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Philosophy/philosophy, an Untenable Dualism*

Was Peirce a Philosopher, a foundationalist, as Rorty sometimes tells us? Or was he a relativist, as Margolis suggests, or a proto-post-structuralist, as Angelica Pabst would have us believe? Olshewsky has bitten off so much more than I can chew that I shall have to confine myself to the first of these questions, commenting on the others only in passing.

I agree that Rorty misunderstands Peirce thoroughly. But I think the problem is not so much that Rorty puts Peirce in a category to which he doesn't belong, as that Rorty's dichotomy of realist, foundationalist Philosopher *versus* pragmatist philosopher is a hopelessly untenable dualism; not only is it not exhaustive—most of the most appealing possible positions lie between Rorty's extremes.

Rorty's explicit references to Peirce are relatively few and strikingly ambivalent. Mostly, as Olshewsky notices, Rorty classifies Peirce as among the unenlightened, a Philosopher; but at least once he says that Peirce anticipated certain of the insights which he prefers, usually, to attribute to "the great pragmatists," though elsewhere he suggests that Peirce didn't appreciate the significance of those insights. And his interpretation of Peirce often seems debatable, not to say downright tendentious. [See Appendix.] I see all this as a sign that Rorty is half aware that the subtleties of Peirce's philosophy strain his (Rorty's) crude dichotomy to the breaking point.

Just about the only simple thing that could truly be said about Peirce's philosophy *vis à vis* Rorty's categories is that Peirce is neither a Philosopher nor a philosopher, and that his work is entire-

ly free of the This-or-Nothing-ism which vitiates Rorty's distinction of realist foundationalism *versus* pragmatism. Beyond this point, things get very complicated very fast.

The multiple ambiguities of "realism"—realism about universals (*vs* nominalism, conceptualism); about the external world (*vs* metaphysical idealism); about knowledge (*vs* epistemic idealism) about truth (*vs* positivism, relativism)—already make it impossible to classify Peirce (scholastic realist, panpsychist, critical common-sensist, pragmaticist) as "realist" *or* "anti-realist," *simpliciter*. On some of these dimensions, furthermore, Peirce does not just adopt one or another of the familiar positions, but recategorizes the problem; his "extreme scholastic realism," for example, in virtue of his distinction between reality and existence, contrasts not only with nominalism but also with platonic realism, or, as Peirce sometimes calls it, "nominalistic platonism."¹ To make matters worse, Rorty's conception of realism even on the one dimension of realism-with-respect-to-truth runs together truth as mirroring noumenal reality with truth as correspondence to mind-independent facts with truth as possibly outrunning the knowable,

The multiple ambiguities of "foundationalism"—between foundationalism: theory of knowledge or epistemic justification requiring a distinction of basic *vs* derived beliefs and a one-directional concept of evidential support (*vs* coherentism, foundherentism, contextualism); *foundationalism*: conception of epistemology as an *a priori* discipline charged with legitimating the claim of empirical science to give us knowledge (*vs* various forms of naturalism); and FOUNDATIONALISM: thesis that epistemic standards require grounding in their relation to the goal of inquiry, specifically their truth-indicativeness (*vs* conventionalism)—make it equally impossible to classify Peirce as "foundationalist" *or* "anti-foundationalist," *simpliciter*. Peirce does not really have a theory of epistemic justification of the kind familiar in twentieth-century epistemology; and I like to think that if one were to try to reconstruct one from clues in his writings it would be rather found-

herentist than foundationalist in structure. Given his naturalism, he does not qualify as *foundationalist* either. But in view of the importance he attaches to arguments that the scientific method is constrained by reality, and so, if persisted in long enough, would reach the truth, he *does* qualify as FOUNDATIONALIST. To make matters worse yet, Rorty simply takes it for granted—quite wrongly—that FOUNDATIONALISM, which he runs together with foundationalism and *foundationalism*, requires an account of truth which is realist in his sense, the run-together sense complained of in the previous paragraph.²

It is a nearly inextricable tangle, and the best I can do, in the time available, is to focus on just three of the many dimensions of Rorty's false dichotomy: (1) science as an idol *vs* philosophy as a genre of literature or literary criticism; (2) truth as mirroring *vs* truth as "not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about"; and (3) transcendental principles *vs* the conventions of conversation.³

