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Ethical and Aggressive Appellate Advocacy: Confronting Adverse Authority

J. Thomas Sullivan*

...we view this as one of those rare cases in which the result below is so improbable that it reveals a fundamental failure on our part to interpret the Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint on judicial discretion.

Crawford v. Washington¹

I. INTRODUCTION

The problem posed by unfavorable precedent is one that plagues appellate lawyers. Regardless of how reasonable a different result on a given claim would be in light of the facts available in a particular case, the existence of a controlling rule of law that requires rejection of the claim often frustrates counsel's best efforts at representing the client. Were we always able to write on the almost mythical "clean slate," the win/loss records of appellants' counsel would undoubtedly improve, although at the expense of appellees' counsel. Yet well-reasoned arguments and well-argued appeals for justice still prevail at times, and appellate lawyers should be cautious in assuming that precedent will necessarily prove to be unyielding in the face of creative lawyering.

The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington² demonstrates that appellate courts are susceptible to the need to correct even their own errors, suggesting that appellate lawyers should not despair when confronted by adverse decisions that will, arguably, doom their

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2. Id.
arguments. \textit{Crawford} is particularly interesting in several respects, not the least of which is that the majority's reversal in thinking did not result in the overruling of a prior decision. Instead, the majority concluded that the rationale for its prior decision in \textit{Ohio v. Roberts} was essentially too broad and permitted constitutionally-erroneous reliance.\(^3\)

The issue presented in \textit{Crawford} involved the admission of a statement made to police by an accomplice not available for cross-examination at trial.\(^4\) The defendant's wife, Sylvia, had given a statement to police officers investigating the stabbing of a man who had reportedly attempted to rape Sylvia.\(^5\) The statement was offered at trial to impeach Crawford's claim of self-defense, even though his wife did not testify.\(^6\) Crawford objected to admission of the statement\(^7\) as violative of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.\(^8\)

The Washington appellate courts reached different conclusions on admissibility of the out-of-court statement made by Crawford's wife to the police. The court of appeals concluded that the statement did not bear sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant its admission without the accused being afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.\(^9\) The state supreme court had reversed the court of appeals, holding that statements given by both Crawford and his wife were sufficiently "interlocking" to demonstrate the reliability of Sylvia's statement, thus rendering it admissible over the Sixth Amendment objection.\(^10\)

The \textit{Crawford} Court reviewed the use of the "indicia of reliability" test articulated in \textit{Ohio v. Roberts} by the lower courts for admission of testimonial statements of non-testifying accomplices in arriving at its conclusion that \textit{Roberts} was overly broad in its suggested application of this test to all confrontation issues.\(^11\) In \textit{Roberts}, a forgery and receipt of stolen property case, the critical fact was that the testimony offered in rebuttal at trial had been given at a prior proceeding in which the accused's counsel had an opportunity for cross-examination.\(^12\) The wit-

\(^3\) \textit{Id.} at 60 (citing \textit{Ohio v. Roberts}, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).

\(^4\) A confession or statement given in response to police interrogation, as well as an \textit{ex parte} affidavit, is testimonial in nature. \textit{Id.} at 52.

\(^5\) \textit{Id.} at 38.

\(^6\) \textit{Id.} at 40.

\(^7\) \textit{Id.}

\(^8\) U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." \textit{Id.}


\(^10\) State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663-64 (Wash. 2002).


\(^12\) \textit{Ohio v. Roberts}, 448 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1980). The fact that defense counsel had not
ness, who could not be located for subpoena for trial, had testified that the accused had been staying with her at her parents' home, but that she had neither given him permission to use their credit cards nor given him the forged check on her mother's account that he had in his possession.13

The Court's decision in Roberts reflected a long-standing approach to admission of hearsay in situations in which prior sworn testimony is offered at trial in the absence of the declarant.14 But the Crawford Court was concerned that the "indicia of reliability" test used to justify admission of prior statements or testimony of unavailable witnesses had been too broadly stated, suggesting that it would always provide a rationale for their admission.15 The suggested broad application of the Roberts "indicia of reliability" test was reinforced by the Court in its later 5-4 decision in Lee v. Illinois.16 There, the majority had rejected admission of an accomplice's confession despite its generally "interlocking" relationship of factual admissions contained in Lee's own statement to the police.17 The proposition that "interlocking" confessions would provide a constitutionally reasonable basis for admissibility of the non-testifying accomplice's testimony—often particularly valuable in rebutting an accused's own testimony disclaiming prior incrimination18—had been advanced in Parker v. Randolph.19

Ironically, Lee proved dispositive in the Washington Supreme Court. Even though the Lee Court had rejected the admissibility argument based primarily on the unreliability of accomplice statements incriminating others,20 the state court relied on the general proposition that "interlocking statements" demonstrate sufficient "indicia of reliability" to justify admission in the absence of cross-examination.21 Because the statements of Crawford and Sylvia did not depart on critical facts, as had the statements given to the police by Lee and his accomplice, the Wash-

engaged in a particularly rigorous cross-examination of the witness at the preliminary hearing was essentially characterized as a matter of strategy or tactics. The fact that the defense had an opportunity to cross-examine on the critical issue of consent was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. Id.

13. Id. at 58.
14. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (admitting cross-examined preliminary hearing testimony of witness unable to recall facts at trial); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (prior declaration or testimony of deceased witness admissible); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (prior trial testimony admissible where witness unavailable due to being out of the country).
17. Id. at 538-39.
ingston court concluded that Lee's doctrinal position justified admission of Sylvia's statement as an "interlocking confession."

Thus, the Crawford Court was placed in the somewhat odd position of rejecting prior doctrine without overruling its prior decisions. Ohio v. Roberts involved a correct application of the rule governing admission of prior sworn testimony. Lee v. Illinois had correctly rejected the proposition that "interlocking confessions" justified admission of an accomplice's statement to police without the accused having a meaningful opportunity for cross-examination.

The Crawford majority observed that a number of courts had applied the "indicia of reliability" test articulated in Roberts to uphold the admission of testimonial statements of accomplices who did not testify at trial and were consequently unavailable for cross-examination. In reviewing these cases, it concluded: "The legacy of Roberts in other courts vindicates the Framers' wisdom in rejecting a general reliability exception. The framework is so unpredictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations." Consequently, the Crawford Court explicitly rejected the admission of such presumptively unreliable statements—statements made to the police by accomplices—categorically.

For any appellate lawyer, Crawford stands squarely for the proposition that courts do rethink their decisions and the language they have used, and when convinced of the need to do so, overrule defective precedent. While even the very best arguments may fail to induce a court to overrule its prior decisions, cases like Crawford remind us that an important part of the development of legal doctrine involves rejection of flawed propositions. The advancement of law is not simply a straight line aimed in one direction; it is, in fact, often something more like a frayed or knotted thread or a series of curves, angles, and sharp turns. Nevertheless, courts strive to avoid departures from the norm, and even the best arguments for overruling precedent will tend toward failure, if

22. Id. at 664.
24. Id. at 58-59. The Crawford majority rejected the argument that, by implication, Lee authorized admission of a fully interlocking confession in its rejection of the statement admitted against Lee based on its divergence from the admissions in the accomplice's statement. While conceding that this inference was possible, Justice Scalia pointed out that it was not an inevitable inference, noting "[i]f Lee had meant authoritatively to announce an exception—previously unknown to this Court's jurisprudence—for interlocking confessions, it would not have done so in such an oblique manner." Id. at 59.
25. Id. at 62-65.
26. Id. at 62-63.
27. Id. at 61, 68-69.
raised at the wrong time, before the wrong panel, or on the wrong set of facts.

II. THE PREFERENCE FOR PRESERVING PRECEDENT

Appellate courts are justifiably reluctant to overrule prior decisions, as the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Paulson v. State in language expressing a commonly held sentiment:

We should not frivolously overrule established precedent. We follow the doctrine of stare decisis to promote judicial efficiency and consistency, encourage reliance on judicial decisions, and contribute to the integrity of the judicial process. But if we conclude that one of our previous decisions was poorly reasoned or is unworkable, we do not achieve these goals by continuing to follow it.

In Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, the Idaho Supreme Court offered its rationale for the principle of stare decisis. "[T]he rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow [precedent], unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." The critical feature of the system based upon precedent is its stability and predictability that permits citizens and attorneys to correctly apprehend the law in understanding its application.

While stability in legal doctrine and procedure is undoubtedly important to the maintenance of a legal system predicated on judicial decisions, the ability of the law to serve the public interest is itself dependent upon the willingness of appellate courts to rethink propositions often basic in nature and reject prior judicial expressions when necessary. For example, Justice Harlan commented on the sometimes competing virtues of stability and justice in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.:

The confidence of people in their ability to predict the legal consequences of their actions is vitally necessary to facilitate the planning of primary activity and to encourage the settlement of disputes without resort to the courts. However, that confidence is threatened least by the announcement of a new remedial rule to effectuate well-estab-

29. Id. at 571-72 (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 983.
32. The burden is typically placed upon a party arguing that the precedent, which should be overruled, would result in "injustice or great injury." See Hill v. State, 65 S.W.3d 408, 453 (Ark. 2002).
lished primary rules of behavior. With that observation, "the Supreme Court overruled a century's worth of precedent which had denied recovery for wrongful death under the general maritime law." The Mississippi Supreme Court explained its duty to overrule precedent a bit more dramatically in Brewer v. Browning:

The names of great judges of the past, who have adorned this court, have been brought into honored review, in the suggestion of error, as great names in the judicial history of this state. We revere the memory of these judges, and have great respect and deference for their decisions. Able and eminent as these judges were, they were human and fallible, and, while we would not lightly depart from rules laid down by them, still we must, where they have decided cases which operate to effect injustice or lead to wrong results, apply the corrective as though we had rendered the same decisions. We do not intend to depart lightly from precedents. We expect to consider and adhere to them where they are sound in principle; but we refuse to crucify justice on the cross of precedent.

If every attempt to overrule controlling precedent could justifiably invoke the degree of passion exhibited by the Brewer court, the problem of contesting controlling rules of law would be far less difficult for counsel. Most issues, however, offer far less drama in terms of their consequences, and the litigant is sometimes far better positioned if the controlling precedent concerns a matter engendering less passion, as in Moragne. A few decades later, the same Mississippi court observed: "Unless mischievous in its effect, and resulting in detriment to the public, a case will not be overruled although wrongly decided."

Effective appellate advocacy requires counsel to approach adverse precedent carefully, but creatively. Not infrequently, appellate lawyers fail to serve the interests of both their clients and the public by simply deferring to precedent, rather than strategically setting about to change the law.

