
debt under harmonized rules) and ordinary debt subordinated by statute.
Another problem is the relationship between non-preferred debt and
subordinated debt issued for purposes of complying with TLAC,
especially if there are ambiguities in the contract language.

Yet, the rules show the difficulty of combining ex post and ex ante
approaches. While the ex post rules on insolvency hierarchy put Tier-3
debt below ordinary liabilities, ex ante prudential rules, with the aim of
complying with the international TLAC standard, include a long list of

resolution.”); see also Directive 2017/2399, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2017 amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards The Ranking
of Unsecured Debt Instruments in Insolvency Hierarchy (hereafter Directive on
Insolvency Hierarchy of Unsecured Debt Instruments).

317 New article 108 (2) BRRD II, by Directive on Insolvency Hierarchy of Unsecured
Debt Instruments.

318 New article 108 (2) and (3) BRRD II.

319 New article 108 (4) BRRD is the default provision, and states that insolvency laws
should apply to standard debt.

320 New article 108 (5) BRRD. The treatment is conditional upon the debt having the
features of 1-year maturity (or longer), no embedded derivatives, and an explicit
reference in the prospectus to its non-preferred status.

321 New article 108 (7) BRRD.
requirements for ‘eligible debt’\textsuperscript{322} which comprise the MREL-instruments requirements, plus others that try to ensure that the instruments are not subject to early redemption, acceleration or modification,\textsuperscript{323} plus, crucially, the requirement that MREL instruments must, in principle, be subordinated to non-MREL ones, at least for G-SIs and top-tier banks.\textsuperscript{324} This could give rise to interpretative difficulties if a bank issues both debt indicating its non-preferred status, and debt indicating its subordinated status. It would not be clear whether the former would qualify for MREL, and whether it would be preferred to the latter. Still, as important as establishing the nature of the instruments is to identify the market for those instruments, and the frictions that this can give rise to between financial stability and investor protection, and the resulting favourable setting for big banks, as we analyse in the next section.


On a global scale, issues of implementation of MREL in the EU can be considered anecdotal and should not obscure the fact that TLAC/MREL face more daunting challenges at the level of policy and principle, related, first, to the interplay between resolution and investor protection, and, second, to considerations of proportionality.

On the first point, resolution rules adopting TLAC and MREL have taken a decisive step towards financial stability with little regard for other policy concerns such as investor protection: for a bank to have loss absorbency, someone has to absorb that loss. This is particularly cumbersome if non-preferred debt is marketed to retail investors, the EU being the case in point. Because MREL rules apply to small banks, and these often lack access to international capital markets, their only possibility is to place MREL instruments among their clients with the subsequent risk of mis-selling. Current EU provisions emphasize that the debt’s status must be advertised in “the relevant contractual documentation and, where applicable, the prospectus.”\textsuperscript{325} Yet this information is of little relevance for retail investors, who do not base their investment decisions on the prospectus but on the advice received from financial intermediaries. For them, it is MiFID and similar standards that matter. If the information is found to be defective, it can

\textsuperscript{322} Article 72b (2) CRR 5.
\textsuperscript{323} Article 72b (2) (g) – (m) CRR 5.
\textsuperscript{324} Article 72b (2) (d) CRR 5.
\textsuperscript{325} New article 108 (2) (c) and (5) (a) (iii) BRRD.
give rise to a wave of mis-selling claims, where the breach of regulatory provisions can give rise to actions for annulment, avoidance, or damages for the value of the securities sold.\footnote{326 See, e.g. Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) Ref. No. XI ZR 33/10 (March 22, 2011) in Germany (damages claim); Rubenstein v HSBC Bank plc [2012] EWCA Civ 1184 in the UK (action in damages); Supreme Court Decision Cass. Civ. 16 February 2007, No. 3683 in Italy (action of avoidance and/or damages); or Supreme Court Decision 20 January 2014 App. No. 879/2012, in Spain (action of annulment).}

The experience of some EU countries like Spain, and, to a lesser extent, Italy, shows that the large-scale marketing of instruments by sizeable-but-not-systemic institutions intended to boost their prudential cushions can result in a problem of mis-selling of those instruments.\footnote{327 See S. Alvaro, M. Lamandini, D. Ramos Muñoz, E. Ghibellini, F. Pellegrini “The marketing of MREL securities after BRRD Interactions between prudential and transparency requirements and the challenges which lie ahead” CONSOB Legal Research Papers No. 15 (December 2017); Marco Lamandini; Giuseppe Lusignani; David Ramos Muñoz “Does Europe Have What It Takes to Finish the Banking Union? Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) and Their Hard Choices, Non-Choices and Evolving Choices” Columbia Journal of European Law (2018 forthcoming); D. Ramos Muñoz “Las participaciones preferentes y su contexto: resolviendo el sudoku” Diario La Ley Nº 7970, Tribuna 22 (November 2012). Italy experienced the same with cases on alleged and mis-selling of banks’ shares and bonds on a massive scale. It even went through the first (successful) experiment of a public offer of settlement in 2017 to prevent thousands of claims by retail investors of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca from becoming a fatal impediment to restructuring (the settlement was finally targeted by a vast majority of holders of these securities).}

For years there was little inquiry on marketing practices, until cases of the so-called participaciones preferentes reached the civil courts, with retail clients claiming that the breach of investor protection rules gave them an action for the annulment of the contract under the doctrine of “mistake.”\footnote{328 See, e.g. Spanish Supreme Court decision no. 504/2015, of 30 September 2015. The decisions from lower courts were much earlier.} A system of large-scale arbitration was put in place to deal with the majority of retail claims in a systematic,\footnote{329 Royal Decree-Law 6/2013, of 23 March. Similar schemes were crafted in Italy in 2016, first for the holders of subordinated debt issued by the four banks resolved in 2015 and then for MPS subordinated debt mis-sold to retail investors.} rather than case-specific, manner, but some individual investors continued to press their claims in court.\footnote{330 In its seventh report in early 2015 the commission indicated that a total of 328,059 holders of hybrid instruments resorted to arbitration, for an amount of 5.188 million euro. This is 79% of all holders, and 65% of the amounts held. Of these, 245,072, or a 75% of the requests received, and 53% of the amount, were admitted. That left a 28% of the requests presented, and 47% of the total, being rejected. This left 27,232 claims before the courts, which looks a low number compared with requests for arbitration but is still impressive in terms of the number of judicial proceedings. The figure is more important if one considers that the amount of the claims was 1.724 million euro, or 25% of the amounts in both arbitration and litigation. In other words, holders of small amounts of}
instruments. Yet, the goal was not to ascertain the breaches of rules for the marketing of instruments, but to address the risk of contagion and mistrust resulting from the holding of such volume of instruments among the general public, not to mention the bad publicity. Thus, there was not an inquiry about the nature, reasons, and extent of the mis-selling. Yet, the problem resulted in a change of heart in the courts’ towards a more investor-friendly stance, one that took place through a modification on the doctrine of mistake, with unforeseeable consequences.