(1) "As for that phrase 'studying in a literary spirit' it is impossible to express how nauseating it is to any scientific man" (1.33, 1869). This indicates that Peirce would have no sympathy with Rorty's description of philosophy as a genre of literature or literary criticism; but doesn't it also indicate that Peirce is guilty, as Rorty claims, of making an idol of science? I don't think so. Peirce wants philosophy to be scientific, yes; but this doesn't mean that he sees philosophy as uncritical apologist for, or sycophantic courtier of, the natural sciences. One finds in Peirce none of the scientism of, say, the Churchlands, or Alvin Goldman, or (in some moods) Quine.⁴ The context of the remark quoted is significant: Peirce is praising the schoolmen as "scientific" philosophers, and scorning the prejudice that refuses to take them seriously because of the ugliness of their technical jargon ("*haeccitas*," "*quidditas*," etc.). "Scientific," as Peirce uses it here, is not purely descriptive; "scientific inquiry" is close to meaning "genuine inquiry, the real thing"—though built in, of course, is the thought that the man of science—in the everyday sense, as

opposed to the man of letters, the businessman, the theologian—is likeliest to *be* a genuine inquirer (compare 1.43ff, c.1896, and especially 1.126ff, c.1905, and 6.1-6, 1898).

"Scientific philosophy," in Peirce's sense, will use the scientific method. Part of what this means is that it will rely on experience and reasoning, which carries with it Peirce's conception of philosophy as not *a priori* but dependent rather on the kind of experience so ubiquitous and commonplace that it requires effort to become self-conscious about it. Even more important, it also requires that a scientific philosopher will adopt "the scientific attitude"; meaning that he has the attitude enjoined by "the First Rule of Reason," *that in order to learn you must desire to learn* (1.135, c.1899, my italics). He aims, that is, at the truth. This thought of Peirce's, that a certain affective disposition—a genuine desire for the truth—is the most important requirement for a real ("scientific") inquirer, is of a depth and complexity matching its importance. There is a direct link to fallibilism: a genuine inquirer, one who really wants the truth—unlike the pseudo-inquirer who only seeks confirmation for an opinion that is already evidence-proof, or who is more concerned with conforming to intellectual fashion, or with writing in a pleasing style—will be a "contrite fallibilist" (1.14, c.1897) prepared "to dump his whole cartload of beliefs, the moment experience is against them" (1.55, c.1896).

There is also a direct link to Peirce's view of truth.

(2) Not only does Peirce not think that truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about; he *has* a philosophically interesting theory of truth. But it isn't a theory which makes truth a matter of "mirroring" or "copying" reality, let alone of correspondence to things-in-themselves. Peirce remarks that "[t]he Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his heart. . . the proposition that a thing-in-itself can. . . be conceived; . . . and he will find himself to have become a Critical Commonsensist" (5.452, 1905); and that "Kant. . . is nothing but a somewhat confused pragmatist," if

only his *Ding an sich* were "thrown out as meaningless surplussage" (5.525, c.1905).

"Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object" (5.554, 1906); Peirce, as I read him, takes it not as false, but as shallow, to say that truth is correspondence to reality. His definition of truth as the opinion on which users of the scientific method would agree were inquiry to go on long enough goes beyond this merely verbal definition to the pragmatic meaning of "true." This conception is not realist, if realism requires the thesis that there may be truths in principle inaccessible to us; but neither is it relativist, if relativism requires the thesis that a proposition may be true relative to one theory or epistemic community or form of life, but false relative to another. [An assessment of Margolis' interpretation of Peirce⁵ might begin here.] I would say that Peirce's conception of truth is distinctively pragmatist, but in the present context, since Rorty has kidnapped that term, I had better say, "prope-positivist." Is truth, in Peirce's conception, mind-independent? Yes and no. Yes: what is true does not depend on what you, or I, or anyone *thinks* is true. No: there could be no truth in principle unknowable by us.

In a different sense, of course, Peirce *does* qualify as a realist; his "extreme scholastic realism" is the thesis that there are real generals, i.e., natural kinds and laws which are independent of how we believe them to be. Realism, in *this* sense, is one of the supports of Peirce's prope-positivistic account of truth, lending plausibility to the presupposition that, if inquiry were to go on long enough, consensus would eventually be reached (see especially 8.12, 1871, and 5.384, 1877); for if there is a pattern of kinds, of knots of similarities occurring together in a lawful way, there is hope that disagreements due to the peculiarities and special circumstances of individual inquirers will eventually be resolved, and the real pattern emerge.