### III. The Controlling Ethical Rules

There are surprisingly few ethical rules directed at the conduct of appellate counsel and they may be summarized quickly: counsel should represent the client competently; counsel must disclose adverse authority

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34. Id. at 403.
36. Brewer v. Browning, 76 So. 519 (Miss. 1917).
37. Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
38. Childress v. State, 195 So. 583, 584 (Miss. 1940) (emphasis added).
to the tribunal; and counsel should refrain from asserting frivolous claims or issues. A review of the specific rules should provide assurance to appellate lawyers that good faith advocacy will not result in sanction.

A. The ethical directive for competent representation

At the outset, Rule 1.1,\textsuperscript{39} the catch-all competence rule, directs lawyers to provide "competent representation to a client."\textsuperscript{40} Competence is defined by the rule as possessing the "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."\textsuperscript{41} This suggests that counsel at a minimum must be sufficiently apprised of controlling case and statutory law in the jurisdiction to advise the client properly concerning the existing state of the law with regard to those issues posed by the client's case. In addition, counsel should also be aware of the likelihood that precedent or authority contrary to the client's position may either be distinguished or overruled. Regrettably, all too often trial counsel makes a strategic or tactical decision that binds appellate counsel, rather than consulting with the attorney who will actually be representing the client on appeal at the outset of litigation. This results in many excellent arguments being forfeited or waived as a result of trial counsel's decisionmaking, or lack thereof.

What Rule 1.1 does suggest is that counsel can aggressively represent the client's interests, even in the face of adverse authority, provided counsel has a good faith basis for going forward. After all, counsel must bear in mind that virtually all changes in case law result either from the impact of legislation or from the willingness of advocates to challenge existing doctrine.

At least in criminal cases, the analog to the requirement for competent representation is suggested by the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment.\textsuperscript{42} The guarantee has been applied to representation on the direct appeal as a matter of right,\textsuperscript{43} but not to discretionary review following disposition of the direct appeal.\textsuperscript{44} The Supreme Court

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{39} Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.1 (2003).
\textsuperscript{40} Id.
\textsuperscript{41} Id.
\textsuperscript{42} U.S. Const. amend. VI.
\textsuperscript{43} E.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 79-81 (1988).
\textsuperscript{44} An indigent criminal defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel as a part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance in a petition for discretionary review in a state court or for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-19 (1974). Nor is a criminal defendant entitled to appointed counsel in a post-conviction action under the Sixth Amendment, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987), even in a case in which the death penalty has been imposed. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). Concluding that the Constitution does not guarantee a right to post-conviction attack on a criminal conviction, the
\end{footnotesize}
initially applied the right to effective assistance in representation in a direct appeal for failure to perform rather ministerial functions, such as giving timely notice of appeal.\textsuperscript{45} More recently, in \textit{Smith v. Robbins},\textsuperscript{46} the Court held that counsel's decision not to raise an issue on direct appeal could constitute ineffectiveness, provided the two-prong standard for ineffectiveness applied in \textit{Strickland v. Washington}\textsuperscript{47} is met. With regard to the latter type of claims, however, the Strickland test is rendered somewhat more difficult than might otherwise be obvious by the Court's deference to counsel's professional judgment in determining what issues should be advanced in the direct appeal.\textsuperscript{48}

The interplay of rules governing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel most likely means that a decision by counsel not to challenge existing adverse authority or precedent will probably not be found to be ineffective when counsel has chosen other issues to argue in the direct appeal. \textit{Smith v. Robbins}, however, offers the possibility that a claim of ineffectiveness might potentially prove meritorious if counsel is unaware of recent trends in the law that suggest that the precedent will not withstand attack, or if counsel deliberately chose to argue points having little or no potential for reversal when the client sought to have a controlling principle overruled, and there was simply no strategically sound reason for not doing so.

In the context of civil litigation, the remedy available for counsel's defective performance is a negligence action for legal malpractice.\textsuperscript{49} These claims are difficult to establish, in part because the same deference to counsel's professional judgment that characterizes the Court's interpretation of the effective assistance guarantee in \textit{Jones v. Barnes} appears to generally apply to counsel's performance in civil appeals.\textsuperscript{50}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[47] Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The \textit{Strickland} test requires the defendant to first demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently and not as a result of an objectively reasonable strategy. \textit{id.} at 690-91. The second prong requires a showing that but for counsel's defective performance, there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome in the proceeding. \textit{id.} at 694.
\item[48] In \textit{Jones v. Barnes}, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), the Court held that counsel was not required to argue all colorable claims, even despite the express wishes of the client, because the conduct of the appeal is generally committed to counsel's professional judgment.
\item[50] In a civil action, \textit{Randall v. Bantz}, Gosch, Cremer, Peterson & Sommers, 883 F. Supp.
Moreover, recovery is typically foreclosed by a more rigid test than that imposed as the second prong of Strickland; the plaintiff is required to show that the appeal would have succeeded "but for" counsel's errors.51

While the general approach of Rule 1.1 is designed to ensure competence in representation, in fact, there is not a very strong enforcement mechanism for determining when competence has not been demonstrated, nor prospects for litigants challenging the performance of their counsel on appeal. In addition to the general admonition of Rule 1.1, counsel must bear in mind the two specific rules that specifically bear on the conduct of the appeal.

B. The "good faith" approach to challenging precedent

First, Rule 3.1 provides the framework for aggressive appellate advocacy:

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.52

The rule provides an opening for creative lawyering in affording counsel the option of arguing the need for overruling precedent.53 The key is that the argument be made in good faith, which, at a minimum, suggests the need for counsel to formulate a colorable reason why the precedent should be overturned, limited, or distinguished.54 A failure to set forth a colorable legal reason for overruling, however, is likely to be considered fatal to the request.

Ethical rules authorize the imposition of sanctions against a party or

449, 450 (D.S.D. 1995), the malpractice claim was rejected where the plaintiff argued that his appellate counsel failed to present issues for the purpose of preserving his option of petitioning for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Because the issues had not been argued in the appellate court, the option of petitioning for certiorari was not available. See Wisotsky, supra note 49, at 580 (noting the testimony of a constitutional law expert's opinion that issues proposed by a lawyer were far more likely to succeed than those proposed by the client).


53. "The role of an advocate necessarily is to be partisan for his or her client ...." BRENT E. NEWTON, NAT'L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, CRIMINAL LITIGATION AND LEGAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 5 (2004), available at http://www.nita.org/sampleChp/crimlitigation.pdf.

54. The Supreme Court has advanced its definition for legal "frivolity" in holding that a legal argument is frivolous when it "is squarely foreclosed by statute, rule, or authoritative court decision." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 894 (1983). In this circumstance, the Court has concluded that the holding is not subject to being reconsidered or overruled. A claim is factually frivolous when "lacking any factual basis in the record of the case." Id.
counsel for advancing a frivolous appeal. For instance, the applicable rule in Arkansas, set forth only in the rules governing civil appeals, provides that "a frivolous appeal or proceeding is one that has no reasonable legal or factual basis." Curiously, but perhaps realistically, the "frivolous appeal" language of Rule 11 of the civil appellate rules has no counterpart in the separate rules that govern the conduct of Arkansas criminal appeals.

However, in a State’s appeal attempted by the Arkansas Attorney General, State v. Warren, the state supreme court sanctioned counsel for violation of criminal appeal rule 3(c). This rule does not define a specific "frivolousness" standard, but defines only the standard applicable for assessing the proper grounds for taking a state’s appeal. Counsel taking the appeal in the case ran afoul of the certification rule because its only attempt at justifying the appeal was expressed in terms of the Attorney General being "‘not happy with the Ross decision’" and because it considered the prior decision to have been "‘wrongly decided.’" Relying on its previously applied standards for imposition of sanctions for taking a frivolous appeal in a civil case in Stilley v. Hubbs, the Warren court concluded "[w]e will not allow the State to pursue frivolous appeals of criminal matters without recourse when we have held that such actions in a civil case warrant sanctions." The court then ordered the State’s appeal dismissed and referred its opinion to the Commission on Professional Conduct, as well as identifying the offending


56. ARK. R. App. P., Civ. R. 11(b) (West 2005). In Jones v. Jones, 944 S.W.2d 121 (Ark. 1997), the court invoked the rule and ordered counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed.


58. Id.

59. ARK. R. App. P., Crim. R. 3(c) (West 2005), which addresses appeals taken by the state, requires the Office of the Attorney General to certify that a state’s appeal is essential to ensure correct and uniform application of criminal law.

60. Warren, 49 S.W.3d at 106. In State v. Ross, 39 S.W.3d 789, 790-91 (Ark. 2001), the court had unequivocally held that under the Youthful Offender Act a prior felony conviction could not support a subsequent felon-in-possession charge.


63. Id.
Assistant Attorney General by name in its published opinion.\textsuperscript{64}

The court's treatment of appellate counsel in \textit{Warren} reflects only part of the picture. Courts themselves often err in their evaluation of frivolousness of claims advanced by counsel on appeal. The classic example is presented by the history of litigation in \textit{McKnight v. General Motors Corp.},\textsuperscript{65} in which the Seventh Circuit rejected as frivolous a claim that section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be applied retroactively in light of prior circuit authority. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the frivolousness determination, while the claim itself was rejected on the merits.\textsuperscript{66} Despite the prior holdings of the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court concluded that the issue was not frivolous because other courts had resolved the question differently, demonstrating a reasonable basis for asserting the claim as well as preserving the issue until finally resolved by the Court.\textsuperscript{67}

Perhaps chastened by the prior disposition in \textit{McKnight}, the Seventh Circuit recently rejected sanctions while finding that an appellant's claims were barred by both existing Supreme Court and circuit precedent in \textit{Brunt v. Service Employees Int'l Union}.\textsuperscript{68} The circuit court observed:

Appellants did attempt to distinguish their case from [controlling authority], and we defer to the district court's finding that Appellants' complaint was not so frivolous that Rule 11 sanctions are warranted.\textsuperscript{69}

The credible attempt to distinguish controlling authority was sufficient to establish counsel's good faith in raising the issue and avoiding sanctions. Given the possibility that the reviewing court might have concurred with counsel's argument, or at least offered some intellectual support for challenge to existing Supreme Court precedent, counsel's assertion of the claim and supporting argument were consistent with ethical and aggressive appellate advocacy. Further, in order to preserve the claim for challenge in the Supreme Court in which that Court would be asked to overrule or distinguish its precedent, counsel was required to assert the claim in the intermediate court, a position perhaps lost on intermediate appellate judges.