Apart from causing friction in bank-investor relationships, the presence of such instruments and marketing practices can create problems for resolution at the level of procedure, policy and principle. At the level of procedure, if an entity is put into resolution, a claim of damages, avoidance or annulment should, in principle, be classified as an “ordinary” claim. This can create a difference in treatment between holders of TLAC/MREL instruments, who would be bailed-in right after Tier 2 instruments, and holders of “mis-sold instruments,” who would be treated as ordinary unsecured creditors, thus ranking above holders of instruments with no mis-selling claim. This creates an incentive for investors to overstate their case and sue for annulment, avoidance, or damages if the entity is in financial difficulties with the intention of ensuring a better treatment.

At the level of policy, since the advantage of resolution tools lies in their swift implementation, the risk of mis-selling claims could bog down the process, and create an impediment to resolution. This would make it likelier for resolution authorities to exclude TLAC/MREL instruments held by retail investors from bail-in. However, this would defeat the purpose of distributing TLAC/MREL instruments in the first place. At the level of principle, if resolution authorities are aware of evidence claims went to arbitration, and succeeded, holders of large amounts went to court, often succeeding, or went to arbitration, and generally failed. See the Séptimo informe trimestral sobre la comercialización de instrumentos híbridos de capital y deuda subordinada (real decreto-ley 6/2013, de 22 de marzo), Enero 2015, available at: http://www.rdmf.es/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/informe.pdf. See Marco Lamandini; Giuseppe Lusignani; David Ramos Muñoz “Does Europe Have What It Takes to Finish the Banking Union? Columbia Journal of European Law vol. 24 (2018).

331 Id.
332 Id.
333 In addition to this, the TLAC standard states that entities should be prohibited from redeeming debt prior to maturity without supervisory approval. FSB TLAC Termsheet no. 12, p. 17. See also EBA Final Report on MREL pp. 104-107, which suggest some measures to structure a redemption authorization procedure. Yet this prohibition cannot prevent avoidance/annulment/damages claims, which would have the same effect.
pointing towards mis-selling on a large scale, an argument could be made that these authorities would be under a duty to clarify the issue before materializing the risk that investors were not duly informed about, or even excluding retail-held instruments from bail-in. This would be reinforced if one considers investor protection as a general principle of the Law of Finance, which helps define the requisite of proportionality, which is supposed to apply to resolution action.335

One alternative would be to adjust the marketing process so that the additional complexity of TLAC/MREL securities is not used as grounds to presume investors’ lack of information:336 the risk itself is lower than the risk of equities, which can be acquired by retail investors. Another alternative would be to phase MREL requirements, especially among non-G-SIIs.337

Recently reformed rules, however, simply restrict the marketing MREL securities to retail clients. This can only be done if the seller has performed a (documented) suitability test, it is satisfied that the securities are suitable for the retail client,338 and crucially there is both a high minimum investment in the instruments; but this does not represent a high percentage of the investor’s portfolio.339 The rules try to deter banks from marketing MREL securities to retail clients (or do so only to the wealthier clients). Similar initiatives are in place in Hong Kong, Japan

335 These tensions are explored in S. Alvaro, M. Lamandini, D. Ramos Muñoz, E. Ghibellini, F. Pellegrini “The marketing of MREL securities after BRRD Interactions between prudential and transparency requirements and the challenges which lie ahead” CONSOB Legal Research Papers No. 15 (December 2017).

336 It is suggested that a streamlined marketing process where risks are well-identified, but intermediaries (and investors) are given relatively simple indications, could also improve things. See S. Alvaro, M. Lamandini, D. Ramos Muñoz, E. Ghibellini, F. Pellegrini “The marketing of MREL securities after BRRD Interactions between prudential and transparency requirements and the challenges which lie ahead” cit. pp. 76-78.

337 Id at 74-76. Indeed, the TLAC standard was conceived only for G-SIIBs, and many of the problems of the MREL standard arise not in relation with the largest international Banks, but in relation with medium-sized Banks, which have no access to international capital markets to place their debentures.

338 Article 44a (1) (a) – (c) BRRD II. Article 44a (1) para. 2nd extends the requirement to every instrument classifiable as a potential target for bail-in.

339 Member States’ options are: (i) a combined requirement that the minimum investment is EUR 10,000 and the instruments do not represent more than 10% of the investor’s portfolio; (i) an EUR 50,000 minimum denomination for securities subject to bail-in; or (iii) (only for smaller banks) that EUR 10,000 is the minimum investment. See article 44a (2), (5) (6).
and Switzerland, but for TLAC securities, i.e. rules applicable to G-SIs. The US and Canada have not introduced any such restrictions.

The consequences of the rules are unclear. Are banks asked to monitor how their TLAC/MREL securities are distributed by their own personnel, or also all across the market (e.g. by other intermediaries)? Are banks expected to know the composition of their investor base? And how accurately? Are resolution authorities expected to perform market monitoring tasks, which fall outside their mandate, and within the mandate of market regulators (e.g. securities markets commissions, such as the SEC)? And what is the consequence of a breach of marketing rules (e.g. if TLAC/MREL securities are marketed to retail clients beyond the limits)? Is it simply a fine for the institution (in which case, who should levy it?) or does that render the instruments not subject to bail-in? Will markets perceive that instruments held by retail investors are not subject to bail-in? Will that translate into differences in pricing of the same instruments?

These questions illustrate the pattern that results from combining the ex ante and ex post perspectives: (i) difficulties are anticipated in the ex post implementation stage (e.g. problems of bail-in enforceability over instruments held by retail clients); (ii) ex ante rules adopt the more risk-averse solution (excluding or strictly limiting marketing of TLAC/MREL instruments among retail clients); (iii) but that, in turn, creates other ex post problems (e.g. bail-in enforceability over instruments sold in breach, coordination problems between resolution and markets authorities); (iv) as well as unintended consequences (incentives for wealthy retail investors to claim mis-selling, monitoring challenges and loss of credibility for resolution authorities).

Such (supposedly) unintended consequences also affect the structure of the banking system. Indeed, the most serious consequence that could arise if TLAC or MREL instruments cannot be marketed among retail investors is that it leaves non-large banks without any options. This is especially acute in the EU, where the applicability of MREL to all banks

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340 In Hong Kong TLAC securities are marketed only to professional investors, with denominations of minimum HKD 2 million, USD 250,000 or EUR 200,000; in Japan the minimum denomination is JPY 10 million; in Switzerland FINMA requires TLAC denominations large enough to deter retail investors. See FSB Review of the Technical Implementation of the Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Standard 2 July 2019, p. 22.