As Peirce realized, the subsequent development of "the" pragmatist theory of truth was flawed by other pragmatists' nominalist sympathies (see especially 6.485, 1908). James's preference for fo-

cussing on the part of his theory that concerns concrete truths, rather than the part that concerns abstract Truth, results from his attempt to adapt Peirce's conception of truth as the ideal end of inquiry to his particularism; and Schiller's openly relativistic theory of "the making of truth" results from his misreading James as if the account of concrete truths were, as James realized it could not be, a complete theory of truth. Sometimes, at least, Rorty misreads James much as Schiller did.⁶

But I digress. Peirce's "scholastic" realism differs from the Sco-tists' in its markedly empiricist character; it is, according to Peirce, a matter for empirical, scientific discovery *which* generals are real, *which* natural-kind terms pick out real kinds. So Peirce acknowledges the shifting character of scientific vocabularies, but, so far from supposing that there is no distinction of better and worse to be made, sees the shifts as groping towards classifications which categorize together things which really are of a kind. Fully aware of the historical and the social dimensions of inquiry (e.g., 6.428, 1893, and 6.3, 1898), noting the way meanings "grow" as theory develops (e.g., 7.587, c.1867, and 2.302, c.1898), Peirce nevertheless avoids any hint of inevitable incommensurability, indifferent pluralism, or the cynical sociologism of the recent philosophy of science that Rorty admires.

(3) It is no accident that Peirce first declared for realism in his review of Fraser's edition of Berkeley.⁷ For the thesis that there are real generals hints at a solution to the difficulty which had long dogged empiricists of a nominalist stripe, among whom Ockham and Berkeley are paradigmatic: how, given that experience is always of particulars, can we have knowledge of a general character? And the interplay of secondness and thirdness—our experiences of particulars which are of real kinds—in Peirce's theory of inquiry is paralleled by the combination of indexical and symbolic elements in his account of propositions.⁸ [An assessment of Angelica Pabst's interpretation⁹ might begin with the point that Peirce holds that every proposition has an indexical element.]

Rorty's pragmatist holds that nothing grounds our epistemic

standards but local and parochial convention. Peirce holds that what distinguishes the scientific method and justifies the hope that it would yield consensus if sufficiently persisted in is that it is constrained by reality. "To satisfy our doubts. . . it is necessary that a method be found by which our beliefs may be determined . . . by some external permanency—by something on which our thinking has no effect. . . . Such is the method of science" (5.384, 1877). Rorty construes Peirce as holding that "we can make no sense of the notion that the view which can survive all objections might be false," and continues by observing that "objections—conversational constraints—cannot be anticipated," thus transmuting the constraints to which Peirce alludes, full experiential testing and full logical scrutiny, into nothing more than "all conversational constraints." But this is of course a *misconstrual*; Peirce is no conventionalist. This does not mean, however, that he "goes transcendental and offers principles," the only alternative Rorty allows. In inquiring at all, Peirce would say, one has no choice but to hope that there is a truth not in principle inaccessible to the cognitive means we have, experience and reasoning. One might describe this as naturalistic, because of the appeal to facts about human cognitive capacities and to their evolutionary adaptedness; or as realist, because of the appeal to the brute secondness of experience and to the mind-independence of the generals which the particulars experienced instantiate; and as fallibilist; by no stretch of the imagination, however, as transcendentalist.

Peirce is as unlike Rorty's philosopher as inquiry is unlike mere conversation, as a counter-instance experienced or a contradiction deduced is unlike a conversational objection, as belief is unlike the mouthing of half-understood catch-phrases. Peirce is as unlike Rorty's Philosopher as scholastic realism is unlike nominalistic platonism, as critical commonsensism is unlike noumenalism, as truth as the hypothetical upshot of inquiry is unlike the Logical Atomists' structural isomorphism of Proposition and Fact. Peirce is, above all, a genuine ("scientific") inquirer; he is, I shall say, a **philosopher**.

Much as I sympathize with most of Olshewsky's interpretation of Peirce, then, I would not say, as he does, that Peirce "lays a base for a more sophisticated post-modern critique than those that prevail today," but rather that Peirce's philosophy is mercifully free of the false dichotomies which prevail today and which, if Rorty is anything to go by, motivate "post-modern critiques." Perhaps Olshewsky fears that Peirce will go out of style if he gets categorized among those Rorty calls, in the tone of patronage characteristic of the higher dismissiveness, "lovably old-fashioned prigs. . .who will solemnly tell you that they are seeking *the truth*."¹⁰ Since Peirce described himself, with cheerful irony, as a "mummified pedant" who "has never waked to the fact that the act of knowing a real object alters it" (5.555, c.1906), I doubt he would have been much troubled by such pinpricks. And overcoming the prevailing false dichotomies seems to me much more important than making Peirce appear fashionable; though doubtless some will think that this shows what a mummified pedant *I* am!