The treatment of the State's appeal in \textit{Warren} and different approaches to civil and criminal representation in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct emphasize the deference paid to criminal coun-

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{64} Id. at 106.
\bibitem{66} Id. at 659-60.
\bibitem{67} Id.
\bibitem{68} Brunt v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 284 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2002).
\bibitem{69} Id. at 721.
\end{thebibliography}
sel's exercise of strategic decisionmaking which is reflected in a number of ways in the criminal justice system. The right to effective assistance of counsel, ensured by the Sixth Amendment, establishes the extent to which representation in criminal matters is deemed central to the correct operation of the justice system. Attorneys representing civil litigants simply do not enjoy quite the same sense of autonomy in advising their clients, just as appellate lawyers have less autonomy than trial counsel in their conduct of litigation.\textsuperscript{70}

C. The duty to disclose adverse authority

The model rules impose a duty on counsel to disclose adverse authority to the court not otherwise disclosed by opposing counsel.\textsuperscript{71} Rule 3.3(a)(2) specifically directs: "(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . (2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel . . . ."\textsuperscript{72} The language of the rule does not confine the disclosure duty to "precedent," or "binding precedent," or even "persuasive authority."\textsuperscript{73} Rather, it suggests a broader duty to litigate forthrightly, even when deception or suppression of known authority would arguably help the client.

This suggestion of a broader duty to disclose than one limited to "binding precedent," or prior authority dictating a particular result based on application of a legal rule in cases resting on materially indistinguishable facts, was clearly relied upon by the court in \textit{Rural Water System \# 1 v. City of Sioux Center, Iowa}.\textsuperscript{74} In moving for summary judgment at trial, Rural Water System’s counsel had failed to disclose the existence of a Sixth Circuit opinion adverse to its position\textsuperscript{75} in the litigation against the City. The court observed:

\begin{quote}
Although \textit{Scioto Water} is the only published decision of a federal circuit court of appeals either this court or the parties have found that considers directly one of the questions presented here—whether a party that has paid off or bought out its loans from the FmHA can
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{70} The reason is simple: unlike trial counsel, appellate counsel is restricted by the record created in the trial court and generally will not be permitted to raise new theories or issues not advanced at trial, or error not preserved properly by trial counsel.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct} R. 3.3(a)(2) (2003).

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{73} For an excellent discussion of these differing concepts of "authority" in the context of "no citation" rules and practices implicated by unpublished appellate opinions, see Stephen R. Barnett, \textit{From Anastasoff to Hart to West’s Federal Appendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules}, \textit{4 J. App. Prac. \\& Process} 1, 9-12 (2002).

\textsuperscript{74} Rural Water Sys. \# 1 v. City of Sioux Ctr., Iowa, 967 F. Supp. 1483 (N.D. Iowa 1997).

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Id}.

\textit{at} 1498 n.2 (citing Scioto County Reg’l Water Dist. No. 1 v. Scioto Water Inc., 103 F.3d 38 (6th CIR. 1996)).
still assert the protections of § 1926(b)—it is not even mentioned in [Rural Water System # 1’s (hereinafter RWS # 1)] opening briefs in support of RWS # 1’s motions for summary judgment. *This omission is all the more odd, because not only was the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down on December 18, 1996, approximately three weeks before the present cross-motions for summary judgment were filed, but counsel for RWS # 1 here was counsel for the defendants-appellees in the Scioto Water case. Nor can RWS # 1’s counsel’s omission of the decision in Scioto Water be excused on the basis that the City had already brought the decision to this court’s attention, because the City’s and RWS # 1’s cross-motions for summary judgment were filed the same day. RWS # 1’s counsel thus had no assurance that the City’s counsel would bring the Scioto Water decision to the court’s attention.*

The court found counsel’s omission ethically unacceptable, if not strictly warranting sanction, and its condemnation is worth considering:

It is hardly the issue that the rules of professional conduct require only the disclosure of controlling authority, see, e.g., C.P.R. DR 7-106(B)(1), which the decision of a court of appeals in another circuit certainly is not. In this court’s view, the rules of professional conduct establish the “floor” or “minimum” standards for professional conduct, not the “ceiling”; basic notions of professionalism demand something higher. Although the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is obviously not controlling on this federal district court in the Eighth Circuit, RWS # 1’s counsel’s omission of the Scioto Water decision from RWS # 1’s opening briefs smacks of concealment of obviously relevant and strongly persuasive authority simply because it is contrary to RWS # 1’s position. RWS # 1’s counsel did not hesitate to cite a decision of the Colorado Supreme Court on comparable issues, although that decision is factually distinguishable, probably because that decision appears to support RWS # 1’s position. *This selective citation of authorities, when so few decisions are dead on point, is not good faith advocacy, or even legitimate “hard ball.” At best, it constitutes failure to confront and distinguish or discredit contrary authority, and, at worst, constitutes an attempt to hide from the court and opposing counsel a decision that is adverse to RWS # 1’s position simply because it is adverse.*

Thus, while strict compliance with the controlling rule may be avoided, many courts will not find a deliberate attempt to conceal relevant authority within the scope of “good faith advocacy, or even legitimate ‘hard ball.’”

76. *Id.* (emphasis added).
77. *Id.* (last emphasis added).
78. *Id.*
The Model Rules do not unreasonably constrain counsel needing to address adverse authority, but they do provide a framework for understanding the parameters of counsel’s creativity. Even the most reserved appellate attorneys will undoubtedly have to deal with contrary precedent or authority and they should be prepared to do so. In order to effectively assess the options available in representing the client’s interests, it is necessary that appellate lawyers think about alternatives for avoiding the application of existing rules which will frustrate those interests.

IV. DEALING WITH UNFAVORABLE, CONTROLLING PRECEDENT

The most difficult problem faced by an appellate counsel often involves the existence of unfavorable precedent within the jurisdiction that is apparently controlling in the factual context. Counsel may have sound reasons for challenging the existing rule or principle and for arguing that controlling precedents should be overruled or distinguished. A number of tactical options in dealing with unfavorable precedent, even within the constraints of the combined requirements of Rules 3.1 and 3.3(a)(2), should be considered when confronting the problem of adverse authority.

A. Challenging unfavorable precedent

Quite often, it is simply implausible to suggest that precedent will not control the disposition of the case, or that prior decisions can be distinguished on their facts. This is particularly true when the precedent reflects repeated application of a rule or principle in a number of cases in which facts were sufficiently different as to suggest that the controlling rule could have been avoided, but in which the reviewing courts rejected the factual distinction arguments and continued to apply and extend the existing principle or rule.

When faced with the need to challenge unfavorable precedent directly, counsel should remain aware of the dual requirements for ethical advocacy set forth in Rules 3.1 and 3.3(a)(2). First, counsel should identify the controlling precedent in the opening brief, or in the preservation of error at the trial level, if possible. Second, counsel must be prepared to advance the argument that the court should either not apply or in the alternative overrule the precedent. In doing so, counsel should bear in mind one overriding principle: in a system governed by judicial precedent, evolution of legal doctrine necessarily requires courts to respond to precisely the types of arguments that must be made by an appellate lawyer aggressively representing the client’s interest. Rather than approaching the problem of contrary precedent apologetically, counsel should affirmatively address the existing rule or principle in
terms of the common law tradition in which change is the result of good faith challenges to existing rules and principles.

In structuring the approach to be taken in challenging unfavorable precedent, it is important to remember the various contexts in which judicially-made law undergoes change. The posture of an appellate court is not simply the result of common agreement that existing rules or principles are correct. Courts themselves are often reluctant to rely on existing precedent, but find themselves bound by prior decisions, or lacking sufficient grounds for overruling them. Similarly, the views of appellate judges change over time and changing views are often manifested in changing law.

To ensure that challenges to existing precedent are not treated as frivolous, counsel should be prepared to fashion an appellate argument that fits within the directives of Rule 3.1. Additionally, a good faith basis for arguing that precedent should be overruled is required to avoid a finding that an argument or point is frivolous. At least three different tactical approaches may be taken or used in combination.

1. CHANGING DOCTRINE AS THE NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION

First, counsel should always rely on prior dissenting opinions from the Supreme Court, state supreme court, or lower appellate courts to support the argument for overruling precedent. The history of appellate practice shows that dissents often evolve into majority positions and reliance on dissenting opinions to ask for overruling existing authority provides a reasonable, good faith starting point for the argument.

An example of a good faith challenge to existing precedent that ultimately proved successful may be drawn from the Roberts/Crawford litigation. In State v. Earnest, a New Mexico murder prosecution, the State attempted to force testimony from an accomplice, Boeglin, who had implicated the defendant in one of four statements he had given to police on the day of the arrest. Earnest, Boeglin, and a third defendant, Connor, were charged with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and

79. For example, Justice Blackmun dissented from the plurality which held existing capital punishment schemes unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). By the time of his retirement from the Court, his experience in reviewing capital litigation led him to conclude that imposition of the death penalty, in practice, could not be squared with constitutional guarantees of due process. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

80. For a general discussion of the role of precedent in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, see Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2001).


82. Id. at 874.
kidnapping in the murder of Eastman, who was supposedly suspected by the other three men of informing on drug trafficking to police. Eastman had left Boeglin’s residence with Boeglin and Connor in his own car. The next morning his body was found on the side of a state highway and Boeglin, Earnest, and Connor were later arrested in possession of the vehicle. Because of the absence of physical evidence linking Earnest to the murder, the prosecution needed Boeglin’s testimony in order to obtain a conviction. Boeglin refused to testify despite a grant of immunity and contempt citation. This resulted in a twenty-six year sentence for contempt that was subsequently overturned on appeal.\footnote{State v. Boeglin, 686 P.2d 257, 257-58 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).} The trial court ordered a mistrial as a result of his refusal to testify, purportedly based on Earnest’s mistrial motions contesting the court’s attempt to force Boeglin to testify.