341 Even if we restrict the banks’ monitoring efforts to their own clients, how accurately can they know the total size of their clients’ portfolio (to apply the maximum of 10% discussed in the previous footnote) if they have diversified their investment management across several entities?
means that, in practice, many of them would be forced to integrate into larger groups or breach the rules.  

This introduces a second consideration about the importance of proportionality as a principle of bank regulation and resolution. Proportionality evolved as a criterion to adjudicate on the legality of an interference by the law or administrative action in fundamental rights. Today, some regard it as an overarching principle in financial regulation. But although the term “proportionality” is the same in form, in substance it is little more than a worthy aspiration, one that is seldom followed by EU legislation, which tends to apply a one-size-fits-all. This sits in contrast with other jurisdictions, such as the United States and Japan, which are characterized by two-tiered, or three-tiered, systems of bank regulation and supervision, as the rules of TLAC illustrate. There is an increasingly perceived need to adjust prudential and quasi-prudential requirements, such as MREL, to banks’ size and business models, to ensure that rules designed against systemic risk are primarily applicable to Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).  

Rather than on lofty words, proportionality’s usefulness would run in parallel to its “actionability”, i.e. the extent to which it could turn into a basis for legal challenges. This could occur if proportionality were to be acknowledged as a specific policy goal. In that case, it would still be difficult to envisage a case where a set of bank rules could be annulled for being “disproportionate”. However, it would introduce a “legitimacy”

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346 Proportionality in Bank Regulation, A Report by the EBA Banking Stakeholder Group cit.


348 Ibid. See also S. Alvaro, M. Lamandini, D. Ramos Muñoz, E. Ghibellini, F. Pellegrini “The marketing of MREL securities after BRRD Interactions between prudential and transparency requirements and the challenges which lie ahead” CONSOB Legal research papers No. 15 (December 2017) p. 71.
dimension, where supervisory and resolution authorities would have to offer a justification if they were to impose burdensome rules without distinguishing between institutions. This system is present in the United States to some extent through rules that require regulators to make a previous assessment of the impact of the rules on small entities before adopting them,\(^ {349} \) in line with the increasing drive towards requiring a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) of regulatory action across the board.\(^ {350} \) In some cases, the burden imposed, together with the lack of justification, could constitute grounds for an annulment action. A precedent is \textit{Metlife v Financial Stability Oversight Council,}\(^ {351} \) where the Court of the District of Columbia found the action by the FSOC to classify Metlife, an insurance company, as systemically important, and, under the purview of the Fed, as “arbitrary and capricious” for lacking a CBA.\(^ {352} \) The court’s decision was very controversial, and courts in the EU do not tend to follow such a strict review of regulatory action, but it remains a useful illustration of how courts may react if there is no appropriate process to ensure that the rules are proportionate.

\textbf{B. The Group Dimension: “Internal TLAC,” Single/Multiple-Point-of-Entry (SPE/MPE), Source-of-Strength, and Interference with Group Structure}

The problems related to TLAC/MREL debt are much more complex when we introduce the “external vs. intra-group” dimension. This dimension leaves open a series of choices for resolution authorities and banks, yet by taking a specific position, resolution authorities constrain the choices of banks and largely shape their intra-group organization. First, there is a direct interference by resolution authorities on banking group structures, with important considerations of policy (1). Second, the need to ensure a smooth process to allocate losses and bail-in debt raises difficult questions of principles and interpretation, especially in light of the interference with banks’ funding structure (2). Finally, the question of whether a parent company has an obligation to financially assist its subsidiaries poses both questions of principle and policy, as it gradually results in a push towards a centralization of functions (3).

\(^ {349} \) Regulatory Flexibility Act 1980, see U.S.C. at 601-602.
i. Internal “TLAC,” SPE/MPE, Interference with Group Structure, and Policy Considerations

The intra-group perspective of TLAC/MREL forms part of the group-level resolution planning and assessment of resolvability.\(^{353}\) This assessment is no longer restricted to determining levels of TLAC/MREL. It now has to encompass (i) an identification of the “resolution entities,” i.e. those that will be subject to resolution tools, including bail-in;\(^{354}\) (ii) the determination of overall TLAC/MREL levels and the amounts that need to be issued and subscribed by third parties; (iii) the internal *allocation* of debt by “down-streaming” the proceeds from externally issued debt to subsidiaries,\(^{355}\) which must in turn issue instruments which are subscribed by the parent-resolution entity to ensure that TLAC is “pre-positioned” in the material subgroups where losses may occur; (iv) the up-streaming of losses from operating subsidiaries to the resolution entities,\(^{356}\) and (v) if losses are too large for the resolution entity, a bail-in of external instruments plus other resolution tools, if necessary. Graphically.\(^{357}\)

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353 See Articles 12-13 BRRD (group resolution plans). This includes an assessment of resolvability for the entity/group, to determine whether it could be wound up under insolvency or resolved using resolution tools to avoid significant effects in the financial system and ensure the continuity of critical functions. Article 16 (1) para. 2nd BRRD. The elements to be considered in making such an assessment are listed under the Annex, section C of BRRD. The resolution authorities at group-level, and for each subsidiary and significant branches have powers to address impediments to resolvability of a group, through joint or separate decisions. Article 18 BRRD. MREL are particularly relevant in the context of groups, where certain liabilities can be an obstacle for effective group resolution. EBA Final Draft Regulatory Standards p. 9-10.


355 Recital (80) of BRRD states that: ‘it is imperative that loss-absorbing capacity is located in, or accessible to, the legal person within the group in which losses occur’.


357 The graph adapts the one in Bank of England The Bank of England’s approach to setting a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) 2015 p. 29 Figure 2.
Initial EU rules provided little guidance, leaving the determination of MREL below group level to a collaborative procedure between resolution authorities and the binding mediation of the European Banking Authority (EBA) in case of conflict. Conversely, the TLAC standard introduced the conceptual distinction between “external” TLAC instruments, which are the equity/debt instruments issued by resolution entities and held by third parties, and “internal” TLAC instruments, which are issued by group entities that are not resolution entities, usually operating subsidiaries, and held by other group entities, usually resolution entities. as the TLAC standard also introduced the requirement that the “pre-positioned internal TLAC” be in a 75-90%
range of the external TLAC level. Amended EU rules are more aligned with the TLAC conceptual framework.

Once the intra-group situation is considered, the question is no longer solely about the instruments’ features to ensure loss-absorbency. It is about the position of those instruments within group’s structure to ensure that resolution tools can be implemented quickly and efficiently. This raises the question of whether (and, if so, how much) the law should interfere with strategic decisions such as those regarding a group’s structure. The basic, stylized choices are two: under a strategy of “Single Point of Entry” (SPE) resolution, measures are adopted at the parent company level; under a “Multiple Points of Entry” (MPE) strategy, there are different “resolution entities” where resolution tools will be implemented.

