National Solutions To An International Scourge: Prosecuting Piracy Domestically As A Viable Alternative To International Tribunals

Kevin H. Govern

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NATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO AN INTERNATIONAL SCOURGE: PROSECUTING PIRACY DOMESTICALLY AS A Viable ALTERNATIVE TO INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

Kevin H. Govern*

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ABSTRACT

This article will assess both the problems and potential solutions to contemporary seaborne threats of piracy, robbery, and terrorism, and discuss challenges and opportunities for the domestic and international forums prosecuting the crimes that constitute piracy and

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maritime terrorism. In particular it will begin with a discussion of the
d(e)volution of events in the late 20th Century, which has transformed
the old problem of piracy into a modern scourge. Piratical tactics,
techniques and procedures (TTP) gave rise to a distinctly different
threat from that faced in the past. Accompanying this discussion is a
survey of present-day piracy, followed by an analysis of why
piratical activities are more susceptible now than ever before to the
long arm of the law, especially, but not exclusively, domestic pro-
secution, as well as anti-piracy policies. The article will advance
reasons for why domestic, rather than international, prosecution will
be the prevailing remedy of choice when dealing with captured
pirates. Concluding comments will note why it is likely that present
and emergent anti-piracy activities will continue to expand across the
spectrum of operations, and summarize the challenges and
opportunities for the domestic and international forces preventing
piracy, those capturing pirates, and the fora prosecuting the crimes
that constitute piracy and maritime terrorism.

I. NEW TIMES, OLD PROBLEMS:
THE MODERN ERA OF MARITIME PIRACY

[Pirates] are peculiarly obnoxious because they
maraud upon the open seas, the great highway of all
maritime nations. So heinous is the offence con-
sidered, so difficult are such offenders to apprehend,
and so universal is the interest in their prompt arrest
and punishment, that they have long been regarded
as outlaws and the enemies of all mankind.¹

Piracy is only one of many elements of what I call
trans-national criminal activity because if [you are]
using the seaways for piracy, [they are] probably
being used for drug trafficking, human smuggling,

¹ Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 338
(1925).
and arms smuggling. So, the way countries come together and solve this is important.²

For thousands of years, piracy, or “robbery of the high seas,” has caused conflict in international waters. Increasingly, piracy has become part of a multifaceted criminal or terrorist enterprise, especially in certain flashpoint locations around the globe. Contemporary “attacks appear to be escalating in frequency, sophistication and severity” in comparison to even the 20th Century’s blight of piratical activity.³ Piracy has thus become a highly organized business with “professional” pirates, threatening the stability of the seas and their surrounding nations. The increase in frequency of pirate attacks and maritime conflicts causes a need for reassessment of the countermeasures that have been implemented throughout history to combat this problem. Typically, many countries who remain involved in combating and preventing piracy tend to promote military solutions and amendment to international laws. However, placing emphasis on the domestication of criminalizing piracy will eliminate many of the problems that arise out of conflicting laws, sovereignty over criminals, and international boundaries.

The author Keith Johnson, in his 2010 work Who’s a Pirate?, mused on how it “may seem strange there should be doubt about an offense as old as this one.”⁴ “Piracy was the world’s first crime with universal jurisdiction, meaning that any country had the right to apprehend pirates on the high seas.”⁵ This jurisdiction was first exercised by the Romans, who, in Johnson’s estimation, took piracy “so seriously [that] they overrode a cautious Senate and gave near-dictatorial powers to an up-and-coming general named Pompey, who soon swept away piracy in the Mediterranean.”⁶ In the realm of one’s employment status bearing on legal status, history has been replete

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⁵ Id.
⁶ Id.
with European countries such as Britain cracking "down on pirates—except when busy enlisting certain ones, dubbed 'privateers,' to help them fight their wars by raiding enemy ships."\(^7\) Johnson even estimates that the creation of the modern U.S. Navy is attributable to "Thomas Jefferson erupt[ing] over the cost of paying tribute to the Barbary Corsairs for safe passage of U.S. merchant ships [when] [a]t the time, the U.S. was paying about one-tenth of the federal budget to the pirates."\(^8\)