After rejecting Earnest’s double jeopardy claim, the trial court ordered a retrial.\footnote{The state supreme court rejected Earnest’s argument that the declaration of mistrial failed to satisfy the “manifest necessity” test justifying retrial over his prior jeopardy claim, concluding that defense counsel’s repeated mistrial motions had waived the prior jeopardy bar. Earnest, 703 P.2d at 874-75.} This time, when Boeglin refused to testify, the court declared him unavailable and permitted the State to offer his statement implicating Earnest as a declaration against penal interest. On direct appeal, Earnest relied on \textit{Douglas v. Alabama}\footnote{Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1965).} for the proposition that the lack of any opportunity for cross-examination of Boeglin violated his right to confrontation. The State countered that \textit{Ohio v. Roberts} had by implication overruled \textit{Douglas}, supplanting the “indicia of reliability” test for cross-examination as the test for admission under the Confrontation Clause.\footnote{Earnest, 703 P.2d at 875-76.}

The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that \textit{Douglas}, rather than \textit{Roberts}, controlled on the facts presented because the prior statement admitted in \textit{Roberts} was preliminary hearing testimony where the defendant had had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness,\footnote{Id. at 876.} and it reversed the lower court’s decision.\footnote{Id.} The Attorney General, however, did not accept this disposition. Instead, the State petitioned for review in the Supreme Court again arguing that \textit{Roberts} had effectively abrogated \textit{Douglas}. The case was argued, but not decided. Instead, the Court vacated the state supreme court’s judgment reversing Earnest’s conviction and remanded for reconsideration\footnote{New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986).} in light of its then-recent deci-
Moreover, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Powell and O'Connor, concurred in the order remanding Earnest. He observed that Lee overruled Douglas by implication, adopting the rationale of Roberts, and that Lee had apparently adopted the "indicia of reliability" test as determinative of even an accomplice’s statement to police. Justice Rehnquist concluded that after Lee, state courts could admit statements of non-testifying co-defendants, assuming that the prosecution could overcome the "weighty presumption of unreliability attaching to codefendant statements by demonstrating that the particular statement at issue bears sufficient 'indicia of reliability' to satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns."

On remand, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that Boeglin’s statement to police was sufficiently reliable as a statement against his penal interest to justify its admission despite the lack of any opportunity for Earnest to cross-examine Boeglin. The persistence of the Attorney General in correctly concluding—at least prior to the Court’s recent holding in Crawford—that Roberts had dramatically reshaped our understanding of the parameters of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment represented reliance on the type of good faith argument for overruling precedent that is a hallmark of creative lawyering.

2. LOOK FOR SUPPORT IN CIRCUIT SPLITS

As a second strategy, counsel should identify splits in circuits or jurisdictions that have previously ruled on the issue raised, and marshal arguments reflecting the contrary view taken in those courts favorable to the client’s position. A showing that reasonable jurists disagree on the point or its resolution should meet the requirement for demonstrating that a claim or argument is not frivolous under the standards implicitly recognized in similar contexts.

An example of an argument for overruling precedent based on rea-

91. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 649-50 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
94. The standard within the federal appellate system for the granting of a certificate of appealability for review of an adverse determination in a federal habeas action is a showing that the issue is one on which reasonable jurists debate or disagree. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). By definition, a colorable claim which meets the standard for the certificate would seemingly also demonstrate a non-frivolous claim. See Newton, supra note 55 (discussing frivolousness findings in the Fifth Circuit).
soning applied by other courts or differing conclusions reached on the same issue is demonstrated by the treatment of claims of cumulative error arising from multiple acts of ineffective assistance in criminal cases. Both Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit refuse to consider claims of cumulative ineffectiveness in counsel’s performance. Arguably, this approach contravenes the clear holding of Strickland v. Washington, in which the Court specifically addressed the question of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel in terms of “showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” It is clear from the repeated reference to the plural “errors” in the opinion that the Court contemplated cumulative consideration of counsel’s performance, as well as individual errors.

But Strickland’s language is sufficiently vague that lower courts have been inconsistent in their understanding of its appreciation for the cumulation of counsel’s errors. In fact, there is a significant split among jurisdictions on the application of cumulative error analysis to ineffective assistance claims. Even jurisdictions recognizing cumulative error analysis are careful to require that the cumulation relates to actual deficiencies that could be termed “errors” on the part of counsel, rather than claims of deficient performance not amounting to errors, as the Tenth Circuit pointed out in United States v. Rivera.

Some jurisdictions have rejected cumulative error analysis by effectively concluding that in the absence of any single error warranting relief, there can be no cumulation of errors. This approach appears to ignore the precise rationale for the doctrine of cumulative error generally, as the Rivera Court pointed out:

The cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error. The purpose of a cumulative-error analysis is

95. See Parks v. State, 785 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Ark. 1990). Parks cites to Isom v. State, 682 S.W.2d 755 (Ark. 1985), which in turn cites Guy v. State, 668 S.W.2d 952 (Ark. 1984), and Henderson v. State, 663 S.W.2d 734 (Ark. 1984), as supporting the same proposition. Isom, 682 S.W.2d at 758. But Henderson did not involve a claim of cumulative ineffectiveness and the doctrine of cumulative error in counsel’s deficient performance is never discussed, even in dicta. See Henderson, 663 S.W.2d at 734. Thus, the Arkansas rule is wholly unfounded in the court’s own precedents.


98. Id.

99. Id. at 678, 679, 682, 693, 694, 695, 696.

100. United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469-72 (10th Cir. 1990).

101. Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1126 (Fla. 2003); McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 701 (Ky. 1986).
to address that possibility.102 Ironically, both Arkansas courts103 and the Eighth Circuit104 recognize cumulative error analysis in other contexts.

In contrast to the approach taken by a minority of courts, a substantial number of courts have recognized the applicability of cumulative error analysis in assessing counsel’s effectiveness when appropriate situations arise.105 The significant number of jurisdictions recognizing cumulative error analysis for ineffective assistance claims may afford a good faith basis on which to challenge the Arkansas and Eighth Circuit positions, as well as suggesting the potential “cert-worthiness” for such a claim in a petition to the Supreme Court.

3. RELYING ON PERSUASIVE SECONDARY SOURCES

As a third tactic, counsel should consider citing secondary sources, such as law review commentary, both favorable to the position being advanced and critical to existing precedent. The partial overruling of the Supreme Court’s decision in Swain v. Alabama106 by its later holding in Batson v. Kentucky demonstrates an example of law review critique of controlling precedent.107 Both cases stand for the proposition that the prosecution cannot use its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion in a criminal trial by removing minority venirepersons from service on the petit jury. The Swain holding, however, had required defendants to demonstrate a pattern and practice of discrimination in the use of peremptories by prosecutors so difficult that it could seldom be achieved. The Batson Court referred to this burden as “crippling” in formulating a new rule for preservation of the claim of discrim-

102. Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1469 (relying on United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Canales, 744 F.2d 413, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1984)).


105. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991); Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1101-02 (3d Cir. 1996); Cooper v. Sowders, 837 F.2d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1988); Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1995); Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1994); Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2003); Bowers v. State, 578 A.2d 734, 743-44 (Md. 1990); Green v. State, 569 S.E.2d 318, 324-25 (S.C. 2002).


inatory use of peremptories. The Court also noted that the Swain procedure had been criticized by commentators in law review articles. The existence of significant negative commentary on existing precedent in the nation's law reviews represents an important source of argument supporting the need for change and should not be overlooked by counsel struggling with adverse authority.

A classic example of the impact a law review article may have in supporting an argument for overruling precedent is demonstrated by *Houghland Farms v. Johnson*, in which the Idaho Supreme Court revisited the issue of the scope of the state's long-arm jurisdiction statute. The proper scope of jurisdiction is particularly significant because it limits the authority of trial courts within the state over nonresident defendants, and in an era of increasing interstate commerce, there are strong policy reasons for both expansive and restrictive notions of this jurisdiction. In *Houghland*, the trial court had asserted long-arm jurisdiction over an out-of-state loan broker who had contacted the Idaho plaintiff about refinancing its loan on business interests located in Arizona, relying on the prior decision in *Beco Corp. v. Roberts & Sons Constr. Co.* The court overruled its prior decision in *Beco*, relying upon the analysis by Professor Lewis criticizing the *Beco* holding in an article published in the Idaho Law Review.

Professor Lewis's article was not merely persuasive; it dominated the court's approach in overruling precedent. Moreover, because significant decisions are the subject of articles and student-written com-

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108. *Id.* at 92-93 & n.17 (noting lower court concern that the burden could not reasonably be met).
109. *Id.* at 90 & n.14.
111. *Idaho Code* § 5-514(a) (Michie 1990).
114. *Houghland*, 803 P.2d at 983-87. Although the court held that the minimum contacts test was demonstrated by the facts concerning the defendant's presence in Idaho, it concluded that fair play and substantial justice considerations did not warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. *Id.* at 984-85.
118. In *Carter v. City of Chattanooga*, 803 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1986), the Sixth Circuit considered the application of its prior holding in *Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't*, 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983), *aff'd sub nom. Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court, to a civil rights claim brought before the circuit court's holding in *Garner*. The plaintiff sought retroactive application of the circuit's decision in *Garner* holding that Tennessee's fleeing felon statute was unconstitutional. *Carter*, 803 F.2d at 219. In assessing the retroactivity argument, the court noted the substantial number of law review articles that had challenged police deadly force policies. *Id.* at 222 & n.2.
ments and casenotes, this type of supporting authority is typically readily available for major cases, and often for more minor ones.

B. Practical considerations in confronting adverse precedent

Appellate counsel considering a frontal assault on precedent should consider the basic reasons why courts overrule prior decisions, or agree with arguments for exceptions to application of existing precedent. Generally, these may be summarized as follows:

1. Changing composition of the court

A change in the composition of the court itself is the most obvious factor that appellate counsel may rely upon in advising the client on the potential success of a challenge to existing precedent. Although a change in court personnel is not a basis for legal argument and in fact, suggesting it may incur the wrath of justices concerned with being viewed as activist in their approach to precedent and stare decisis, it is clearly an avenue for counsel's creativity.

The willingness of a "new" majority of an appellate court to reexamine precedent typically reflects the judicial philosophy of key judges for whom precedent is less controlling than other considerations. Most importantly, overruling of prior precedent typically occurs in supreme courts rather than intermediate appellate courts. Judges at the top tier of an appellate system are more susceptible to equitable and justice arguments offered in support of change in the law because that is consistent with the function of a court of last resort in a three-tiered judicial

119. For an interesting exchange regarding the value of student-written law review notes, compare the positions taken by the majority and dissenting judges in State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blevins, 551 N.E.2d 955 (Ohio 1990). The issue before the court concerned whether an arbitrator could award punitive damages on a claim based on an insurance contract. Id. at 957. A prior decision of the court in Hutchinson v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 478 N.E.2d 1000 (Ohio 1985), had held that punitive damages could be awarded on the basis of a standard policy provision promising to pay for losses incurred by the insured. The majority in Blevins observed that the holding in Hutchinson was "controversial" and had been "sharply criticized" in law review commentaries. Blevins, 551 N.E.2d at 958 & n.3. The majority's decision to overrule Hutchinson, id. at 959, itself drew criticism from Justice Sweeney in dissent. Id. at 959-62 (Sweeney, J., dissenting). He attacked the majority's reliance on student written law review articles, which he argued included misinterpretations of the term dictum and an incorrect assertion that the Hutchinson court had not properly cited authority. Id. at 961 & n.5 (Sweeney, J., dissenting). The conflict in the majority and dissenting opinions suggests that appellate counsel take care in citing law review materials, particularly when written by law students. But courts continue to rely on student-written materials in support of their positions. See, e.g., Carter, 803 F.2d at 223 n.3: "For a comprehensive discussion of the trend of the law in the fleeing felon rule, see Comment, The Unconstitutional Use of Deadly Force Against Nonviolent Felons, 18 Georgia Law Review, 137 (1983)."
The classic example of a changing court composition influencing an important principle of law is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's treatment of victim impact evidence in capital prosecutions. This evidence is considered essential in the movement for integrating the rights of victims and their families into the criminal justice system. Death penalty defense counsel and capital punishment opponents view the evidence skeptically because it invites imposition of the death penalty based on passion or sympathy present in a particular case and may arbitrarily or unfairly subject some defendants to capital punishment. Nevertheless, the movement for inclusion of such evidence in capital trials has generally been successful.