The purported advantage of SPE is its simplicity: the parent holding company is the only resolution entity, a “clean HoldCo”, i.e. a company with no operational liabilities. This makes “structural subordination” easy. Losses are up-streamed to the holding company using subordinated “internal TLAC/MREL” and then “external TLAC/MREL” is bailed-in, which is easy, since it is the only kind of liabilities issued by the parent. It is also ideal for structures characterized by a financial holding company (FHC), typical in the US. The Dodd-Frank Act is purportedly neutral, as has been the guidance on resolution planning, which uses the concept of “legal entity rationalization”, but does not openly advocate one approach over the other. Yet, American

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360 This allocation ensures (i) that only the resolution entity is put into resolution, and (ii) that there is adequate cooperation between home and host resolution authorities. FSB TLAC Term Sheet, no. 16.

361 New article 45g BRRD II. Still, some adjustments are needed. One relevant aspect is the adjustment needed to the concept of “material sub-groups”, which is defined in the TLAC standard as one or more direct or indirect subsidiaries of a resolution entity ‘incorporated in the same jurisdiction outside of their resolution entity’s home jurisdiction’, whilst the EU should, to this effect, be treated as a ‘single jurisdiction’. See EBA Final Report on MREL p. 135.

362 We first discussed ‘structural subordination’ in section III.B.1. The main implications of the concept become clear now.


364 See, e.g. Section § 210 (a) (E) Dodd-Frank Act (power of the FDIC to appoint itself receiver of a subsidiary when it has appointed itself receiver of the parent company).

365 FDIC and Fed Guidance for 2017 §165(d) Annual Resolution Plan Submissions by Domestic Covered Companies that Submitted Resolution Plans in July 2015 § VI.
authorities have decidedly moved towards SPE.366 Advocates of SPE argue that EU rules should be bolder and force financial groups into American-style FHC structures.367

While EU rules are neutral,368 UK authorities have opted for an SPE strategy with “structural subordination” for all entities subject to bail-in on policy grounds, i.e. because it is considered better in general terms.369 In France, home to some large universal banks, authorities also opted for an SPE strategy370 yet clarifying that the choice is not definitive, irreversible or systematic,371 but idiosyncratic, i.e. based on a list of factors to choose the best strategy for the larger banking groups that are dominant in France.372 When banking groups have been allowed to

366 Wells Fargo was the only group with an MPE approach, and in the December 2016 assessment of resolvability it was the only one found to have failed in its efforts to correct obstacles to resolvability, primarily because of a lack of ‘legal entity rationalisation’. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Agencies announce determinations on October resolution plan submissions of five systemically important domestic banking institutions Joint Press Release, December 13, 2016, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20161213a.htm. Wells Fargo’s 2019 Resolution Plan (Public Section) states that: “Since filing the 2017 165(d) Plan, we announced on October 13, 2017 that we were moving to a single point of entry (SPOE) approach as a part of our Preferred Resolution Strategy for this 2019 165(d) Plan submission. We believe this approach better aligns with our business model and corporate structure as we continue to evolve as a company.”

367 This could be achieved by introducing the requirement under structural rules for Banks, or by using prudential (Basel) rules to “penalize” structures without financial holding companies. See Jeffrey Gordon; Wolf-George Ringe ‘Bank resolution in Europe: The Unfinished Agenda of Structural Reform’ ECGI Working Paper Series WP No. 507 (Jan. 2015), and also ‘Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What It Would Take’ Vol. 115, No. 5 (June 2015), pp. 1297-1369.

368 See Recital (80) of BRRD.


371 “The choice of an SPE strategy may be combined with a pragmatic approach to resolution. It should not be viewed as definitive, irreversible or systematic, but rather as a position in favour of the strategy that seems best suited from an operational perspective, given the organisation and functioning of the main French entities.”

372 These were (i) the centralisation of decision-making; (ii) integration of business model; (iii) location of the business in France; (iv) concentration of loss-absorbing capacity in the parent company (financial structure); (v) pooling of management of support functions (operational structure); (vi) number of significant foreign subsidiaries
choose, many have opted for SPE, including large German banking groups such as Deutsche Bank,373 with Santander being the exception of major banking groups in using an MPE strategy.374

Yet, despite the relentless move towards SPE, there are clear objections to it. First, an approach that considers the structure of US FHC-based financial groups as the least risky is debatable.375 Then, the SPE dismisses too quickly the usefulness of market forces in disciplining subsidiaries when they seek external funding and ignores the rigidities that a “clean HoldCo + bail-in” strategy may impose if, say, a sale of business is needed and no suitors are found for the whole group, which needs to be sold in parts.376 Furthermore, the group-level seamless implementation required by an SPE approach may be jeopardized if, say, resolution authorities in the parent HoldCo country object to the up-streaming of losses of a foreign country subsidiary into “their” parent holding company and to the subsequent bail-in of “their” investors.377

Most importantly, stark distinctions between SPE and MPE can be equivocal. US bodies, for example, favour SPE for US banking groups, but also for the US activities of foreign banks. Large foreign banks have to create an Intermediate Holding Company (IHC) for their US

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373 See, e.g. Deutsche Bank U.S. Resolution Plan Submission Section 1: Public Section July 1, 2015, p. 39. Despite the title of the document, the references to SPE in the plan are not restricted to US operations but refer to the overall strategy for the international group as a whole.

374 Banco Santander, S.A. Resolution Plan for U.S. Operations Public Section at 6, 8 (December 31, 2018). This is due to its business model based on local units with separate governance structures. See ibid p. 6, and also Banco Santander, S.A. Resolution Plan for U.S. Operations Public Section December 16, 2015, p. 4.


376 Either if the debt issued at the top of the group is insufficient to absorb the group’s losses, and/or different parts of the group can continue on a standalone basis, an MPE strategy may be preferable. Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions A joint paper by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Bank of England 10 December 2012, no. 3, p. 1.

operations. Thus, for non-US banks, the SPE approach at a US-level effectively means an MPE at a global level, with different holding companies for different countries or regions.

ii. “Internal TLAC,” Problems of Interpretation, and the Resulting Pre-Determining of Intra-Group Funding

The previous point highlights how the rules on group resolution planning have led resolution authorities to position themselves vis-à-vis the ideal structure of banking groups. This point shows that there are other matters of principle and interpretation with regard to internal TLAC that remain open, and that the need to fill those gaps is leading resolution authorities to adopt similarly deterministic views on intra-group funding. These concern (i) the type of instruments that can be considered TLAC/MREL and their ranking, (ii) the extent to which internal TLAC/MREL levels must be met by pre-positioning instruments inside subsidiaries, as opposed to other forms of support, e.g. parent guarantees and (iii) the triggers for write-down and conversion.

