Supreme Court Splits on Grammar and Writing Style

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Supreme Court Splits . . . on Grammar and Writing Style

By Jill Barton

On most matters of writing, U.S. Supreme Court Justices achieve unanimity. Their opinions consistently follow long-established style and grammar rules, not trendy changes in language. Grammarians' latest fears, like using the singular pronoun they, eliminating the period, and adding hashtags and words like mic drop, have little chance of surfacing in a Supreme Court opinion.

But on subtler matters of style, unanimity among the Justices is as sporadic as in their decisions. What's a legal writer to do when the Justices differ on whether to drop a fragment into a paragraph for emphasis, what conjunctions are acceptable, and how to write possessives? Writers everywhere grapple with style or grammar questions, whether they are writing an e-mail to a colleague or a brief to the U.S. Supreme Court. Views on the proper approach are not consistent, even at the highest Court.

On three points of style in particular — how to use conjunctions, possessives, and fragments — the Court is split on whether to follow traditional or more modern rules. This fnd-

ing is based on a review of every signed opinion, concurrence, and dissent from the 2014 and 2015 terms. The examples on the next pages — culled from opinions displaying distinct writing styles — are classified as the majority or minority approach, and may offer some tips for your next writing project.

Fragments Are Not Forgettable

If sentence fragments were bad for writing, we wouldn’t have famous opening lines in literature like “One dollar and eighty-seven cents. That was all.”4 And “Lolita, light of my life, fire of my loins. My sin, my soul.”5

If sentence fragments were bad for legal writing, we wouldn’t have “Pure applesauce.”6 And the favorite of crime-noir fans: “North Philly, May 4, 2001. Officer Sean Devlin, Narcotics Strike Force, was working the morning shift. Undercover surveillance. The neighborhood? Tough as a three-dollar steak.”7

Sentence fragments are rare in judicial opinions. Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner writes that short sentences and fragments can “lower” the writing’s tone, making it more conversational.8 But he calls for a balance and writes that eliminating all brevity could impart a tone that’s too rigid.9

The Justices are split on whether writers should drop a sentence fragment into their writing for emphasis. Justices Samuel Alito, Stephen Breyer, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas follow the conservative approach; none of these four used a fragment in any of their opinions or dissents over two terms. The other five Justices — Chief Justice John Roberts and Jus-

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9 Id.

Justice Kagan appears to employ sentence fragments more than her colleagues. Here are two lively examples, each leading a paragraph on the same page, in the majority opinion in *Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment*:

- “Maybe. Or, then again, maybe not.”
- “Truth be told, if forced to decide that issue, we would not know where or how to start. Which is one good reason why that is not our job.”

Chief Justice Roberts fit his signature fragment — “So too here” — twice in a 2016 opinion. Here is one of those fragments, with context that shows how he varies his writing with long and short sentences. The first two sentences have about 30 words each:

> The Federal Circuit had adopted a two-part test for determining when a case qualified as exceptional, requiring that the claim asserted be both objectively baseless and brought in subjective bad faith. We rejected that test on the ground that a case presenting “subjective bad faith” alone could “sufficiently set itself apart from mine-run cases to warrant a fee award.” *So too here.*

Legal-writing guru Ross Guberman highlighted the same fragment in Roberts’s 2003 brief in *Alaska v. EPA*, which Guberman dissected to show why Justice Ginsburg and others called Rob-

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10 This article studied opinions from the 2014–2015 and 2015–2016 terms, including those of Justice Scalia, whose last opinion was published January 20, 2016 — 24 days before his death on February 13, 2016.


13 *Id.* at 1932–33 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The other reference read: “So too here: A patent infringer’s subjective willfulness, whether intentional or knowing, may warrant enhanced damages, without regard to whether his infringement was objectively reckless.” *Id.* at 1927.
erts the best advocate to come before the Court. Using these clipped phrases is one of the “Roberts-esque ways to spice up your writing.”

Justice Scalia was well known for spicing up his writing with fragments. His injections of incomplete sentences have been so creative that he likely could not have used them twice. But other jurists are mimicking his style. Since Justice Scalia introduced “Pure applesauce” in 2015, at least seven admiring lower-court judges have quoted the phrase. Scalia fit two additional zingers in that King dissent. He chided, “Surely not.” And he questioned reproachfully, “It is bad enough for a court to cross out ‘by the State’ once. But seven times?”