There have traditionally been many relevant motivations that drive piracy including economic hardship, lifestyle choices, and in some cases social gain through organized crime. The ever-present threat of maritime piracy demonstrates the clear need for an effective international legal response to attacks on ships and developing the appropriate mechanisms to bring malefactors to justice. However, some piracy is also associated with political rebellion against their governments such as the Somali pirates who claim nationalist motives, or Nigerian pirates who claim to be rebelling against lost tribal rights. As Professor John Winn and this author have previously written, political motivation—or the lack thereof—appears to be a major contributing factor to the continuing crisis of contemporary piracy.\(^9\) Both scholars have assessed the following incident as the first major modern confluence of piracy and politics:

The modern era of maritime piracy, [hallmarked by complex, multifaceted operations], arguably began at 2320 hours (11:30 pm) on September 19, 1992. On that date, after a long period of relative inactivity, armed criminals grappled aboard the Nagasaki Spirit, a Liberian registered oil tanker, which was proceeding south in the Malacca Strait between Sumatra and Malaysia. After robbing the crew and looting the ship stores, the gang forced the captain and crew over the side before leaving the ship cruising at full speed on

\(^7\) Id.
\(^8\) Id.
autopilot in the most crowded shipping channel on Earth. At the same time, on an opposite heading, the container ship Ocean Blessing was also pilot-less with its crew locked below decks after a similar attack. The resulting collision and uncontrolled fires destroyed both ships and killed all but two of the crew. Ocean Blessing burned for six weeks spewing tons of heavy oil into nearby Malaysian fisheries. To complicate matters, the hulk of Ocean Blessing was towed by a Chinese flagged tug to a breakers yard in India. Upon arrival, however, suspicious customs investigators discovered dozens of containers filled with the charred remains of un-manifested Chinese-made small arms and explosives destined for the Middle East. Shortly afterwards, the owner of the breaker’s yard disappeared without a trace.10

The Ocean Blessing-Nagasaki Spirit incident illuminates the complex nature of maritime piracy. “Since 1992, the threat to maritime commerce has increased dramatically.”11 Maritime piracy and sea robbery represent the most challenging current threat to international maritime security. What is possibly the most disturbing aspect of recent piracy “is the growing nexus between maritime crime, terror organizations, and failed or failing states.”12 Martin N. Murphy has opined that piracy may be a “marginal problem in itself, but the connections between organized piracy and wider criminal networks and corruption on land make it an element of a phenomenon that can have a weakening effect on states and a destabilizing one on the regions in which it is found.”13 The emergent threat appears to come not so much from “traditional commercial

11 Winn & Govern, supra note 9.
12 Id
pirates, but from a new breed of maritime terrorist, whose skills evolve from a conventional piracy base.] 14 The value of distinguishing modern piracy as maritime terrorism may result in government funds channeled into maritime security projects as a form of law-enforcement. 15 In some instances, corrupt government officials work directly with naval units to steal cargoes or even entire ships or cargoes under the guise of “anti-smuggling” enforcement. 16 Pirates and sea-robbers now range far out at sea in flotillas of small boats supported by sophisticated “mother-ships” to opportunistically attack vessels of almost any size. 17 Maritime underwriters take the threats seriously that “sea sport scooters, scuba diving equipment, and mini-submarines” will be used in the near future to facilitate maritime attacks. 18

II. TALLYING ACTORS AND THEIR TERRIBLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS

As Snodden has pointed out, there is a genuine dilemma of how to distinguish who the principal actors are in these activities, versus the accomplices and second or third-hand beneficiaries, where sponsorship and/or identity are not apparent and actors have overcome deterrence and evaded apprehension: “[H]ow would you know that pirates attacking a ship are those motivated by political ideals