Regarding the first matter, i.e. the kind of instruments and their ranking, internal TLAC must be equity, or debt susceptible of bail-in. However, this is a “prudential requirement”, which merely stipulates ex ante the conditions the instrument must fulfil to be eligible as internal TLAC, not the ex post enforcement of the bail-in tool over them. The entities are thus responsible for the decision of how to comply with the rules and through which instruments, which may be designed as own-funds or debt, as long as they are subordinated to other kinds of debt, and do not affect the parent’s control over the subsidiary.\(^{379}\)

As said above, whether these conditions are fulfilled, however, can only be ascertained ex post, i.e. when the group reaches its point of non-


\(^{379}\) New Article 45f (2) (a) of BRRD II, as per the Directive on Loss Absorbency requires internal TLAC liabilities to be ultimately bought by a resolution entity, to be MRE-eligible, and to rank below non-MREL liabilities (other than equity), among other requirements. Equity instruments that are TLAC-compliant are CET1 or other equity instruments, provided they are subscribed by group entities, or by other entities, as long as bail-in does not affect their control by their parent (article 45f (2) (b) BRRDI). This could raise difficulties if debt instruments with a contractual subordination clause, though not eligible for own funds requirements, have been issued to third parties, e.g. if the contract subordination clause suggests that they should also rank below all ordinary liabilities.
viability. Since the rules do not back the *ex ante* requirement with an *ex post* determination of the ranking of the instrument (as they do with external MREL\(^{380}\)) there is room for uncertainty. This concerns cases where the entity has issued contractually subordinated debt (or ordinary debt subject to conversion into equity) that is held by third parties, in which case the problem may not be the internal TLAC itself, but the debt held by third parties.

Another problem may be the status of internal TLAC relative to intra-group “operational debt”, such as intra-group loans, deposits, derivatives, etc. Liabilities originated between related parties are subject to statutory subordination in some countries (e.g. Germany or Spain).\(^{381}\) EU rules provide that, when certain liabilities are not considered as TLAC/MREL, but are subject to subordination by insolvency rules, because they are intra-group debt (or debt with related parties) the requirement that MREL instruments be “subordinated” shall not be assessed by reference to those excluded liabilities.\(^{382}\) Thus, the determination of MREL levels shall be done independently of the debt subordinated for being intra-group. Yet, on an *ex post* setting where resolution tools have to be deployed, “operational” intra-group debt would rank *pari passu* with internal TLAC, but its bail-in may disrupt the group’s operations.\(^{383}\)

Regarding the second matter, i.e. ways to comply with internal TLAC/MREL rules, this can be done by pre-positioning instruments in the subsidiary, i.e. the subsidiary issues equity or debt instruments, subscribed by the parent or the resolution entity, or through a financial commitment by the parent to “come to the rescue”, e.g. a parent guarantee. The former is better to allay authorities’ fears, since the loss-absorbing resources are already there, but is costly, and can result in “misallocation risk”.\(^{384}\) The latter is better for banking groups, which will

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380 See Article 108 (2) BRRD II.
381 See Section III.B.2., supra.
382 Article 72b (2) 4th para.
383 Since subordinated debt is all intra-group debt, one may argue that this problem is a relatively minor one. However, we can imagine a situation where internal TLAC is held by the parent company, while part of the operational debt is held by sister companies, in which case the authorities in the parent company’s home jurisdiction might object to the parent’s absorption of the full cost of the “upstreaming” of losses, while intra-group loans, derivatives, or cash and collateral arrangements (which they may see as one of the sources of risk) remain untouched.
384 That is, the risk that the pre-positioned internal TLAC at material subsidiaries does not match the actual distribution of losses incurred. See FSB Review of the Technical Implementation of the Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Standard 2 July 2019, p. 45.
not wish to bear the cost of issuing the instruments or immobilizing recourses beyond the projected needs of local operations.\textsuperscript{385}

On pre-positioning, TLAC/MREL can be issued \textit{directly}, i.e. from the subsidiary to the resolution entity, or following the existing chain of legal entity ownership (“daisy chain”), e.g. if Resolution Entity A owns 100% of subsidiary B, which holds 100% of subsidiary C, C could issue TLAC to be subscribed by A (direct issuance) or B (“daisy chain”). The former provides greater transparency, and faster bail-in execution, while the latter ensures that there will be no change of ownership.\textsuperscript{386}

Guarantees are another admissible way to comply with TLAC requirements, in theory. Under global standards, to be TLAC-compliant these guarantees must fulfil several conditions regarding the guarantee itself, the collateralisation agreement, and the collateral itself.\textsuperscript{387} EU rules in cases where the parent and subsidiary are part of the same resolution group, and located \textit{in the same State}, and the parent complies with TLAC/MREL, allow the possibility to (i) waive internal TLAC/MREL if the parent \textit{declares} that it guarantees the subsidiary’s commitments, and there is no impediment for the transfer of funds or repayment of liabilities from parent to subsidiary,\textsuperscript{388} and also to (ii) comply with TLAC/MREL requirements by means of a formal collateralised guarantee where the amount of the guarantee is the same as the amount of the requirement, the value of the collateral is at least 50% of the value of the guarantee, and other requirements that try to ensure the guarantee’s enforceability.\textsuperscript{389} US authorities include parent guarantees as

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{385} TLAC Termsheet no. 19; EBA Final Report on MREL pp. 137.
\item \textsuperscript{386} See, e.g. FSB Guiding Principles on the Internal Total Lossabsorbing Capacity of G-SIBs (‘Internal TLAC’) Consultative Document 16 December 2016, p. 19. See also FSB Review of the Technical Implementation of the Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Standard 2 July 2019, p. 27, for the (direct/indirect) options followed by authorities in the EU, US, UK, or Singapore
\item \textsuperscript{387} These include the following: (i) the amount of the guarantee must be at least equal to the amount of internal TLAC for which it substitutes, (ii) the value of the collateral must, following conservative haircuts, be sufficient to fully cover the amount guaranteed; (iii) the guarantee must be drafted in a way that does not affect the loss-absorbency of the subsidiaries’ other capital instruments, such as minority interests; (iv) the collateral must be unencumbered, and not used to back any other guarantee; (v) the collateral maturity must fulfil the same requirements as external TLAC, i.e. residual maturity of at least 1 year; and (vi) there must be no legal, regulatory or operational barriers for the transfer of the collateral from the resolution entity to the subsidiary. TLAC Termsheet no. 19.
\item \textsuperscript{388} This applies both in cases where the parent is a “resolution entity”, and when the parent is not a resolution entity (i.e. the resolution entity is, e.g. the parent’s parent, and is located in a different State). See article 45f (3) and (4) BRRD II.
\item \textsuperscript{389} Article 45f (5) BRRD II. No reference is made to the TLAC requirement that the guarantee must be drafted to not affect the loss-absorbency of other capital instruments.
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part of the intra-group funding strategy (see infra IV.B.3), but only within the US.