Sentence fragments can take a few different forms. They might lack a main subject or a verb or both, like this pair from Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor:

- “THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s dissent asserts that our decision transfers authority from the federal courts and ‘hands it to the plaintiff.’ Quite the contrary.”
- “But regulated entities are not without recourse in such situations. Quite the opposite.”

Or sentence fragments might be a subordinate clause, like Justice Kagan’s “Which is one good reason why that is not our

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15 Id.
17 135 S. Ct. at 2501 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 2499.
job.” They can also contain an incomplete thought, like an answer to a question, as in Justice Scalia’s “Surely not.”

Often fragments denote a mistake rather than a literary choice. Grammar teachers regularly mark incomplete sentences as errors because they know that many writers, especially those learning the craft, can’t distinguish a complete sentence from an incomplete one. But good legal writers know that fragments can inject a page with flair — and not just a “bit of interpretive jiggery-pokery.”

Short Conjunctions Take a Leading Role

Starting off sentences with short, punchy conjunctions is standard writing practice among Supreme Court Justices. All the Justices sprinkle their opinions with sentences that open with and, but, and yet. Take, for example, Justice Kagan’s quip in a 2015 opinion: “But Marvel must have been pleased to learn of it.” She sandwiched the line between two other sentences in the paragraph that begin with punchy transitions: “And then” and “So.” Her writing flows. Bryan Garner, known as the dean of legal-writing specialists, defends the practice of using conjunctions to start sentences, noting that it’s anything but “stylistically slipshod.”

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22 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2414.
24 Id.
25 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2500 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2406.
27 Id.
28 See Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 56, 126 (3d ed. 2011) (defending the use of conjunctions to start sentences and noting that it is common among good writers).
The Most Conversational Sentence-Starter: So

Still, the myth that writers should avoid using these blue-collar conjunctions to start sentences persists.29 When it comes to one conjunction in particular — so — the writing myth is more than myth. New York Times columnist Anand Giridharadas, for example, argues that so should be shunned — that it’s akin to using well, um, and like.30 Indeed, speakers who add so at the start of a sentence or in the middle of a speech often use the word out of habit or to create a pause. The two-letter word can indicate a verbal tic as much as it can point to a transition or a connection as a coordinating conjunction. Other critics have said that so is a crutch that writers use to puff up their language and that it undermines their credibility.31

Eight out of nine Justices, however, lend credence to the conversational sentence-starter. All but Justice Breyer used so to start at least one sentence in the 2014 and 2015 terms. The word is versatile and common. National Public Radio calculated that it used the word 237 times in a single week in 2014.32 In defense of the frequent use, NPR’s linguist contributor, Geoff Nunberg, said that the little conjunction can accomplish a lot. He noted that it “is a conversational workhorse” that introduces new ideas, shows the connection between cause and result, and sets up jokes.33

Justice Ginsburg, for instance, recently wrote, conversationally: “So yes, we have affirmed, Congress may indeed direct

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29 George Dorrill, “Don’t Begin Sentences with But” Is a Writing Myth, 24 Q. 23 (Fall 2002).
31 Id.
33 Id.
courts to apply newly enacted, outcome-altering legislation in pending civil cases." Justice Kagan also used so at the start of two sentences in the more recent Voisine v. United States:

- "So in linking §922(g)(9) to those laws, Congress must have known it was sweeping in some persons who had engaged in reckless conduct"; and
- "So in the 35 jurisdictions like Maine, petitioners' reading risks allowing domestic abusers of all mental states to evade §922(g)(9)'s firearms ban."

Nearing the minority view, Justice Clarence Thomas reserved so to lead just one sentence in a concurrence over two terms. It did little to relax his formal style: "So the civil in rem forfeiture tradition tracks the tainted-untainted line." He has also used the word to begin sentences in other ways.