17 ‘Mother Ship’ Behind Pirate Raids, BBC NEWS, Nov. 11, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4428808.stm (reporting that “[p]irate attacks off Somalia’s coast are being organised from command vessels, or ‘mother ships,’” according to the International Maritime Bureau).
and are part of a group of extremists intent on causing an economic downturn in the maritime markets?” In its breakdown of first and second order costs of maritime piracy, the One Earth Future Working Group estimated in 2010 that piracy created a global expense of $7 to 12 billion per year:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Factor</th>
<th>Value (Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ransoms: excess costs</td>
<td>$176 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance Premiums</td>
<td>$460 million to $3.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-Routing Ships</td>
<td>$2.4 to $3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Equipment</td>
<td>$363 million to $2.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Forces</td>
<td>$2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutions</td>
<td>$31 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piracy Deterrent Organizations</td>
<td>$19.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost to Regional Economies</td>
<td>$1.25 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL ESTIMATED COST</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7 to $12 billion per year</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 – 2010 Estimate of Total Cost of Piracy

Regarding those losses, the “Joint War Committee” representing the marine committees of both Lloyd’s Market Association, and representatives from London's insurance company underwriters classified the Strait of Malacca in 2005 as a “war zone” for purposes of indemnity coverage. Despite an increase in piracy, the “war zone” status was removed a year later—to the relief of shippers paying insurance premiums—as a “testimony to the increased security of the strait[.]” Nevertheless, other locations such as Benin

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have been added as emergent “war zones.” Elsewhere, particularly in Asia, piratical attacks have tended to result in thefts of ship’s cargo with or without fraudulent re-flagging. In such instances, crews are often murdered to deter detection or prosecution. Because of limited ports and market infrastructures, seizures in African waters typically involve demands for cash as a ransom, payment of which inadvertently encourages the persistence of piracy from the international community and causes the number of attacks to go up consistently despite best efforts to curb this trend. Moreover, paying the ransom can cause a slippery slope, in that publicizing the capitulation to ransom demands will proliferate worldwide growth in piracy. The piracy threat is so severe that the International Maritime Board (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) broadcasts “piracy alerts” from a twenty-four manned Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur, and at least one law firm informs its clients of daily vessel casualty and piracy risks.

qfcrMgdnABAun9hOA8IwnbTA&cad=rja; see also Newsbank Access World News, Rec. No. 1136F1464F5AD8E0.  
25 See id. at 6.  
27 SeeIMB Piracy Reporting Centre, ICC COM. CRIME SERS., http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (Formed in 1992, the PRC’s role includes efforts to “raise awareness of piracy hotspots, detail specific attacks and their consequences, and investigate incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea and in port.” The PRC also “work[s] with national governments on a range of initiatives to reduce and ultimately eradicate attacks against ships.).  
The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) was established in October of 1992 following a series of violent pirate attacks, namely but not exclusively the attack on the oil tanker *Valiant Carrier*. It has served as an active correspondent for the international community of the potential danger that piracy poses to the maritime industry. The PRC is an international nongovernmental organization financed by voluntary contributions from sixteen ship-owners associations and maritime insurance companies. The center records and reports incidents of maritime pirate attacks occurring globally. The IMB’s responsibilities and services range from being a primary point of contact when captains or shipmasters suspect piratical activity or attacks, to coordination with governmental law enforcement and regional organizations to report and combat piracy.

By 2010, the IMB reported 445 acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, the fourth successive year that the numbers of reported incidents have increased, with Somalia having “accounted for 92% of kidnappings” and 49 of 53 vessels seized, as the “highest numbers the IMB’s PRC has ever seen.” By the Fall of 2011, piratical acts were on-track to hit a regrettable all-time high, as the PRC reported that “[p]iracy on the world’s seas had risen to record levels, with Somali pirates behind 56% of the 352 attacks reported this year, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau (IMB) revealed [on October 18, 2011] in its latest global piracy report.” Meanwhile, the PRC encouragingly noted “more Somali hijack attempts are being thwarted by strengthened anti-piracy measures.”