When initially considered by the Supreme Court in the context of an Eighth Amendment/due process challenge in *Booth v. Maryland*, the Court held that this evidence was fraught with potential for abuse in the imposition of capital sentences. The Court reaffirmed this position two years later in *South Carolina v. Gathers*. However, just two years later, the Court's membership had changed and so had its view of victim impact evidence. In *Payne v. Tennessee* a new majority of the Court overruled *Booth* with Chief Justice Rehnquist justifying the change in constitutional interpretation or policy in terms of the narrow majority in *Booth* and its lack of lengthy tradition as precedent. *Payne* vividly demonstrates that a change in the composition of an appellate court may undercut a narrow or single vote majority resulting in a shift in our understanding of the meaning of even basic constitutional guarantees.

Arguing for the overruling of existing precedent, Chief Justice Rehnquist's position in *Payne* provides a good faith basis for challenging a rule or principle on the grounds that the prior holding was the result of a narrow majority's view of the issue, or that the holding was...
incorrect and has not withstood the test of time.\textsuperscript{125} He pointed out that
the Court had overruled thirty three decisions in whole or part over the
past twenty years, and argued "[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable com-
mand; rather it 'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision.'\textsuperscript{126}

Counsel seeking an argument for overruling prior precedent should
consider referencing Chief Justice Rehnquist's position,\textsuperscript{127} particularly
when challenging recent precedent or narrowly decided prior holdings in
order to demonstrate a good faith basis for the argument.

Although the changed composition of an appellate court may
explain a rejection of precedent, it does not constitute a good faith argu-
ment for overruling precedent by counsel. In Jones v. Jones,\textsuperscript{128} the
Arkansas Supreme Court imposed sanctions for counsel's assertion that
a change in the court's composition justified a petition for rehearing in
protracted litigation in the case.\textsuperscript{129} In her petition, counsel candidly argued:

A. The ruling in the March 7, 1997 \textit{per curiam} order indicating that
the emotional needs issue was decided on it [sic] merits, and not on
procedural grounds, could not be accurately determined with the cur-
rent court. The Court erred in proclaiming that the November 22,
1996, mandate (Jones I) was decided on its merits, rather than on
procedural grounds for three reasons. First, Justice Brown, who was
a sitting Justice at the time that the Arkansas Supreme Court rein-
stated custody of the minor child to Ms. Jones (in Jones I) on Novem-
ber 22, 1996, indicated in his concurring opinion that the case was
reversed and remanded on procedural grounds, not on its merits. At
the time of the original hearing, Chief Justice Jesson, Associate Jus-
tice Roaf, and Associate Justice Dudley were sitting on the Court.
When the Writ of Prohibition was decided, Chief Justice Jesson, who
actually wrote the opinion, and Associate Justices Roaf and Dudley
were no longer on the Court. At this time, it would be difficult to

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\item 125. \textit{Id.} at 828-30:
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\item \textit{Booth} and \textit{Gathers} were decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents
challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions. They have been questioned
by Members of the Court in later decisions and have defied consistent application
by the lower courts.
\item 126. \textit{Id.} (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
(observing that \textit{stare decisis} is less rigid in application when applied to constitutional precedents).
\item 128. Jones v. Jones, 947 S.W.2d 6 (Ark. 1997).
\item 129. The history of litigation in \textit{Jones} was extensive. \textit{See} Jones v. Jones, 852 S.W.2d 325
(Ark. 1995); Jones v. Jones, 907 S.W.2d 745 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995); Jones v. Jones, 931 S.W.2d
767 (Ark. 1996). This extensive litigation in the appellate courts might have influenced counsel to
conclude that changed composition of the supreme court would lead to a different result, of
course.
\end{itemize}
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determine whether the November 22, 1996 Court (Jones I) reversed the trial court and the Arkansas Court of Appeals on procedural or substantive grounds as only four Justices that comprised the November 22, 1996 (Jones I) Court remain on the Supreme Court. Of those four, only three Justices were of the opinion that the case was reversed on substantive grounds. Three Justices do not comprise a majority the (Jones I) Court of November 22, 1996. Without the participation of Chief Justice Jesson and Associate Justices Roaf and Dudley, it would be impossible to know the basis for his or her ruling (in Jones I) on November 22, 1996.130

The court noted counsel’s attempt to pre-empt adverse consequences by acknowledging the possibility that her advocacy had “overstepped the line,” but nevertheless determined that the failure to predicate the petition for rehearing on a specific factual or legal error in the original opinion constituted an abuse of the rehearing process.131 Consequently, the court imposed sanctions, awarding costs and attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party.132

2. CHANGE REFLECTING GENERAL PUBLIC CONSENSUS

The classic example of a long-term challenge to existing precedent is the work of Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP in its litigation strategy133 to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson.134 The eventual victory in Brown v. Board of Education135 was the product of direct challenge to the continuing viability of Plessy. Certainly, the historical record reflects substantial social and political support for the Court’s 1954 action in Brown, but it is not clear legally that there was any greater force to the legal argument which finally prevailed than to that which caused Justice Harlan to dissent in Plessy.136

There are probably no unresolved issues in American constitutional jurisprudence of the magnitude of Plessy/Brown. Developments in

130. Jones, 947 S.W.2d at 8.
131. Id. Justice Brown, who had disagreed with the majority’s characterization that the court’s prior holdings had been rendered on the merits, argued instead that the case had been decided on procedural grounds. He concurred specifically in the disposition on rehearing, explaining the lack of a good faith basis for counsel’s petition under the supreme court’s rules. Id. at 9 (Brown, J., concurring) (citing ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-3(g), which sets forth the recognized grounds for rehearing).
132. Jones, 947 S.W.2d at 8.
133. E.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (holding Virginia law mandating segregation of passengers on interstate motor carriers invalid as burden on interstate commerce).
136. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan observed that the doctrine of separate, but equal “will, in time prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case.” Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
CONFRONTING ADVERSE AUTHORITY

medicine, biology, and digital technology, however, suggest long term litigation battles will be fought pertaining to rights to life, medical treatment, death, and privacy. Nevertheless, even less “significant” issues than legally enforced discrimination based upon race warrant recurring review and relitigation. This is particularly true when the underlying issue involves competing views of fundamental rights or potential conflicts between constitutional principles that may induce courts of last resort to revisit prior decisions. For instance, there will likely be continuing conflict over the interpretation of the limits of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, thus exemplifying a tension that may never be finally resolved.

Another obvious example lies in the Supreme Court’s reversal of position regarding criminalization of adult homosexual sodomy. In 1986, the Court upheld the authority of states to criminalize consensual adult sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick. The Bowers majority rejected the dissenter’s argument that this conduct had generally been subject to decriminalization over time, reflecting a national consensus that adult homosexual sodomy was protected by federal constitutional guarantees. Less than twenty years later, a majority of the Justices reversed the Court’s position in Lawrence v. Texas, holding that the state’s sodomy law violated the liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause.

Moreover, the changing legal landscape on major social issues is not necessarily limited to appeals raising federal constitutional issues. Significant questions of state constitutional law may also influence major doctrinal changes by a state court of last resort. For example, even before the Supreme Court’s shift in constitutional policy in Lawrence, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down the state’s sodomy statute in Jegley v. Picado, relying on the state’s historical protection of privacy in state law. The Lawrence Court noted the action taken in Jegley v. Picado and other state court decisions rejecting criminalization of consensual homosexual activity in reaching its conclusion.

While conservative critics of the Supreme Court may characterize

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139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
142. Lawrence, 529 U.S. at 570-71 (“Over the course of the last decades, States with same-sex prohibitions have moved toward abolishing them.”). The court then cited several cases addressing prohibitions on same-sex sodomy. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct.
Lawrence and other decisions as "activist," the Court's action in this case might be viewed in an entirely different light. Lawrence rests, at least in part, on the perception of at least some Justices who must be viewed as conservative—Justice Kennedy—or moderate—Justice O'Connor—that Bowers v. Hardwick was no longer constitutionally viable. Had this conclusion been reached simply on a difference in ideological or moral positions of the Court's membership, the "activist" label might be appropriate. The Lawrence majority, however, looked to the determinations of state legislatures in concluding that Bowers no longer reflected a national consensus on the proper scope of the liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause. Clearly, it does not rest on the strict constructionist sentiment that prompted a narrow majority in Bowers to hold that criminalization of sodomy was constitutionally permissible because it was contemplated by the drafters of the critical amendments, or by the state legislatures representing the citizens in ratifying those amendments, a proposition questioned by the Lawrence majority. In fact, the Lawrence majority ultimately concluded that Bowers had not been supported by historical precedent, as claimed by the Bowers plurality.

As in Crawford, the Lawrence majority ultimately pronounced Bowers as wrongly decided. "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled." Undoubtedly, Lawrence was the product of rejection by a majority that reconsidered the Court's prior authority in light of both its accuracy at the time of decision in Bowers, and general public consensus reflected in the lack of supporting state legislative action for implementation of the restriction on personal liberty authorized by the Bowers Court.

The Lawrence Court simply corrected a socially unacceptable interpretation of the Constitution in a means less formal than amendment would have required. Overruling Bowers was predicated on the lack of
support for its holding and recognition that the states, by implication, had rejected its holding as a matter of public policy.