Appendix: Rorty on Peirce

There are only three references to Peirce in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1979). One (p. 42) reports Peirce's use of the metaphor of "man's glassy essence." The second (p. 230n) suggests that a regress argument used by Malcolm is the same as an argument used by Peirce against Descartes; the footnote refers to Rorty, "Pragmatism, Categories and Language," *Philosophical Review*, 49, 1961, 197-223. The third discusses a quotation from Sellars about Peirce's theory of truth, which, according to Rorty, makes "the very existence of truth depend[ent] on the continuation of the race and the Enlightenment's notions of rational inquiry" (it is unclear whether Rorty is claiming that Peirce's theory requires this, or only that Sellars' interpretation of it does).

I shall concentrate on *The Consequences of Pragmatism*, where there are more, and more interesting, references to Peirce.

- (1) Man makes the word, and the word means nothing which the man has not made it mean, and that only to some other man. But since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn around and say: You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought. . . .the word or sign which a man uses is the man himself. . . . Thus my language is the sum-total of myself; for the man is the thought. (Peirce)

Peirce goes very far in the direction that I have called the de-construction of the transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would place a reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign. (Derrida)

. . . This chorus should not, however, lead us to think that something new and exciting has recently been discovered about Language—e.g., that it is more prevalent than had previously been thought. The authors cited [also including Sellars, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, Foucault, Heidegger] are making only *negative* points. They are saying that attempts to get back behind language to something which "grounds" it, or which it "expresses," or to which it might hope to be "adequate," have not worked. . . . Peirce and Sellars and Wittgenstein are saying that the regress of interpretation cannot be cut off by the sort of "intuition" which Cartesian epistemology took for granted. (*Consequences of Pragmatism*, introduction, p. xx)

Comment: Here Rorty (like Derrida and Ms. Pabst) is classing Peirce with the enlightened. It seems doubtful that Peirce is committed to the negative point Rorty attributes to him, since he holds: that there are correct and incorrect ways to classify things

into kinds; that propositions must have an indexical element connecting them to their "object;" that the object of the true opinion is the real, an "external permanency" independent of how we think it to be.

- (2) Peirce's definition of truth as that to which inquiry will converge has often seemed a good way for the pragmatist to capture the realists' intuition that Truth is One. But he should not try to capture it. . . . (*Consequences of Pragmatism*, notes to introduction, p. xlv)

Comment: Here Peirce is classed with the realist opposition to ("real") pragmatism, here characterized as holding that "Truth is One." If this means that Peirce thinks there is a fixed, ahistorical, privileged vocabulary, it is false; if it means, what is not equivalent, that Peirce thinks there is an "ultimate opinion" or ideal theory, it is true. I note also that Peirce realizes that inquiry may not be an even progression towards the truth; he speaks of consensus, but does not, as Rorty apparently does, confuse this with convergence.

- (3) Peirce said that "the first rule of reason" was "do not block the way of inquiry" (1.135). . . . What he was getting at. . . was the same point as he makes about the ubiquity of language—that we should never think that the regress of interpretation should be stopped once and for all, but rather realize that there may always be a vocabulary, a set of descriptions, around the corner that will throw everything into question once again. (*Consequences of Pragmatism*, notes to introduction, p. xlvii)

Comment: The first rule of reason is "that in order to learn you must desire to learn," i.e., (I think) "you have to *really want* the truth." No-one who, like Rorty, takes the view that to call a statement "true" is just to give it a rhetorical pat on the back could hold to such a maxim. It is no surprise to find that later (see (6) below) Rorty misinterprets the corollary principle, "do not block

the way of inquiry" as concerning *conversation* rather than *inquiry*. The claim made here, that "do not block the way of inquiry" makes the *same* point as that made in the passage quoted in (1), is confused by the fact that Rorty says here, what he denied under (1), that the issue concerns the ubiquity of language; in any case, the potentially infinite continuation of inquiry is not the same point *either* as the ubiquity of language *or* as the rejection of Cartesian intuition.

(4) To lump Dewey with Peirce, James, and Quine is to forget that he was swept off his feet, and into a new intellectual world, by Hegel's and Comte's visions of our past. ("Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey" (1976), *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. 46.)

Comment: this seems to classify Dewey as "the great pragmatist," counting Peirce and James as among the unenlightened, as Philosophers. (Cf. (5) below.)