30 See IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, supra note 27.
31 Id.
34 Id.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>370</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>383</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>452</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>330</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>266</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>239</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>263</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 – Global Maritime Pirate Attacks

The slight 1.3% decline from 2010 to 2011 contrasts with 2010’s 10.9% leap over 2009’s attack statistics, which in turn came after an 11.4% increase in piracy and armed robbery committed at sea worldwide between 2007 and 2008. In the first two months of 2012...

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alone, there have been sixty-two pirate attacks and six hijackings worldwide, of which twenty-six of the attacks and four hijackings have been off Somali waters, bring the total vessels held captive off Somalia to twelve, and total hostages to 177. These statistics unfortunately invalidated the IMB’s sanguine assessment of national and international antipiracy measures, such that it assessed a “relative decline in pirate attacks worldwide,” despite an increase in Somali pirates’ range and capabilities:

[a] total of 196 incidents around the world were recorded by the IMB’s 24 hour Piracy Reporting Centre [for the first two quarters of 2010], compared to 240 incidents in 2009. This includes 31 vessels hijacked, 48 vessels fired upon and 70 vessels boarded.

During this period, one crew member was killed, 597 crew members were taken hostage and 16 were injured. The use of firearms including rocket propelled [sic] grenades was particularly marked in the waters off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Attacks in this region and in the Red Sea represent more than half of the incidents reported over the past six months.

The coast of Somalia remains particularly vulnerable with 100 pirate attacks in 2010, including

27 hijackings. The numbers of attacks [in 2010] have decreased compared to 2009 in the most dangerous maritime area of the world.38

The predominance of these attacks has occurred in the Gulf of Aden and the remainder off of the Horn of Africa, with the Malacca Straights and South China Sea a distant third.39 Ports have not been immune, with over 112 separate attacks on ships berthed or in anchor in port. Many of these attacks result in injury or death, with 11 crewmen killed, 32 crewmen injured, and 21 crewmembers missing. More disturbing is that during 2008 assailants took a total of 889 crewmembers hostage and hijacked 49 vessels.40 The ICC Commercial Crime Service’s 2010 analysis of the 2009 IMB figures is even more disturbing. During this time period, the IMB reported:

153 vessels were boarded, 49 vessels were hijacked, 84 attempted attacks and 120 vessels fired upon - compared to 46 ships fired upon in 2008. A total of 1052 crew were taken hostage. Sixty eight [sic] crew were injured in the various incidents and eight crew killed. The level of violence towards the crew has increased along with the number of crew injuries.41

As was the case in 2009, most of the attacks occurred off of the Somali Coast.

In recent years, there has been a demographic shift associated with attack locales. In 2008, most of these attacks occurred off of the Gulf of Aden, adjacent to clan-led Puntland; the IMB assesses that “[p]irates from the Puntland region were believed responsible for 35 incidents of piracy in the first quarter of 2010, including nine hijackings.” In 2009, there was a marked increase in attacks off of the east coast of Somalia near Haradhere; an area that since the Summer of 2010 has been controlled by the militant Islamist group *Hizbul Islam* that “wants to establish Sharia law and order and put an end to the pirate trade in the town[.]” The attacks have become more sophisticated utilizing mother ships and occurring as far as 1,000 miles from the coast of Mogadishu, indicating that this type of piracy is becoming better funded and more refined. In August 2011, the IMB ranked piracy off the coast of West Africa to rival levels near Somalia, with Nigeria and Benin being second in the world, only to Somalia, for incidents of sea piracy in the world, dramatically increasing the cost of shipping to and from Nigeria in a region where the United States and other Western nations do not have substantial antipiracy patrols to augment national efforts.