The Court's reliance on trends in state legislative action reflecting public policy is even more pronounced in its decision in *Atkins v. Virginia* overruling less than fifteen-year-old precedent, *Penry v. Lynaugh*. In *Penry*, the Court had rejected the argument that the execution of a mentally retarded capital defendant constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The *Atkins* Court, relying in part on *Penry*, expressly noted the importance of state legislative action in assessing whether national policy continued to support contemporaneous interpretation of federal constitutional protections. Significantly, the *Atkins* Court noted that state legislatures had affirmatively moved away from authorizing execution of the mentally retarded in the years following its decision in *Penry*.

The Court's actions in *Brown v. Board of Education*, *Lawrence*, and *Atkins* reflect its willingness to reappraise constitutional doctrine in light of changing social policy. In *Brown*, the Court essentially reacted to the failure of Congress and state legislatures to correct a long-term legally indefensible policy. In *Lawrence*, the majority reconsidered the evidence argued to support the precedent and subsequent legislative trends, and concluded that its decision in *Bowers* was simply incorrect. In *Atkins*, the Court reacted to recent and definitive trends in state legislation to informally amend its interpretation of the applicable constitutional provision. It brought its own view in line with national sentiment, as reflected in the action of state legislatures.

Significant social issues will continue to warrant reconsideration over time. As public sentiment or policy shifts on these matters, courts may sometimes view the previously rejected legal arguments with greater interest. Counsel should continue to argue the good faith basis for overruling precedent in light of changing national sentiment, particularly when reflected directly in the actions of state legislatures.

3. **INTERPLAY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION**

Because a primary duty of an appellate court is to interpret statutory law, legislative action may prove an important source of argument in addressing unfavorable precedent. Often, this results from the need to

150. *Id.* at 334-35.
151. *Atkins*, 536 U.S. at 312 ("We have pinpointed that the 'clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.'") (citing *Penry*, 492 U.S. at 331).
152. *Id.* at 313-17.
interpret legislation in light of existing precedent. An example of such interpretation is the Arkansas courts' treatment of voluntary intoxication as a defensive theory in criminal cases. Under common law principles, voluntary intoxication could serve as a defensive theory that reduces the degree of culpability as it impairs the defendant's intellectual processes. Typically, the application was important in first degree murder cases that required proof of premeditation or deliberation, or a high degree of criminal intent. Evidence of intoxication served to negate the inference that the defendant was capable of operating with the requisite high degree of intent at the time of the offense because his intoxication compromised his ability to reason and make choices.

When the legislature abolished a statutory provision that apparently barred use of intoxication as a defense in 1977, the courts were required to construe the legislative intent. Initially, the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the 1977 enactment had the effect of repealing the earlier prohibition and thus, reinstated the common law recognition of the limited use of intoxication as a defense to criminal intent in *Varnedare v. State.*

The state supreme court revisited the issue in *White v. State* when the State, as appellee, responded to the defendant's argument that the trial court incorrectly denied his requested instruction for intoxication as a defensive theory. The court properly rejected the claim because the defendant had already been convicted on the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and under Arkansas common law, intoxication would not have afforded him a defensive theory to this lesser degree of criminal intent. It also straightened out its own view of the legislative intent implicit in the statutory language, holding that the General Assembly did not intend to reinstate the common law defense when it expressly rejected reliance on voluntary intoxication as a defense. The *White* court overruled its prior decision in *Varnedare* and effectively foreclosed reliance on voluntary intoxication as a defen-

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154. *Ark. Stat.* § 41-115 (Michie 1964) (repealed) ("Drunkenness shall not be an excuse for any crime or misdemeanor, unless such drunkenness be occasioned by the fraud, contrivance or force of some other person, for the purpose of causing the perpetration of the offense . . . ") (precluding reliance on voluntary intoxication through the clear language in the statute).
156. Varnedare v. State, 573 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ark. 1978). ("By amending s 41-207 to remove self-induced intoxication as a statutory defense, the legislature, in effect, reinstated any prior Arkansas common law on the subject.").
158. *Id.* at 787.
159. *Id.* at 787-88.
sive theory in any context in Arkansas trials. Because the Attorney General continued to press the issue of legislative intent, the Arkansas court eventually rendered a decision in *White* properly expressing the General Assembly’s position.

In some instances, counsel should consider challenging prior decisions aggressively because the appellate courts have invited legislative action. An example is presented by the history of litigation stemming from the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in *Boren v. Boren*. There, the court voided a non-holographic will based on defective execution because the witnesses executed a self-proving affidavit to the will, but did not witness the will itself. The problem led to contrary judicial results in other jurisdictions. The Texas courts, however, held to the *Boren* rule that wills defective in this respect were not properly executed under state probate law and refused to find that substantial compliance with execution formalities warranted its admission to probate.

Some Texas decisions and dissenting justices argued the inherent unfairness in the application of a rule of form that effectively negated and frustrated the testator’s clear intent. The legislature ultimately responded to the court’s “invitation” to correct the situation. In this context, litigants faced with controlling precedent that appellate courts refuse to overrule should continue to assert claims in efforts to induce legislative or administrative action. Unfortunately, for many litigants,

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162. *Id.* at 729-30.


166. *Wich*, 652 S.W.2d at 356 (Robertson, J., dissenting).

167. In *Wich*, 652 S.W.2d at 355, the court noted that “the Legislature [had] amended section 59 of the Probate Code twice since the date of the *Boren* decision, but [had] not modified the [requirements for valid execution of a will to make substantial compliance adequate].” *Id.* The legislature finally corrected the problem created by *Boren* wills in 1991, amending Section 59(b) of the Texas Probate Code to provide that the signature of the testator on a self-proving affidavit could serve as the signature required for the will itself. 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3062, 3065 (codified in *Tex. Prob. Code Ann.* § 59(b) (Vernon 2003)). The amendment applied retroactively to wills executed prior to the effective date of the Act, but not offered for probate until the death of the testator subsequent to the effective date. *Bank One, Tex.*, v. *Ikard*, 885 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).

168. For example, in *Hopkins v. Hopkins*, 708 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), the appellant recognized the controlling authority of *Boren* but expressly preserved her claim for
the laudable public service of fighting against an unjust rule in the appellate courts is simply not economically feasible, or may be contrary to their own interests. Consequently, the reluctance of courts to act results in the continued application of unreasonable rules until the legislature takes corrective action.

4. RECOGNITION OF NATIONAL TRENDS IN THE LAW

An important rationale for overruling precedent is that a jurisdiction's view of an issue is simply out of step with the weight of authority from other jurisdictions, or is contrary to an emerging national trend. A classic example is demonstrated by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in which the court overruled a longstanding rule of state workers compensation law. The issue involved compensation for injuries suffered by employees on the employer's property while coming or going from work. The court observed that it had consistently rejected recovery for such injuries in a series of decisions, including eight reported and eleven unreported cases. The court observed that under state law, only employees who suffer injuries as a result of traveling "required routes" that preclude access by members of the general public can recover.

The Lollar court then noted that Tennessee was virtually alone among American jurisdictions in applying such a restrictive rule to compensatory recovery for an employee injured on an employer's property while going to or coming from work. It ultimately concluded that its "rule has not proved a workable one," pointing to a difficulty in reconciling application of the rule in many of the cases in which the issue had been raised. It then adopted an approach more consistent with the clear national trend noted by Larson's treatise, holding:

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169. The appellant in Hopkins did not press her claim, which sought to have Boren overruled, in the Texas Supreme Court because she was able to negotiate a favorable settlement of her claims with other heirs who faced the prospect that the court might overrule its prior decision and deprive them of any recovery under the will.


171. Id. at 143-44.

172. Id. at 144 & n.1 (observing in a note its usual prohibition against reference to unreported decisions).

173. Id. at 144-48 (summarizing numerous Tennessee decisions).

174. Id. at 148 (observing that only Tennessee and Kentucky applied such a narrow construction for recovery and that Kentucky, as seen through Smith v. Klarer Co., 405 S.W.2d 736 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966), actually applied a less restrictive rule).

175. Id.

176. ARTHUR LARSON, 1 LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §15.11 (1985).
[The] rule . . . has failed as a test for determining when *en route* injuries are "in the course of employment." Faced with the prospect of increased litigation on this issue under *de novo* review, we think the better approach is to frankly admit the inequities that have resulted from Tennessee's unique minority rule.177

The court expressly followed the lead of the New Mexico Supreme Court178 in *Dupper v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.*,179 rejecting a narrow construction of the "coming and going rule" in favor of the broader rule evidenced by the national majority trend:

In aligning ourselves with every other jurisdiction by adoption of the premises rule, we simply recognize that the "course of employment" includes not only the time for which the employee is actually paid but also a reasonable time during which the employee is necessarily on the employer's premises while passing to or from the place where the work is actually done.180

Another example of a court conforming local law to a national trend is the treatment of dramshop liability by the Arkansas Supreme Court. In its 1965 decision, *Carr v. Turner*, the court rejected liability for a defendant who furnished alcohol to minors injured as a result of their intoxication.181 The court's holding persisted through a line of cases until it reconsidered its position in 1997 in *Shannon v. Wilson*.182 In *Shannon*, the court observed, "[s]ince *Carr*, this Court has been entreated to reevaluate the issue of a seller of alcohol's liability on numerous occasions. Repeatedly we have held that absent a change in the common-law principle by the legislature, this Court would not depart from the ruling in *Carr* and its progeny."183 The court reminded the legislature that it had suggested the need for corrective action through legislation in the *Carr* opinion itself and noted its prior conclusion that few other jurisdictions had imposed liability in the absence of legislative action.184 The court then traced the history of appellate litigation on this issue, noting its 'consistent' rejection of liability for alcohol providers over the course of thirty years since 1965 when *Carr* was decided.185

The *Shannon* court then discussed the legislature's failure to act in light of its own duty to address changing circumstances that warrant

177. *Lollar*, 767 S.W.2d at 150.
178. *Id*.
180. *Id.* at 746.
183. *Id.* at 351.
184. *Id*.
185. *Id.* at 352.
intervention. Noting the increased public danger posed by intoxication in light of the common use of automobiles, the court observed, "[t]he reality of modern life is evidenced by the fact that most drinking establishments and liquor stores provide patrons parking lots." It concluded, "[t]he rule espoused in Carr was judicially created. When a judicially created rule becomes outmoded or unjust in its application, it is appropriate for the judiciary to modify it." In breaking with its own precedent, the Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed a substantial body of case law from other jurisdictions that demonstrated a decisive trend in the law toward recognizing tort liability for providers of intoxicants whose patrons cause or suffer personal injuries as a result of their intoxication. The court also looked to jurisdictions in which legislative action has created liability. The court recognized the weight of this trend in noting:

Most state and federal courts that have considered this issue since the 1960's have reevaluated and rejected as patently unsound the rule that a seller cannot be held liable for furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated or minor patron who injures a third person based upon the grounds that the sale or service is causally remote from the subsequent injurious conduct of the patron. A substantial majority have decided that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages may be a proximate cause of such injuries and that liability may be imposed upon the vendor in favor of the injured third person.