One possible difficulty could arise with collateral re-use, which is contemplated as a right of the collateral taker.\textsuperscript{390} Collateral re-use gives rise to the duty to return equivalent collateral,\textsuperscript{391} but this is a personal obligation, which poses a risk in times of scarcity of collateral.\textsuperscript{392} EU rules require the collateral to be “unencumbered”, and in particular not used to back another guarantee,\textsuperscript{393} but the potential scenarios are three: (i) if the collateral is transferred to the subsidiary, which re-uses it; (ii) if the same collateral is used to secure different mutual obligations between different group members; or (iii) if the parent re-uses collateral taken from a client or a third party under a different transaction to secure its guarantee with its subsidiary. Because the implications of collateral re-use are still poorly understood, little is said in the rules about requirements of immobilizing, “tracing” or “sourcing” collateral. It seems that the collateralisation requirement would be considered fulfilled in the first scenario, even if the subsidiary may lose the collateral; clearly not fulfilled in the second scenario; and most likely fulfilled in the third scenario, although the case would be less straightforward.\textsuperscript{394}

Regarding the third matter, i.e. the triggers for the activation of bail-in, international TLAC principles outline the importance of adequate triggers but are skimpy about the details,\textsuperscript{395} except to indicate that it should be possible to bail-in “internal TLAC” without putting the

\textsuperscript{390} See article 5 FCD, or Section §9-207(c)(3) of the US Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).

\textsuperscript{391} See, e.g. FCD article 5 (2).


\textsuperscript{393} Article 45f (5) (e) BRRD II.

\textsuperscript{394} Consider the requirement that the collateral must be “unencumbered”, and in particular ‘is not used as collateral to back any other guarantee’ is not breached if the parent merely has a personal obligation to return equivalent collateral in case of re-use. More difficult may be the case of re-hypothecation of clients’ assets, since some courts have concluded that these assets are simply held in trust by the dealer-custodian and clients have a right which can be exercised upon insolvency. See In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2009] EWHC 3228 (Ch); [2010] EWCA Civ 917; and [2012] UKSC 6. The ‘maturity’ requirement applies to the collateral, not to any potential issues with its return. The main difficulty would come from the requirement that there must be no legal, operational or other difficulties to transfer the collateral.

\textsuperscript{395} TLAC principles state that: ‘Eligible external TLAC should contain a contractual trigger or be subject to a statutory mechanism which permits the relevant resolution authority to effectively write it down or convert it to equity in resolution’. TLAC Termsheet no. 14, p. 17.
subsidiary in formal resolution proceedings. Triggers are relevant because, even if the relative ranking and hierarchy of the debt instruments were clear, the clarity of the picture may be upset if different instruments are activated through different triggers, especially if one debt instrument ranking pari passu or below, a second instrument, e.g. Tier-3 non-preferred debt is hierarchically superior to, say, subordinated debt, and yet its conversion into equity may be triggered before subordinated debt is touched, or if, absent contractual triggers, it is not possible to bail-in debt without putting the entity into resolution. Initial EU rules, for example, only permitted debt (unlike equity) to be bailed-in if the entity were put into resolution, but not before. New rules, on the other hand, provide the possibility of pre-resolution bail-in for both equity and debt if the entity fulfils the conditions for resolution, and unless bail-in is exercised with respect to the capital or liabilities the entity will no longer be viable.

A final, and perhaps major, source of difficulties, may be the treatment of TLAC/MREL-eligible debt by EU authorities outside of areas with a harmonized regime. Such cases may include cross-border groups, whereby the debt issued under the laws of one jurisdiction needs to be subject to bail-in under the laws of a different jurisdiction. Such issues, however, have more to do with the cross-border recognition of bail-in decisions and will be examined in a succeeding article.

iii. Source-of-Strength and Intra-Group Support: Impact on the Bail-In Hierarchy and the Push Towards Central Planning

The two previous points show a pattern: group-resolution planning requires choosing among different options (group structure, intra-group funding instruments and organization). This raises the question of

396 Rules for ‘internal TLAC’ only indicate that ‘internal TLAC that comprises capital instruments must comply with the relevant provisions of Basel III, including those in relation to write down and conversion ‘at the point of non-viability’, but they add that ‘Internal TLAC must be subject to write-down and/or conversion to equity by the relevant host authority at the point of non-viability, as determined by the host authority in line with the relevant legal framework, without entry of the subsidiary into statutory resolution proceedings’. TLAC Termsheet no. 19. This is confirmed in point no. 6 c.
397 Article 59 BRRD, as originally drafted.
398 Article 59 BRRD II, as reformed by the Directive on Loss-Absorbency and Recapitalization. The provision replaces the reference to ‘capital instruments’ with a reference to ‘capital instruments and eligible liabilities’ (heading) and clarifies that bail-in powers can only be exercised independently of resolution action when absent such bail-in the entity will no longer be viable (section 3). Such bail-in can only be exercised with regard to certain types of liabilities. See article 59 (1a) and article 45f (2) (a) BRRD II.
whether some options are generally better than others. Resolution authorities make policy choices, and, in so doing, constrain and pre-
determine banks’ choices, which raises matters of principle, both with
regard to the interpretation of the rules, and to the limits of the
authorities’ exercise of powers. This point shows the same pattern by
asking a related question: is a parent obliged, as a matter of law or
policy, to financially assist its subsidiaries?

It is one thing to say that the law requires organizing intra-group
funding to facilitate orderly resolution, and quite another to argue that
such funding must flow from the parent to its subsidiaries. And yet, there
is some legal basis for this. The best example is the US “source-of-
strength” doctrine, originally envisaged by the Fed under its powers to
approve transactions399 and recently codified by the Dodd-Frank Act.400
Under this doctrine, supervisors could require a bank holding company
to be a “source of strength” to its subsidiaries, including in times of
liquidity scarcity.401 The doctrine was originally validated by the US
Supreme Court in Lincolnwood in the context of the authorization of
acquisition transactions.402

Yet, saying that a parent company has to be a source of strength in
that it must not weaken its subsidiaries’ financial position is not the same
as saying that financial authorities can compel the former to financially
assist its subsidiaries. Thus, after it was initially validated in theory, the
Fed tried to use the doctrine to impose upon a troubled bank holding
company the duty to use the money obtained from the sale of non-bank
subsidiaries to recapitalize some of its ailing subsidiaries, an attempt that
was successfully challenged before the Fifth Circuit Court in McCorp.403

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399 See the analysis of the traditional doctrine in Leonard Bierman; Donald Fraser “The
Source-of-Strength” Doctrine: Formulating the Future of America’s Financial Markets”
Source of Weakness? A Critique of the “Source-of-Strength” Doctrine in Banking
Reform” Vol. 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (1991) p. 1344. For a more recent study, comparing the
former and current approaches, see Paul L. Lee “The Source -of-Strength Doctrine:
Revered and revisited. Part I” The Banking Law Journal Vol. 129 No. 9 (October 2012)
867.
400 Section 616(d) Dodd-Frank Act.
401 See, e.g. Leonard Bierman; Donald Fraser “The Source-of-Strength” Doctrine”
supra note 397, p. 269.
402 The Court accepted that the Board had the power to impose upon the acquirer of a
bank the need to be a source of strength for its subsidiary as a condition for acquisition.
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve System v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234,
238 (1978).
403 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. M Corp Financial, Inc. aff’d in
The case was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court, which held that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction based on procedural grounds.\textsuperscript{404} This left open the issue about the scope of the Fed’s mandate.