The Since vs. Because Debate

All the Justices shun what once seemed to be a tradition of using since instead of because to start sentences. The practice, Garner writes, could stem from grammar teachers who told students not to start sentences with because to keep them from writing sentence fragments. But while all the Justices open sentences with because, some shy away from switching it up with since at any point in a sentence. That could be because of the

37 In Justice Thomas's dissent in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., he started two sentences with so, but its use was not as a conjunction: "So understood, the distinction the Court drew pertains more to an emerging rule of administrative deference than to a definitive classification of judicial determinations." And "So damaging is this unpredictability that we identified uniformity as an 'independent' reason justifying our allocation of claim construction to the court." 135 S. Ct. 831, 850, 851 (2015).
38 Garner, Garner's Dictionary of Legal Usage at 867.
The precise difference in meaning: *since* usually marks a temporal relationship, while *because* marks a causal one.

Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor avoid using *since* to show anything but a temporal relationship. Justice Ginsburg used *since* only twice in her opinions of the 2014 and 2015 terms, and both references show time as opposed to cause. Here’s one example: “Since December 2011, Mellouli has been engaged to be married to a U.S. citizen.”

Though all the Justices use *since*, they do so rarely. In the Court’s last three opinions of the 2015–2016 term, the word *since* appears in only one: the lengthy *Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt* opinion, which struck down Texas abortion restrictions. In that 107-page opinion, the word *because* appears 54 times, but *since* gets only 9 mentions. Nearly all the references to *since* describe timing, as opposed to cause. The only reference where *since* means *because* is in a quotation of a Justice Scalia opinion: “[T]he comment ‘must be regarded as a proposal for change rather than a restatement of existing doctrine, since the commentary refers to not a single case, of this or any other United States court.’”

The distinction between *since* and *because* typically matters only when confusion would result. Consider a sentence like this: “Since the meeting occurred, the client had second thoughts about testifying.” The reader isn’t sure whether this *since* means that the client had second thoughts because of the meeting or from the time that the meeting occurred. That dif-

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41 *Id.* at 2301–43.
42 *Id.* at 2339 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting *United States v. Stuart*, 489 U.S. 353, 375 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
ference warrants a precise choice, Patricia O’Connor explains in her
book *Woe Is I*.

In the next example, Justice Kennedy uses *since* to show
timing: “Since the dawn of history, marriage has transformed
strangers into relatives, binding families and societies togeth-
er.” And here, he uses *since* to mean *because*, also with no pos-
sibility of confusion: “Indeed, since the University is prohibited
from seeking a particular number or quota of minority students,
it cannot be faulted for failing to specify the particular level of
minority enrollment at which it believes the educational bene-
fits of diversity will be obtained.”

Besides Justice Kennedy, five other Justices use *since*
inter-
changeably with *because*, representing a solid majority. And the
results make for more conversational sentences, like this one
from Justice Thomas: “Since Luis cannot afford the legal team
she desires, and because there is no indication that she will re-
ceive inadequate representation as a result, she does not have a
cognizable Sixth Amendment complaint.” That approach fol-
lows the authorities on writing. Garner writes that for modern
writers, using *since* to mean *because* is nearly as common as us-
using it to mean “from the time that.” Writing is more conversa-
tional today, so using *since* to begin sentences makes sense.

**Take Your Pick on Possessives**

The Justices have long disagreed on whether a singular word
ending in *s* should get a lone apostrophe or an apostrophe-plus-*s*
to indicate the possessive. This split is most evident with a

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44 *Id.
word like Congress. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, and Scalia add an extra s to show the possessive of Congress as Congress’s. The slim majority — Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Sotomayor, and Thomas — leave off the extra s.

Justice Alito demonstrates the Court’s split view on how to write the possessive of Congress in Taylor v. United States. In the same paragraph, he adds an s to the possessive for Congress, and then quotes an older opinion where Justice John Paul Stevens did the opposite:

> In Raich, the Court addressed Congress’s authority to regulate the marijuana market. The Court reaffirmed “Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”

The minority on the possessives rule — Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, and Scalia — follows a practice that Garner and most other authorities advocate: add an apostrophe and an s to the end of the singular form of a noun, regardless of how the word ends.

Justice Kagan demonstrates how to follow this rule on a single page in Michigan v. EPA. She adds an extra s to the possessive of Congress and to the possessive of process — both singular nouns. (She leaves it off the possessive form of plants because the word is plural.)