Even in dissent, Justice Newbern observed the value of challenging existing precedent in the course of appellate litigation. Although he disagreed with the majority's conclusion about the continuing viability of the Carr rationale, he nonetheless prefaced his argument:

It is indeed proper for an appellate court of last resort to overrule a prior decision when that decision was made on the basis of a mistake or when conditions have changed so as to make it outmoded. Stare decisis does not require stagnation. The law develops through the application of tried-and-true principles to changing times. That is not what the majority is about in this case.

Such "tried and true principles," as reflected in a national trend concerning the admission of expert opinion in medical malpractice, led

186. Id. (discussing prior deference to legislature with respect to issue of abolishing governmental immunity from tort actions in Parish v. Pitts, 429 S.W.2d 45 (Ark. 1968)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 353 (citing decisions from the Oklahoma and Wisconsin courts and Justice William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949)).
189. Id. at 353-55.
190. Id. at 355-56.
191. Id. at 353.
192. Id. at 358 (Newbern, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
the Mississippi Supreme Court to adopt a “national” standard of practice for surgeons. In *Hall v. Hilbun*, it abandoned the jurisdiction’s long-held practice of requiring proof of the “local” standard of care. The court specifically looked to rules applied in other states in support of its conclusion that the “national” standard reflected a better rule of law. It also noted that its prior reliance on the “locality” rule had itself undergone some liberalization in terms of the expansion of the concept of “locality.” The evolution of the rule afforded counsel a good faith basis for asking for the necessary extension or modification required for the malpractice plaintiff to develop proof of the breach of the standard of care.

Clearly, shifting opinion regarding the correctness of judicially imposed rules or principles can be instrumental in arguing the need for overruling precedent. When apparent, counsel should not hesitate to challenge adverse precedent directly and offer the appropriate policy arguments, particularly when they are supported by a dominant national trend in appellate decisionmaking.

5. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER BRANCHES OF KNOWLEDGE

New developments in non-legal fields of knowledge are often reflected in changing attitudes toward theories of a claim, a defense, or the admissibility of evidence. The most influential example of a development in science that has been embraced by appellate courts has been the recognition of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) technology as a means of identification. The acceptance of DNA, however, does not really indicate a change in appellate court views as a result of changing science. Rather, it demonstrates the acceptance of a new technology not

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193. *Hall v. Hilbun*, 466 So. 2d 856, 873 (Miss. 1985). Although subsequent legislative action abrogated the rule that a plaintiff could recover from “one, all or a select group of tortfeasors and collect full damages from those parties sued,” applied in *DePriest v. Barber*, 798 So. 2d 456, 458 at ¶ 7 (Miss. 2001), the rule regarding use of the “national” standard of care in medical negligence actions continues to be viable. See *Ortman v. Cain*, 811 So. 2d 457, 462-63 at ¶ 21 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002); *McCaffrey v. Puckett*, 784 So. 2d 197, 202-03 at ¶ 17, 20 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

194. *Hall*, 466 So. 2d at 867-69.

195. *Id.* at 866-67. The court cited *King v. Murphy*, 424 So. 2d 547, 550 (Miss. 1982), in which the court had expanded the relevant “locality” to include the entire state and “a reasonable distance adjacent to state boundaries.” *King* also recognized the admissibility of an opinion rendered by an expert from beyond this “locality,” provided they had familiarized themselves with the standard of care within the “locality.” *Id.*

196. But see *Taylor v. State*, 754 So. 2d 598, 609 at ¶ 29 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (rebuffing counsel’s reliance on Idaho authority in arguing his position to the Mississippi Court of Appeals, observing that “Mississippi, of course, has ample case law on point regarding the standard employed in reviewing a motion for a new trial”).
previously addressed by the appellate courts. This is not an uncommon occurrence, as many new technologies simply require articulation under relevant standards of admissibility. In other cases, however, appellate courts change their views of relevance based upon newly emerging science. For example, recent developments in the fields of psychiatric medicine, psychology, and behavioral sciences have resulted in the courts' recognition of new ways to look at human behavior. These developments are truly recent and continuing, and therefore courts have been forced to respond to creative efforts by lawyers to integrate new thinking in the mental health and behavioral science fields into their theories for relief or defense. Prior caselaw, which could not have reacted to the previously non-existent degree of scientific knowledge, proves inadequate to address claims and evidence now grounded in reliable scientific theory. As a result, courts continually re-evaluate existing precedent in light of these developments.

An example of how scientific developments are influencing rules of law is in the recognition of relevance and admissibility of expert opinion on human perception in eyewitness identification cases. Traditionally, many courts have held that admitting opinion testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification would invade the factfinding province of the jury. In *State v. Chapple*, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed other courts' positions on the admissibility of expert testimony in criminal prosecutions in which identification was the central issue at trial. The court also addressed the scientific developments in the field of psychology relating to human perception. The *Chapple* court considered the framework for admissibility of expert opinion developed by the Ninth Circuit in *United States v. Amaral*, an earlier case that involved exclusion of testimony relating to human perception. It then further noted that *Amaral* and other cases had uniformly upheld the exclusion of this type of expert opinion.

Distinguishing the factual context underlying *Amaral* and other rejections of expert opinion on the reliability of eyewitness testimony, the *Chapple* court ultimately held that the evidence presented was admissible and overruled a prior Arizona decision in the process.


199. *Id.* at 1218 (observing that identification was the “one issue” on which the defendant's guilt or innocence hinged).


201. *Chapple*, 660 P.2d at 1218.

court reviewed the proffered testimony of the expert who delineated a series of factors that influence eyewitnesses to err in identifying individuals involved in criminal activity. These factors included: (1) the tendency of witnesses to shocking events to misidentify, rather than identify more accurately; (2) the typical nature of an immediate identification to be more reliable than one in which time has passed—the "forgetting curve"; (3) the process of "unconscious transfer" that occurs when the witness confuses the person identified with another individual, often as a consequence of viewing a photo lineup; (4) the tendency of an eyewitness to incorporate information received after the event into her identification recollection, particularly when feedback from others confirms a particular perception; and (5) the fact that the accuracy of the witness' identification is likely to vary substantially from the witness's belief in her own accuracy.203

Reviewing the proffered expert opinion on each of these points, the Chapple court concluded that the expert's testimony would assist jurors precisely because of common misperceptions about the way in which the human memory works.204 The recognition of admissibility of this type of testimony in appropriate cases has influenced other courts to overrule prior decisions categorically excluding expert testimony relating to human perception. The Georgia Supreme Court did this in Johnson v. State,205 yet it also declined to endorse the minority position that exclusion of the testimony results is a per se abuse of discretion.206 The Kentucky Supreme Court overruled prior decisions holding expert testimony on human perception inadmissible in Commonwealth v. Christie.207 The supreme court elected to follow the "vast majority" of courts that have committed the question to the trial court's exercise of discretion rather than adopting the alternatives of either admissibility per se or exclusion of the evidence.208

The acceptance of expert opinion on human perception by many courts is an example of empirical evidence promoting a change in admissibility. The trend toward admission is supported by the considerable body of research focusing on common inaccuracies in eyewitness identification. The body of scientific evidence supporting this field of

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203. *Id.* at 1220-21.
204. *Id.* at 1221.
206. *Id.* at 552.
208. *Id.* at 488.
expertise is extensive. Recognition of this well-developed body of information has prompted many courts following *Chapple* to admit expert testimony on the general issue of factors affecting reliability of eyewitness identification.

Nevertheless, a substantial number of courts continue to refuse admission of expert testimony on human perception, as the Kansas Supreme Court did in *State v. Wheaton*. There the court relied upon a cautionary instruction on the potential hazards of eyewitness identification rather than permitting an expert opinion on the factors that may influence the accuracy of an identification in particular circumstances. The trend toward admissibility, however, has followed more extensive psychological research, as the appellant argued in *Wheaton*. This suggests for appellate counsel the need to advise trial attorneys to lay the proper predicate for admission of expert testimony on eyewitness credibility in order to urge changes in the law of admissibility in those remaining jurisdictions that categorically exclude this expertise.

Another example of developments in psychological research influencing admissibility determinations was the recognition of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by the mental health community approximately twenty-five years ago. This disorder began to be understood during the Vietnam War when servicemen returned home

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212. *Id.* at 1185 (citing *State v. Warren*, 635 P.2d 1236 (Kan. 1981)).

213. *Id.* at 1188 (declining to accept the appellant’s assertion as correct).

experiencing problems. These servicemen were often diagnosed as suffering from "Vietnam stress syndrome." PTSD is characterized by anxiety resulting from exposure to a particularly traumatic event outside the normal realm of human experience. Symptoms include: recollections of the event; recurring dreams of the event; sleeplessness; hyperactivity; startle response; and a dissociative state.

The defensive use of evidence of PTSD has impacted the criminal law in two distinctive, and sometimes contrary, ways. For example, the impairment may be viewed as essentially a form of mental state disorder implicating either the accused’s sanity or degree of culpability because it may reflect an inability to appreciate criminality of conduct or ability to conform one’s conduct to the requirements of law. Alternatively, PTSD may also be relevant to a determination that a sane accused acted in self-defense because it influenced her ability to properly appreciate a potential threat to which she has responded. Some jurisdictions have viewed PTSD as relevant to only one of these inquiries, while others permit the defensive use of the evidence with respect to either.

Changing views on the admissibility of psychological evidence for self-defense claims have allowed the defensive use of Battered Woman’s Syndrome, a form of PTSD. Growing acceptance within the community of mental health professionals of syndrome-based defensive theories, including Battered Woman’s Syndrome, has caused many appellate courts to allow the admission of evidence relating to the presence of the syndrome or its symptoms in the criminal defendant.