The current statutory formulation legitimizes authorities’ power to require the parent to be a source-of-strength.\textsuperscript{405} Yet, this answers the question of policy, i.e. this is a goal to organize the authorities’ exercise of powers, but it does not answer the question of principle of how much discretion does this leave authorities to micro-manage intra-group funding structures, and in particular whether authorities can impose the parent company a duty to financially assist the subsidiaries including when this compromises the parent beyond its point of non-viability, or whether they can dictate which subsidiaries to assist or how to structure the assistance, over the views of the parent’s board. This would seem to interfere with the bank’s freedom of enterprise. Should the matter arise in an \textit{ex post} resolution scenario the courts could review the exercise of powers under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard, where authorities would be required to justify their actions, with or without a cost-benefit analysis (CBA),\textsuperscript{406} or on a “balancing” or “proportionality” assessment, which would weigh the finality of the measure against the interference with rights.\textsuperscript{407} In addition to this, parent company creditors may raise legal challenges to the execution of financial assistance by the parent company through doctrines of fraudulent transfer or breach of fiduciary duty.\textsuperscript{408}

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  \item \textsuperscript{404} According to the Supreme Court, the court could only review the Federal Reserve Board decision when it was a final decision, which the one concerned in the \textit{McCorp} case was not. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991).
  \item \textsuperscript{405} Section 616(d) Dodd-Frank Act adds a new Section 38A to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Subsection (a) of the new Section 38A states that: ‘The appropriate Federal banking agency for a bank holding company or savings and loan holding company shall require the bank holding company or savings and loan holding company to serve as a source-of-financial strength for any subsidiary of the bank holding company or savings and loan holding company that is a depository institution.’
  \item \textsuperscript{406} Metlife v Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) US Dist. C. D. Col. Civil Action No. 15-0045 (2016). See \textit{supra} 4.1.3.
  \item \textsuperscript{407} This could be undertaken under a “proportionality” test, typical of European jurisdictions, or under the various forms of “balancing” more typical of US courts. See Moshe Cohen-Eliya; Iddo Porat “American balancing and German proportionality: The historical origins” \textit{International Journal of Constitutional Law}, Volume 8, Issue 2, (2010) pp. 263-286, for a comparison.
  \item \textsuperscript{408} Benton E Gup (ed.) \textit{Handbook for Directors of Financial Institutions} Massachusetts, Elgar, 2008, p. 64.
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The friction between policy and principle, however, is mitigated as we move from the *ex post* scenario of execution of resolution tools to the *ex ante* scenario of resolution planning. In that context, it no longer looks excessive for authorities to require banking groups to organize their affairs in a way that facilitates the flow of financial assistance from the top-down. Actually, it seems a logical next step to an SPE strategy (*supra* IV.B.1), and it helps to rationalize the decisions over the ways to comply with internal TLAC/MREL. This tendency can be observed clearly in the US. The 2017 Guidance for 2017 Resolution Plans introduced the concepts of Resolution Capital Adequacy and Positioning (“RCAP”), Resolution Liquidity Adequacy and Positioning (“RLAP”), and Resolution Capital (and Liquidity) Execution Needs (“RCEN”, and “RLEN”).409 The idea is to require entities to “preposition” sufficient resources to meet capital and liquidity needs (RCAP, RLAP) during “business as usual” to anticipate a stress scenario, and, when such stress scenario arrives, to make real-time projections of capital and liquidity needs (RCEN and RLEN),410 and, if necessary, activate a parent support agreement,411 typically channeled through a Funding Intermediate Holding Company (Funding IHC)). In anticipation of *ex post* bankruptcy challenges, US resolution authorities required major banks to include a detailed legal analysis of the potential challenges to the planned provision of capital and liquidity to the subsidiaries, and the mitigants to those challenges.412 Such mitigants have taken the form of contractually binding mechanisms (CBM) including clear triggers synchronized with the (centralized) capital/liquidity methodologies, security interests, and collateral, and penalties for non-compliance.413 These have taken the form of Secured Support Agreements (SSA), which constitute the framework of reference for the major US banking groups, such as Bank of America,414 Citigroup,415 Goldman Sachs,416 JP Morgan Chase,417 or

410  Id.
412  Ibid.
413  FDIC and Fed Guidance for 2017 §165(d) Annual Resolution Plan Submissions by Domestic Covered Companies that Submitted Resolution Plans in July 2015 § IV (Governance mechanisms).
415  Citigroup Inc. 2019 Resolution Plan Public Section, July 1, 2019, pp. 4-5, 15-16.
Morgan Stanley. Yet, the brief information in the public section of those plans does not include a discussion of the actual challenges and mitigation techniques.

A side effect of the source-of-strength doctrine, and its expansion into the ex ante planning stage is the push it entails towards operational centralization. By requiring firms to centrally plan their capital and liquidity needs, financial authorities have incentivized them to centralize management, or management and funding, and normally at the level of the parent holding company. Citigroup, for example, besides pre-positioning capital and liquidity, relies on access to a pool of centrally managed resources. Bank of America relies on a mix of secured and unsecured liabilities through a centralized, globally-coordinated funding strategy. Goldman Sachs relies on a Capital and Liquidity Support Agreement, based on a specific sub-holding (Funding IHC), dependent of the top parent company (GS Group). This arrangement combines the holding (pre-positioning) of liquid assets by material group entities, with centralization through the holding of liquidity surplus by Funding IHC. A similar arrangement characterizes JP Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley. This can create operational rigidities (e.g. if the entity that has the resources is not the one with the best expertise to make decisions on resource allocation), and while providing a neat picture for a single jurisdiction and authority, the push towards centralization can create friction when more than one jurisdiction and authority are involved.

The source-of-strength doctrine may be a US creation, but the questions it addresses also arise in the EU framework, where authorities have broad powers in regard to (i) the assessment of resolvability; and (ii) early intervention. Yet the EU system for intra-group support measures is not discretion-based but rules-based. First, the rules that regulate intra-group financial support agreements (IGFSAs) include a list of requirements to be fulfilled by those agreements, which need to take...