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51 Id. at 2080 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17, (2005)) (emphasis added).
52 Scalia’s approach has been described as more nuanced, following the practice of the New York Times, where, for example, he cuts the extra s if you would not pronounce it, as in “Justice Stevens’ contention.” Guberman, Feeling Possessive?, http://www.legalwritingpro.com/articles/C15-feeling-possessive.php.
55 Id. at 2709–10.
At the outset, EPA determined that regulating plants’ emissions of hazardous air pollutants is “appropriate and necessary” given the harm they cause, and explained that it would take costs into account in developing suitable emissions standards. . . . Indeed, EPA could not have measured costs at the process’s initial stage with any accuracy.  

Justice Thomas, representing the majority’s simplified approach, leaves the s off the possessive of Congress twice.  

If the minority approach seems confusing, consider that the rules on possessives can get even more muddled. The Chicago Manual of Style, for instance, gives other exceptions for leaving off the extra s on possessives. For example, when the name of a single organization is in a plural form ending in s (e.g., General Motors), the possessive is formed by adding an apostrophe only. The same thing goes for words for which the singular form of the noun ending in s is the same as the plural. (For grammar lovers, this rule applies to uninflected plurals like economics and species.) So you end up with the following: “politics’ true meaning” and “the United States’ role in international law,” but “Dickens’s novels” and “a bass’s stripes.”  

Writers who’d prefer not to wrestle with these seemingly conflicting rules are in good company — with a majority of the Court. But authorities have not caught up. Garner, The Chicago Manual of Style, Strunk & White’s The Elements of Style, H.W. Fowler’s A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, and Woe Is I, among others, support the Court’s minority approach on possessives. The Associated Press Stylebook, chided as holding “little sway” in legal-writing circles, is one of few sources that support the space-saving practice of skipping the additional s

56 Id. (emphasis added).
59 Id.
60 Id. § 7.16.
61 Id. § 7.15.
on all possessives. Prognosticators, however, foresee a simpler world — one in which apostrophes can uniformly stand alone.

Conclusion

Nearly a century ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes tried to write in an opinion that changes to a statute would “stop rat holes” in it. Chief Justice William Howard Taft wanted none of that colloquial style. His criticism prompted Justice Holmes to retort that dull legal writing would continue unless the judiciary abandoned the belief that it must stick to “solemn fluffy speech, as, when I grew up, everybody wore black frock coats and black cravats.”

The days of arguing over whether a conversational style is fitting for the Court are over. This review of the Court’s writing style shows that the Justices lean toward writing in a more liberal, modern fashion. They regularly splash their opinions with sentence fragments, drop the traditional extra s from possessives, start sentences with the conversational conjunction so, and swap since for because.

A solid minority still adheres to more traditional rules. A split 5–4 Court comes out narrowly in favor of using sentence fragments and leaving an extra s off possessives. The Justices rule 6–3 in favor of using since when they mean because. But they rule a decisive 8–1 in favor of starting sentences with so. All these style choices reflect a willingness to leave old-fashioned conventions behind and adapt to a more evolving view of language.


Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage at 174 (quoting 2 Holmes–Pollock Letters 132 (M. Howe ed., 1941)).
None of the Justices made the more liberal choice on all four points of style discussed here. A slim majority — Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia, Sotomayor, and Thomas — took the liberal route on three points. The other Justices came out with choices evenly divided between the conservative and liberal writing styles.

From the conservative side of the Court, Justice Scalia comes out as among the most liberal in these results. His flamboyant style makes that finding unsurprising. Tributes following his death lauded his writing panache and zingers, like “Pure applesauce,” with some calling him the Court’s “best” writer. But other writers on the Court rival Justice Scalia in crafting creative and compelling reads. Chief Justice Roberts has been recognized throughout his career for his writing prowess, and his opinions today are conversational and spirited. Justice Kagan’s gifted and casual style also often draws accolades. Their words are provocative in a way that reflects a modern way of speaking and writing. So too does this review of the Court’s writing style. The study reflects a Court inclined to avoid dull, old-fashioned writing that’s at all reminiscent of an era of black frock coats and cravats.

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