Maritime piracy may even be an extension of armed insurgency extending its operations beyond land borders into the sea. Arabinda Acharya and Nadeeka P. Withana from Singapore have identified the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as the "pioneer in maritime terrorism with a state-of-the-art maritime terrorist organization" known as the "Sea Tigers."
Withana report that the “Sea Tigers” are capable of “infiltrating harbours [sic] to lay mines, conducting reconnaissance operations and recovering material from vessels that have been sunk.” Their tools of terrorism and piracy include mines improvised from “everyday household objects such as rice cookers[,]” to sophisticated free floating mines such as those found in Trincomalee harbor. One unsuccessful mining operation led to the June 2006 arrests of Sea Tigers laying mines off the shore of Wennappuwa. The British Broadcasting Service reported on March 22, 2008 that ten crew from a Sri Lankan patrol boat went missing off the coast of Nayaru after their vessel exploded upon striking a sea mine placed by the LTTE. The “Sea Tigers” have also used a commercial fleet as a seemingly “legitimate commercial cover and a source of revenue” in order to clandestinely transport weapons and narcotics to support its own operations, along with other piratical and terrorist groups. Piratical activity facilitates delivery of illegal weapons and explosives, allows undocumented movement of cadres, and provides banking-free anonymous cash from ransoms. Also, while maritime terror attacks may lack some of the desired public theatre of urban attacks, terror organizations clearly do appreciate the potential of using ships as both instruments and facilitators of terror. The U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has observed that while the


46 Balakrishnan, supra note 45.

47 Id.

48 Id.


50 B. Raman, Action Against LTTE’s Maritime Terrorism, International Terrorism Monitor: Paper No.58, INDIA DEF. CONSULTANTS (May 26, 2006) http://www.indiadefence.com/LTTEnavy.htm (records that the Indian Navy confirmed at least one instance in 1995 when an LTTE ship had “clandestinely transported a consignment of arms and ammunition, dispatched by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) of Pakistan to the southern Philippines for use by the Abu Sayyaf. The HUM paid the LTTE for its services by donating to it some anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition. This was in addition to the cash paid for [the services].”)
September 11th attacks involved airplanes as bombs, “it would not take much of a leap to show that a ship could become the bomb, particularly a ship with volatile cargo.”\textsuperscript{51} Most disturbing is the potential for these groups to create catastrophic disruptions to regional or worldwide markets, especially for petroleum and liquefied natural gas (LNG) products.

Less than a year after the September 11th attacks, Greek authorities intercepted the Baltic Sky, a Comoros flagged ship carrying an unprecedented 750 tons of high explosives.\textsuperscript{52} This represents the amount of explosives the allies dropped on the German V-1 rocket assembly sites in World War II.\textsuperscript{53} When intercepted, it was discovered that the Baltic Sky was destined for Sudan with a cargo consigned to a private company using a post-office box in Khartoum.\textsuperscript{54} In October 2002, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, a senior Al Qaeda operative in Yemen, was credited with the suicide attack of the French super-tanker MV Limburg in the Red Sea.\textsuperscript{55} The next year, the Abu Sayef group took credit for an attack on a passenger ferry in Manila that killed over 100 passengers and crew.\textsuperscript{56}

More recent piracy attacks include the highly publicized April 8, 2009


\textsuperscript{53} Adam L. Gruen, THE UNITED STATES ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II PREEMPTIVE DEFENSE ALLIED AIR POWER VERSUS HITLER’S V-WEAPONS, 1943–1945 32 (1998) (The U.S. Fifteenth Air Force based in Italy attacked the V-weapon manufacturing plant at Ober Raderach in southern Germany with more than 750 tons of bombs.).

\textsuperscript{54} Patrick Quinn, Greeks Probe Possible Terror Links To Seized Ship Loaded With Explosives, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 24, 2003, Westlaw, File No. 6/24/03 APWORLD 00:00:00.