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419 Citigroup Inc. 2019 Resolution Plan Public Section July 1, 2019 p. 68 (resources provided by Citibank NA, and managed by Citi Treasury). See also Citigroup Resolution Plan July 2015, p. 30.
420 Bank of America Corporation 2019 resolution Plan Submission. Public Executive Summary, p. 43.
421 Goldman Sachs Group Inc 2019 Resolution Plan Public section, June 28, 2019, pp. 18-22, 43.
422 JP Morgan Chase 2019 Resolution Plan Public Filing, pp. 20-21, See also p. 17 to see the group arrangement.
424 Articles 17-18 BRRD.
425 Articles 27-30 BRRD.
into account the interest of all participating entities and the public interest to not undermine financial stability, or the resolvability of the providing institution.426 Second, the rules regulate two procedures. One is to approve the agreement, which requires an application by the group parent, the authorisation by the consolidating supervisor and other competent authorities,427 and approval by the shareholders of every group entity.428 The other procedure is to approve the actual provision of financial support under the agreement, which requires a reasoned decision from the management of the providing and receiving entities, and notification to competent authorities, which have a right to oppose.429 The combination of substantive and procedural requirements secures a robust framework of legality and legitimacy.

This tighter approach by EU rules does not answer all open questions, however. Intra-group support may be adopted by financial groups,430 which means there is no statutory source-of-strength duty, something in line with the more neutral EU position between SPE and MPE strategies. Furthermore, the rules do not state that intra-group support can only be provided under cover of a regulated IGFSA. Group entities can conclude arrangements on funding, including centralised funding, which are not covered by IGFSA rules, provided they are conceived for cases where none of the entities meets the conditions for early intervention.431 Also, an IGFSA is not a precondition to provide ad hoc support, even in the case of financial difficulties.432 Finally, the incentives for such agreements are limited. From a supervisory perspective, competent authorities may temporarily waive prudential

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426 The conditions under article 23 (1) BRRD include the need of a reasonable prospect that the agreement will redress financial difficulties, the need that the agreement preserves the financial stability of the group as a whole, and is in the interest of the providing entities, the need that the agreement reflects the risk of default and loss-given default, and benefits and costs, the need of a reasonable prospect of loan repayment (which means the need to evaluate collateral) the need to not jeopardise the providing entity’s liquidity, solvency, or resolvability, make it breach prudential rules, or undermine financial stability. See EBA Guidelines specifying the conditions for group financial support under Article 23 of Directive 2014/59/EU EBA/GL/2015/17, 9 July 2015.

427 In case of disagreement the rules contemplate the intervention by the EBA. See article 20 BRRD.

428 Article 21 BRRD.

429 The management of the providing entity and the receiving entity have to approve the financial support (through a reasoned decision) and notify the competent authorities, which may oppose. Again, the rules contemplate an intervention by the EBA in case of disagreement between competent authorities. See articles 24-25 BRRD.

430 Article 19 (1) BRRD.

431 Article 19 (2) BRRD.

432 Article 19 (3) BRRD.
requirements on liquidity, solvency or large exposures to the providing entity, but are by no means obliged to do so. From a company law perspective, financial support under cover of an IG FSA has the benefit of expedience, as it has been pre-approved by shareholders, but also entails rigidity and transaction costs.

This still leaves open the most important question (which takes us to square one), about the relationship between the ex-ante framework on planning and the ex-post framework of entities’ rights and authorities’ powers. Although a first reading of the rules may suggest that every ex-post measure has to be accounted for in the ex-ante planning, this is not the case from the entities’ perspective. Nor is it the case from the authorities’ perspective. Competent supervisory authorities may, as part of their powers, request the implementation of measures contemplated in the recovery plan, but can do many other things, including changes in the business strategy, legal or operational structures, removal of senior management and installation of temporary administration, etc. For our purposes, the authorities may require the entity to update the recovery plan, in light of changed circumstances. Add to this the fact that the supervisory competences include the possibility of imposing extra prudential buffers and that early intervention measures include requiring the entity to negotiate a debt restructuring, and the ensemble of provisions could be used by supervisors to require a parent company to increase financial support to its subsidiary with fresh money and, absent that money, through a restructuring of intra-group debt. If the measure is not contemplated by the recovery plan, this could be correspondingly updated.

These issues have a high significance in the context of resolution, bail-in and the insolvency hierarchy. Resolution powers, including bail-in powers, are broad, but their use is limited by (i) the exceptional situations in which they can be exercised, and (ii) the fact that bail-in takes the group’s liability structure as given. The source-of-strength doctrine in the US, and the use of pre-resolution powers in the EU framework to eliminate obstacles to resolvability or for early intervention purposes, can dramatically alter this balance. They could support an interference analogous to a bail-in without having to put the entity into resolution or reach the point of non-viability, without taking the liability

433 Article 23 (1) (g) and (h) BRRD.
434 Articles 27 (1) (a) – (h), 28 and 29 BRRD.
435 Article 27 (1) (a) BRRD.
436 Article 104 (1) (a) CRD. See also article 27 BRRD, for the reference to article 104’s supervisory competences as part of the toolkit for early intervention.
437 Article 27 (1) (e) BRRD.
structure as given, and without any regard for the fiduciary duties applicable to the parent company directors.

In our view, this use would contravene the EU framework, where the powers of resolution authorities are constrained by clear rules, principles and procedures. Thus, the more reasonable interpretation is to consider the exercise of pre-resolution powers by supervisory authorities as limited by \textit{ex ante} planning measures, such as the recovery plan and the IGFSA. Changes in the plan should respond to a real change of circumstances, be well justified, and should not be a way to alter the liability structure or impose greater intra-group funding obligations, which should be voluntary and constrained by fiduciary duties.\footnote{We admit that this is easier said than done. This would leave open the question of how to limit supervisory authorities’ use of the point of non-viability assessment as a threat to coerce intra-group support outside the IGFSA framework.}

The US system is more mandate-based, which means that, as long as the authority acts within its mandate, the action will not be illegal \textit{per se}. This, however, would still subject the decision to require the parent to support its subsidiary with extra funding to justification under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard. In practice, however, it is likely that the review standard for both types of measures will be a legitimacy-based “enhanced justification” \footnote{See Section 2.3, \textit{supra} for a discussion on the importance of the notion of “legitimacy” to assess the legality of measures in this context.} as the means to subject decisions with an important policy component to adequate judicial review.

\textbf{V. CONCLUSION}

In this article, we have described the tensions that arise between bank resolution frameworks and priority rules in insolvency law at the level of policies and principles. We have also presented an analytical framework to explore how these tensions will give rise to practical problems when bank resolution authorities implement the new bank resolution rules. This framework identifies three layers of complexity. First, the application of these rules in the context of banking groups. Second, the existence of \textit{ex-ante} (crisis prevention) and \textit{ex-post} (crisis management) tools. And third, the need to apply bank resolution rules to cross-border banks. In this article, we have examined the practical problems that can arise when looking at the first two levels in isolation, as well as when superimposing both layers. In a succeeding article, we will examine how the application of bank resolution rules at the cross-border level leads to further complications as a result of underlying
tensions with insolvency law. We will also reflect on how these tensions are shaping the face of global banking today.