(5) The great pragmatists should not be taken as suggesting an holistic variant of this [standard, academic, neo-Kantian, epistemologically centered philosophy, [Philosophy?]], but rather as breaking with the Kantian tradition altogether. As long as we see James or Dewey as having "theories of knowledge" or "theories of morality" we shall get them wrong. . . . We shall not see how radical their thought was. . . . One symptom of this incorrect focus is a tendency to overpraise Peirce. Peirce is praised partly because he developed various logical notions and various technical problems (such as the counterfactual conditional) which were taken up by the logical empiricists. But the main reason for Peirce's undeserved apotheosis is that his talk about a general theory of signs looks like an early discovery of the importance of language. For all his genius, however, Peirce never made up his mind what he wanted a theory of signs *for*, nor what it might look like, nor what its relation to either logic or episte-

mology was supposed to be. His contribution to pragmatism was merely to have given it a name, and to have stimulated James. Peirce himself was the most Kantian of thinkers—the most convinced that philosophy gave us an all-embracing ahistorical context in which every other species of discourse should be assigned its proper place and rank. ("Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism" (1980), *Consequences of Pragmatism*, pp. 160-161)

Comment. This passage is so extraordinary as almost to defy comment! But I note that Peirce is here unambiguously classified as unenlightened, a Philosopher; James is counted among the enlightened (on p. 165 of the same paper, James, as well as Dewey, is classed with Rorty's heroes Heidegger and Nietzsche); that Peirce's contribution to recognizing the importance of language—which in quotation (1) Rorty said wasn't the point anyway!—is now downgraded, apparently on the grounds that Peirce stumbled on something of which he didn't understand the significance; and that Peirce's repudiation of noumenalism is not mentioned.

(6) [P]ragmatism. . . is the doctrine that there are no constraints on inquiry save conventional ones. . . . The only sense in which we are constrained to truth is that, as Peirce suggested, we can make no sense of the notion that the view which can survive all objections might be false. But objections—conversational constraints—cannot be anticipated. There is no method for knowing *when* one has reached the truth, or when one is closer to it than before. ("Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism,"

Comment. Peirce did not suggest that the view which can survive all conversational constraints cannot be false, but that the view which can survive all possible experiential input and full logical scrutiny cannot be false; Rorty is forcing him into a

"pragmatist," or conventionalist, mold. Peirce would have agreed that we can't know, for sure, when we have reached the truth, nor when we are closer to it than before; he would—quite rightly—have been puzzled, though, by Rorty's implication that to acknowledge this is to acknowledge something fatally damaging to the concept of inquiry, something that would force us to settle for mere "conversation."

(7) The pragmatist must avoid saying, with Peirce, that truth is *fated* to win. He must even avoid saying that truth *will* win. He can only say, with Hegel, that truth and justice lie in the direction marked by the successive stages of European thought. ("Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism," *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. 103)

Comment: Peirce *does* say that truth is the opinion that is destined to be believed (8.13, 1871); but this (no doubt rather incautious) statement should not be interpreted in the spirit of Mill's claim that if free debate is permitted, truth will win out. It is about *inquiry*, not *debate*; and it is better stated not indicatively but subjunctively, as: the truth is that opinion that *would* be believed if inquiry *were* to go on long enough. See 5.566 (1901), where Peirce shifts, mid-sentence, from an indicative to a preferred subjunctive formulation.

(8) Through the nineteenth century, men like Huxley and Clifford and Peirce still saw respect for scientific truth as the highest human value, the moral equivalent to the Christian's love and fear of God. ("Philosophy in America Today" (1981), *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. 228)

Comment: Peirce would have said, indeed, that the scientific inquirer aims at the truth—but "scientific," in this context, is largely honorific, meaning "the *bona fide*, genuine inquirer [whether in the sciences, in history, in philosophy, or in detective work or whatever]." And though he stresses that the desire to get the truth is essential for any serious, genuine inquirer, Peirce does not

suggest that inquiry is "the highest human value." No doubt he thinks inquiry is an important and honorable human occupation; but this is hardly equivalent to seeing it as "the moral equivalent of the Christian's love and fear of God." There is, to be sure, a short piece in the *Collected Papers* entitled, by the editors, "A Religion of Science" (6.428ff., 1893); but its theme is that religion should "become animated by the scientific spirit, confident that all the conquests of science will be triumphs of its own" (6.433)—for eventually, Peirce holds, apparent conflict between science and religion will be seen to be merely apparent. I think Peirce would have found Rorty's use of the phrase "scientific truth" tendentious; for in this piece he explicitly repudiates the doctrine of "two [religious *vs* scientific] truths." I note that this represents a quite interesting sense of "Truth is One" not discussed under (2) above.