\textsuperscript{55} OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, Biographies of High Value Terrorist Detainees Transferred to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay 7 (Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.dni.gov/announcements/content/DetaineeBiographies.pdf.

hijacking of the *Maersk Alabama* off the coast of Somalia, and the attack on the U.S.-flagged *Liberty Sun* on April 14, 2009, showing that this international threat of piracy is continuous and must be addressed. How the world community is responding to this menace is predicated on the interpretation and enforcement of the assortment of international treaties, international and common law attributes, and adjacent State regulation, code and law. According to Honorable William D. Delahunt, speaking before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight in April 2009, “[p]iracy will present a particularly difficult task because it is not only an American problem—but an international problem that will need a coordinated response from the world community.”

A BBC report in 2008 estimated that the total payout to pirates that year exceeded $150 million, making piracy quite a lucrative enterprise. Even more disturbing is the inability of powerful nations to control the occurrences of piracy. By August 2010, “at least 22 foreign vessels plus one barge [were] kept in Somali hands against the will of their owners, while at least 401 seafarers—including an elderly British yachting couple—plus the lorry drivers from Somaliland” were being detained. In January 2011, the 320

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elderly passengers aboard the *Spirit of Adventure* had the unexpected adventure of coming under attack by Somali pirates, while at the same time some forty other ships came into pirates’ hands and more than 800 crew were being held captive in the seas south of the Gulf of Aden.\(^6\) The STRATFOR Global Intelligence organization assessed in January 2011, that “[a]s long as these pirates have safe-havens along Somalia’s coast, they will be able to replace men, weapons and vessels lost at sea to foreign naval forces—and will continue collecting ransom payments ranging as high as $10 million.”\(^6\)

A “perfect storm” of increasing maritime vulnerability and pirate capability threatens maritime underpinnings of international trade, peace, and security. Failed, corrupt, or indifferent states ignore obligations to cooperate with other states to repress piratical activity.\(^6\) Access to weapons and technologies, including global positioning systems (GPS) and marine satellite (MARSAT) communications, can allow pirates to venture forth with impunity. Weak maritime registration regimes also allow stolen vessels to be re-registered at sea, and crews carrying false passports, forged competency certificates, and fraudulent bills of lading are able to man stolen ships. Maritime documents were discovered to be fraudulent or questionable in some locations, according to the IMO as well as press sources.\(^6\) The IMO report notes that issuers of fraudulent documents are “‘well-organised [sic], with effective links to maritime administrations, employers, manning agents and training establishments.’”\(^6\)

Port officials and customs agents may also collude with

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\(^6\) Id.
organized criminal groups to identify and track potential target ships; they work together to prevent recovery of ships and cargoes or the prosecution of offenders.\textsuperscript{67} Billions of dollars are lost to piracy and maritime predation each year, yet most incidents go unreported.\textsuperscript{68} Owners clearly wish to avoid protracted, futile, or corrupt investigations, negative publicity, or increased underwriting costs that may exceed the amount of the loss itself.\textsuperscript{69}

Prior to the late 20\textsuperscript{th} Century, threats to maritime security "were either political or military in nature" and normally resolved through diplomacy or conflict.\textsuperscript{70} In that century, pirates escaped detection by navigating at high speed, ignoring international boundaries, and taking advantage of safe havens in their own or foreign coastal waters. Areas most affected by piracy and maritime criminality also typically lack bilateral or multilateral understandings with neighbors.\textsuperscript{71} National self-interest (and corruption) fosters a lack of commitment to address maritime theft and violence. Economically challenged maritime states with limited littoral ("brown water") and deep water ("blue water") naval capabilities are often reluctant to spend their limited fiscal resources to benefit primarily foreign

\textsuperscript{67} Examining The Links Between Organised Crime And Corruption, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY (Apr. 2010), \url{http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/132594/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/5d40e029-9b44-4b00-bf40-92690ceef37f4/ISN/132594/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/5d40e029-9b44-4b00-bf40-92690ceef37f4/en/OrganizedCrime%26Corruption.pdf} (example of Greece at pp. 238-241 where several members or whole departments of state administrative bodies, to include police and port customs officials, members of the judiciary, and politicians have colluded with organized crime groups by engaging in what is termed "systemic" or "organised corruption.").