In a leading case on the admissibility of Battered Women’s Syndrome evidence, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Kelly considered admissibility of expert testimony purporting to explain the

215. For a general discussion of this disorder in returning veterans, see State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 376-78 (La. 1982), and the dissenting opinion of Justice Henderson in Miller v. State, 338 N.W.2d 673, 678-82 (S.D. 1983) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
218. E.g., State v. Purcell, 669 N.E.2d 60, 62-63 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (prosecution and defense experts agreed defendant suffered from PTSD, but disagreed on issue of whether perception of threat was influenced by “flashback” resulting in “hyperarousal” response causing overreaction); see also Commonwealth v. Pitts, 740 A.2d 726, 733-34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
219. E.g., State v. Harris, 870 S.W.2d 798, 816 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (concluding that PTSD defense is inconsistent with self-defense under state law).
defendant’s perception of the threat which prompted her to use force against her husband, the victim. The defendant had suffered long-term abuse by her husband. The court observed that developments in the preceding decade, provided a new and better understanding of the psychological experience of battered victims demonstrated that a battered victim’s perception might give rise to a legitimate claim of self-defense. The court described the research results in support of its conclusion by examining theories underlying the syndrome at length.

In Kelly, the trial court excluded expert testimony on battered woman syndrome based on the prior holding in State v. Bess, where expert testimony on the reasonableness of a defendant’s perception of the threat giving rise to his claim of self-defense had been rejected. The court did not overrule Bess instead it distinguished the thrust of the two uses of expert testimony reflected in the differences in expert opinion in the two cases. In Bess, the expert had offered the opinion of a psychologist who examined the defendant and concluded that because of his emotional instability and below-average intelligence, he would tend to become confused and overact when confronted by an emotionally exciting experience. The defendant was charged with murdering a much larger individual whom he claimed was attempting to commit a robbery. Killing the larger man was, according to the defendant, done to prevent the robbery and in self-defense. The court held that the expert’s proffered opinion, that the defendant’s response to a threat resulting in a claim of self-defense was reasonable under the circumstances, was inadmissible because it assessed the state of the accused’s mind under a subjective standard, rather than an objective standard as required by state law.

The Kelly court distinguished Bess, holding that expert testimony on the question of reasonableness of the actor’s belief in the perceived danger would be admissible, apparently assuming that any actor in the

224. Id. at 370-74.
225. Id. at 381.
227. Id. at 672-73.
229. Bess, 247 A.2d at 672.
230. Id. at 671.
231. Id. at 672.
232. Id.
same situation would have reasonably reached the same conclusion. The court thus distinguished between expert opinion that essentially characterized the accused's testimony as "honest" from that which would permit a jury to conclude that any person in the accused's situation could objectively be found to have had a reasonable belief that the perceived threat justified use of force. The *Kelly* court effectively permitted expert opinion that jurors could use to reach a conclusion on the objective reasonableness of the accused's perception that force was justified, as long as the testimony itself related to objective factors. In essence, the *Kelly* court opened the door to far broader admissibility of psychological opinion about the accused's state of mind than had previously been contemplated by the *Bess* opinion without actually overruling the earlier decision.

Admission of expert testimony on the defendant's state of mind at the time of an assault when claiming self-defense has proved to be a rather innovative use of expert opinion at trial. In *State v. Branchal*, the New Mexico court considered its exclusion in a murder prosecution where the circumstances would have ruled out a traditional self-defense instruction because the accused provoked the assault and the threat was not immediate. Branchal had been repeatedly threatened by her husband, who often would become intoxicated and put a fingerless glove on one hand that he claimed permitted him to talk to the "Devil." The deceased was wearing a fingerless glove when his body was examined by the medical examiner. The defense offered the testimony of a psychologist who had examined the defendant and was prepared to offer an

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233. *Kelly*, 478 A.2d at 377. The court may have actually drawn its line based on the tenor of the questioning of the two experts, rather than on the experts' findings. It held:

We also find the expert testimony relevant to the reasonableness of defendant's belief that she was in imminent danger of death or serious injury. We do not mean that the expert's testimony could be used to show that it was understandable that a battered woman might believe that her life was in danger when indeed it was not and when a reasonable person would not have so believed, for admission for that purpose would clearly violate the rule set forth in *State v. Bess*. Expert testimony in that direction would be relevant solely to the honesty of defendant's belief, not its objective reasonableness. Rather, our conclusion is that the expert's testimony, if accepted by the jury, would have aided it in determining whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed there was imminent danger to her life.

*Id.* at 377 (citations omitted).


235. *Id.* at 1167. The trial court commented on the record that it did not want to condone retaliation for past domestic violence. The record reflected a lengthy history of violence and threatening acts by the defendant's husband directed at her, her family, and their children. The evidence included the defendant's prior attempt to obtain assistance from police, who advised her that the problem was a family problem that she would have to resolve on her own.

236. *Id.* at 1165.
opinion not only on the reasonableness of her perception of fear, but also on her subjective belief in her right to use deadly force in defense of herself and her family. Unlike the New Jersey court in Kelly, however, the Branchal court did not draw the fine distinction between admissible opinion on the objective reasonableness of her response and her honesty in invoking the right to use force in self-defense:

Defendant also offered proof through Dr. Salazar, a psychologist, concerning her state of mind when she fired the fatal shot. The psychologist would have testified that she was a religious person and that she took the fingerless glove and the victim’s invocation of the devil seriously. He would have explained the predictability of the victim’s behavior when drunk, why defendant felt trapped in the kitchen and why she did not leave the victim. He would have testified that she was afraid for her life when she fired the fatal shot.

The New Mexico court did not make any reference to Battered Woman’s Syndrome and apparently the defense expert had not relied on this diagnosis in his proffered testimony at trial. Yet, it is clear that in this early application of the rationale for admitting expert opinion on the justification for use of deadly force against an abuser, the court was confronted with the problem of reconciling this approach with the traditional self-defense claim issues of immediacy of threat and reasonableness of the response. It gave an expansive answer on this issue, opening the door to reliance on novel expert opinion on issues of mental state.

The theory of “syndrome” evidence in self-defense cases was explained by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Robinson v. State. The discussion of the defensive application of the theory arose in the context of an ineffective assistance claim directed against counsel who failed to raise the defense at trial. In its discussion, the court accepted the syndrome as accurate, and concluded that it has value in assisting the jury in analyzing the application of the law of self-defense to the battered victim charged with homicide or assault against her abuser. The syndrome theoretically explains or justifies the accused’s act of violence in terms of delayed reaction to the terror imposed by the abuser. A significant number of jurisdictions have responded to a general recognition of the Battered Woman Syndrome diagnosis by holding that expert testimony is admissible on the syndrome in support of a claim of self-

237. Id. at 1167.
238. Id.
240. Id. at 90.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 90-92.
defense.  

Although the "science" underlying the theory that battered women, or spouses, or anyone involved in intimate relationships behave in particular patterns remains subject to criticism, courts have adopted their approaches to the general recognition that self-defense may be treated more broadly than in traditional contexts.

When dealing with newly developing scientific or technical knowledge, counsel intent upon forcing the court to reevaluate prior decisions limiting admissibility should stress the increasing acceptance of the expertise within the relevant field and make the proper offer of proof supporting the change in law sought.

Developments in scientific and technological knowledge will undoubtedly result in a continuing assault on precedents based on information rendered outdated by these advancements. Perhaps cognizant of the long-range potential for litigation of issues relating to advancements in other fields of knowledge and expertise, the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. articulates a new framework for evaluation of the science underlying expert opinion. For jurisdictions adopting Daubert, or Daubert-like approaches to admissibility of expert evidence; in light of its reasoning, the prospects for challenge to existing precedents would appear healthy.


244. Expert opinion that a sixteen year old defendant charged with murder of his mother suffered from Battered Child Syndrome was recognized as admissible on issues of his criminal intent and justification of use of forced based on his perception of threat in State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1334-36 (Ohio 1998).

245. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Domestic Violence: Competing Conceptions of Equality in the Law of Evidence, 47 Loy. L. Rev. 81, 113-24 (2001). Professor Beecher-Monas offers a scathing critique of the traditional view of Battered Woman’s Syndrome, arguing that it cannot be reconciled with standards for admissibility that require expert opinion to be grounded in sound scientific principles. Instead, she argues that courts have accepted syndrome evidence, apparently in sympathetic response to the significant problem of domestic abuse without requiring a showing of scientific authenticity imposed on other subjects of expert opinion.


V. Conclusion

The development of an effective argument for overruling precedent is often the product of cooperation between trial and appellate counsel, or the appreciation of counsel for the need to assert the argument for overruling in the trial court. The rules of error preservation necessitate asserting grounds for overruling precedent in the trial court; failure to do so will generally doom any argument advanced for the first time in the appeal.\textsuperscript{248} Generally, even claims of constitutional error may be forfeited by failure to preserve error in timely and appropriate fashion at trial, regardless of whether the claim is based on federal\textsuperscript{249} or state constitutional grounds.\textsuperscript{250} Notwithstanding how interesting the appellate argument may be in relying on novel grounds, lack of preservation of the claim at trial will likely result in the appellate court refusing to consider the merits of the claim.\textsuperscript{251}

Arguably, of course, a claim requiring overruling of precedent might succeed as a matter of fundamental error, assuming a court would conclude that application of the precedent resulted in denial of fundamental fairness in the proceedings. The requirement that preservation rules be followed with regard to existing precedent that binds a trial court renders objection almost always futile. Because the trial court is bound by existing precedent, one can hardly justify asking that same court to overrule precedent as a threshold for asserting the same argument in the appellate courts actually empowered to reconsider the wisdom of their prior decisions.\textsuperscript{252} Nevertheless, effective representation requires recognition and respect for existing preservation rules, although appellate counsel may well decide to argue for the overruling of precedent as a matter of fundamental error.

The well-recognized doctrine of “plain error,” as opposed to “fun-
damental error," certainly will not afford appellate counsel grounds for excusing the preservation requirement. By definition, the concept of plain error requires that there be "error"—deviation from application of a legal rule that is both plain and clear. The underlying concept of "plain error" is contrary, in theory, to the argument that precedent should be overruled despite lack of objection precisely because the trial court's adherence to existing precedent will not constitute error.

Assuming preservation of the claim for overruling precedent in the trial court, appellate counsel is positioned to advance the argument on behalf of the client in the appellate courts. The assertion of a properly preserved claim for a change in the law reflects the necessary catalyst for change in law contemplated by the common law system. When appellate counsel makes a good faith claim for overruling, modifying or, in fact, extending existing precedent, her representation is consistent with zealous representation of her client. It is also consistent with both the text and spirit of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

Many appellate lawyers equate timidity with deference to the court, and equate such deference with respect. Unfortunately, the lack of passion often displayed in appellate practice may lead reviewing courts to the conclusion that a case or claim is so lacking in legal or equitable merit that the client's own lawyer has little or no interest in the merits of the appeal. Ethical representation simply does not foreclose aggressive advocacy.

253. The concept of "plain error," as set forth in Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, was examined fully by the Supreme Court in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
254. Id. at 732-33.