Summary: (2), (4), (5), (7) and (8) classify Peirce as Philosopher, while (1) suggests that he anticipated a key idea of pragmatist philosophy, and (3) misinterprets his "first rule of reason," and (6) his definition of truth, in pragmatist-philosophical vein.

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NOTES

*This is a slightly amplified version of comments on Olshewsky, "Peirce's Anti-Foundationalism," delivered at the conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy at Xavier University in March 1992 under the title, "Pragmaticism and Its Misunderstanders." My thanks to Mark Migotti for helpful correspondence.

1. I explore some of the ambiguities of "realism" in "'Realism'," *Synthese*, 73.2, 1987, 275-300; and some of the subtleties of Peirce's scholastic realism in "Extreme Scholastic Realism: Its Relevance to Philosophy of Science Today," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce So-*

ciety, XXVIII.1, 1992, 19-50.

2. I explore some of the ambiguities of "foundationalism" in "Recent Obituaries of Epistemology," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 27.3, 1990, 199-220; and suggest an intermediate theory, between foundationalism and coherentism, in "Double-Aspect Foundherentism: A New Theory of Empirical Justification," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* LIII. 1, 1993, 113-128.

3. For these themes as components of Rorty's Philosophy/philosophy dichotomy, see the introduction to *The Consequences of Pragmatism*, Harvester Press, Hassocks, Sussex, UK, 1982.

4. For amplification of this hint about ambiguities in Quine, see my "The Two Faces of Quine's Naturalism," forthcoming in *Synthese*.

5. But the next move—a formidably difficult one!—would have to be a careful examination of Margolis' somewhat unusual sense of "relativism":

Relativism is an empirically motivated thesis to the effect that, in particular sectors of inquiry, it is methodologically advisable to retreat from insisting on a strong bipolar model of truth and falsity, while not denying that the affected propositions or claims *are* genuinely such and, as such, are to be ascribed suitable truth-like values—just such, in fact, that on the bipolar model (but no longer) would yield and confirm incompatibles [R]elativism is not only not opposed to realism, but its advocates are positively committed to realism. . . (*Pragmatism Without Foundations*, Blackwell's, Oxford, 1986, p. 111)

6. The theme of this paragraph is developed in my "Pragmatism," in *Handbook of Epistemology*, eds. Sosa, E. and Dancy, J., Blackwell's Oxford, 1992, 351-7. It strikes me that Rorty's claim that according to pragmatism truth is not the kind of thing one should expect to have an interesting theory about may be explained, in part, as a misreading of James's urgings that philosophical attention shift from abstract Truth to concrete truths.

7. 8.7ff (1871). My appreciation of the importance of the fact that Peirce declares for realism in his review of Berkeley was en-

hanced by a conversation with Cornelius de Waal.

8. See e.g. 5.473 (c.1906), 2.230 (c.1897); and note that the quotation from 5.554 (1906), "Truth is the conformity of a representation to its object," continues "*its* object, ITS object, mind you." On this matter I am grateful for the help of Risto Hilpinen's paper, "On Peirce's Philosophical Logic: Propositions and Their Objects," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* XXVIII. 3, 1992, 467-88, and for correspondence with Nathan Houser.

9. Angelica Pabst's source is Patricia Parker, *Inescapable Romance*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1979:

The metaphor of the striptease or dance of veils is one of the privileged images of modern semiology for a process at once erotic and semiotic. C.S. Peirce argues that the meaning of a representation can be nothing but another representation whose "clothing" is not "stripped" but only "changed for something more diaphanous." [1.339, c.1895] But the "vale" of exile and the "veil" of language were assimilated long before even Blake's combination of the mysterious and the lachrymose in the romance figure of Vala, and the figure of the veil and unveiling is one of the oldest of narrative—and semiotic—images, from the Book of Revelation to the series of romantic enchantresses whose uncovering is related both to the discovery of meaning and to a sense of narrative ending. (p. 221)

["As for that phrase 'studying in a literary spirit' . . .!"]

10. See Anthony Gottlieb's review of Rorty's *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth* and *Essays on Heidegger and Others*, *New York Review of Books*, 6.2.91, p. 30. "The higher dismissiveness" is Gottlieb's fine phrase.

