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attempted application of objective measurements to what perforce must be subjective judgments of preconceived pleasure feelings connected with specific activities, it must fall far short of its aim. Nowhere is it made clear nor does it seem possible that there could be found any omniscient body of judges, legislators, or philosophers, or any others for that matter, who could make value judgments of pleasure and pain applicable to all strata and sectors of their own or other societies. On the other hand, if we regard Bentham's writings as having contributed a new exactness to ethical thinking by precise definition of what were previously vague generalities, it seems apparent that the criticism in no way negates the value of his work.

Previous mention was made of the challenge presented to our societal foundations. More specifically, in our own Declaration of Independence certain truths are held to be self-evident, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. But to Bentham there is only one truth—the pursuit of happiness—and all other such propositions must be relentlessly and coldly weighed on his scales of pain and pleasure. In his philosophy there can be no such quality as we are pleased to call unselfishness; it must perforce be termed enlightened self-interest, no matter how remote the "pleasure" to be gained may be from the act in question; i.e., the mother who sacrifices her own life or limb to save her child from an onrushing automobile must be getting more pleasure from the thought that the child will live than the amount of pain she is about to suffer. By Bentham's standards, the right to rebel against bad or tyrannical laws is based only on the utilitarian criterion of "the prospect of success." And, of course, since the happiness of the greatest number is the ultimate end, any means which do not produce pain in such amounts as to outweigh the happiness to be produced are absolutely justified. If this is in truth a nation of laws rather than of men, could it ever survive the adoption of a philosophy in which any end, no matter how worthy, could justify the adoption of dishonorable means to reach it?

This is not a book for reading in an evening, a week, or a month. It is a largely indigestible, but nevertheless stimulating presentation of the ideas, right or wrong, of a courageous and original intellect. The author, despite his justifiable, intellectual vanity, makes a substantial contribution to a clearer understanding of the Great Reformer.

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For more than a quarter of a century "Hudson's Cases," now in its third edition (1951), was used as the casebook in law school courses on international law. Dickinson's Casebook (1950) and Briggs' valuable "The
Law of Nations" (2d ed. 1952) made a choice possible and many a teacher noticed this opportunity. Professor Bishop recently added a new book to this list, his "International Law," and it is an excellent contribution indeed.

At the present time international law is not taught in all our law schools or even in a great majority of them. This is being rapidly remedied. more and more law schools are including international law in their curricula. This fundamental change in the traditional attitude has been long overdue. Plain facts of international life and their impact upon this nation show clearly the problems to face coming generations of lawyers.

Professor Bishop's new book will help make such a change easier, more inviting and more promising. It presents the vast, overwhelming problems of international law in a well balanced collection of readings and cases, supplemented with a series of expertly written notes and editorial notes. Cases are well edited and the Lotus case has finally received a proper treatment (pp. 345-359). Compared with other casebooks there are fewer decisions of foreign jurisdictions included, and I find it a welcome and wise change. Bibliographical data contained in notes and footnotes are carefully selected, abundant and reliable. Less fortunate, however, seems to be the bibliography on pages 712-714.

It is easy for a reviewer of a book like this to sit back and point out matters which should have been included. The only fair way to indulge in such criticism is to single out, at the same time, what could safely have been omitted. This understood, some remarks will not be unfair.

First of all, Inter-American problems are neglected. The Organization of American states is not discussed. The Caribbean Commission and other important regional activities in the Americas deserve a note, as do American doctrines of recognition of governments (Tobar, Estrada, etc.). Space could be made available by omitting the Albanian story (pp. 228-229), the extract from Lauterpacht (pp. 232-234) and parts of the Statute (pp. 704 ss.).

The second important topic missing in the book is a proper discussion of functions performed by organs of international intercourse (diplomatic, consular, etc.) since only their privileges and immunities are covered (p. 417 ss.). Materials regarding this important subject could replace the greater part of the extended note on the Kasenkina case (pp. 451-455).

A third remark may be permitted. It refers to the treatment of our treaty law. In our routine courses on international law most teachers are concerned with constitutional and other aspects of treaties, and there seems never to be time to realize that treaty law is elevated to the dignity of the Law of the Land. This law is one of the neglected areas of legal education and it is not taken up by teachers in specific courses, e.g., on decedents' estate, on real property, on torts, on conflict law, on monopolies, etc., apparently because they rely upon their colleague in the course on international law. As it may be—the matter is generally lost in the gray
area of inter-course relations. My idea is that, judging by the relation between case law and treaty law as presented in this book (and in others as well), case law is given an unfair preference over treaty law. It is, of course, reassuring to find in Professor Bishop’s book the recent treaty with Uruguay reprinted in toto (p. 714). But this alone seems not to be sufficient to teach students how to read and how to interpret treaties, how to use collateral materials, etc., since young lawyers will be more frequently faced with application of treaty law in our courts than with pleading cases before some international tribunal. Therefore, at least the most typical treaty provisions should be included in a casebook on international law, e.g., concerning interests in land, protection of property, including nationalization, foreign corporations, double taxation, various standards of treatment, from the most-favored-nation clause (properly treated, p. 113 ss.) to the equal national treatment, etc. The necessary space could be provided by shortening the section on nationality insofar as it contains municipal law, and, partly from the rather extensive chapter on international claims.

The chapter on jurisdiction is divided by the author on the basis of contact used to determine it, i.e., nationality, territory and special problems concerning vessels. It appears to me that a discussion distinguishing between judicial and legislative jurisdiction on the international level is more promising; it would also help to dissipate a long established uncertainty.

Lastly, I would like to say that the printing is done well and the legibility is excellent. Two reservations, nevertheless, I cannot suppress. One of them concerns the ever reappearing heading referring to “Hackwort’s Digest,” printed in bold type, a rather tiring feature. This could be replaced by an appropriate heading indicating the matter discussed while a mere citation of the source could be added in the usual inconspicuous way. The second observation is a trivial one, I know. Here it is: Why must our casebooks be printed on the heaviest type of paper?

Quite a list of desiderata copied from notes jotted down in perusing this fine book! It is a good omen: the better the book, the more we dare to demand.

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