\textsuperscript{68} Bowden et al., \textit{supra} note 20, at 25.

\textsuperscript{69} See Anna Hopper, \textit{Squashing the Skull and Bones: Reforming the International Anti-Piracy Regime}, \textit{HARV. INT'L REV.}, Winter 2008, at 28, 30 (asserting that barriers to reporting contribute to less-than-complete data on piracy).


\textsuperscript{71} Lauren Ploch et al., \textit{Piracy Off the Horn of Africa}, \textit{CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS} R40528 (Apr. 27, 2011), \url{http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf} (As noted on page 3 of the report, "[p]irates tend to operate in regions with large coastal areas, high levels of commercial activity, small national naval forces, and weak regional security cooperation mechanisms.").
commercial interests. When regional and sub-regional diplomatic meetings do occur, they typically yield no more than pledges of cooperation or information sharing, often because of the inability of some nations to support an anti-piracy initiative. Regional states, particularly in Asia, remain especially sensitive to issues of sovereignty, but are increasingly willing to discuss and pursue serious counter-piracy regimes, including ones involving cooperation with the U.S.\textsuperscript{72}

Maritime pirates, sea-robbers, and sea-terrorists present a daunting set of legal, political, and practical challenges, including the task of patrolling 2.5 million square miles of sea to prevent such attacks in the pirate plagued country of Somalia alone.\textsuperscript{73} Nevertheless, in an age of diminishing resources and burgeoning demand for manufactured products and raw materials, mitigating the maritime piracy threat is critical. The threat posed by pirates and

\textsuperscript{72} Ralph A. Cossa et. al., \textit{The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration}, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS) REPORT (Feb. 2009), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v09n01.pdf (As noted on page 69 of the CSIS report, “[m]ore concretely, the littoral states of Southeast Asia should step up efforts to secure sea lines of communication and prevent piracy.”). The Djibouti Code of Conduct is also noteworthy regarding antipiracy measures in this region. See \textit{Djibouti Code of Conduct}, INT’L MAR. ORG. (2011), http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx. Signatories promote cooperation to fight against piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Id. In conformity with local and international laws, nations under this initiative will set up inquiries, arrests and prosecution of persons suspected to have committed piracy acts and armed attacks against ships, as well as the interdiction and seizure of suspected vessels and their cargo, the medical treatment and repatriation of sailors, fishermen and onboard personnel and other passengers. Id. Representatives of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen signed on Jan. 29, 2009, and Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Mauritius, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates have since signed making the current total eighteen countries from the twenty-one eligible to sign the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Id. It remains open for signature at IMO Headquarters by other countries in the region. Id.

sea robbers will increase dramatically in scope and violence into the foreseeable future without global commitment, cooperation, and engagement. Piracy undermines global international market systems and is symptomatic of failed, weak, and corrupt states. In turn, weak and failed states are most associated with other maritime crime, including illegal fishing, drug and arms smuggling, illegal migration, pollution, and terrorism.

III. LOOKING FROM DISTANT SHORES CLOSER TO HOME: LAW AND POLICY TO COMBAT PIRACY

Under customary international law, piracy included every unauthorized act of violence committed by a private vessel on the open sea against another vessel with intent to plunder.74 Prior to the 19th century, captured pirates were *hostes humana generis* (enemies of mankind) and subject to summary justice (including capital punishment) “without any solemnity of condemnation, by the [m]arine [l]aw.”75 By the mid 20th Century, several important international conventions had already been developed, including the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1948 (SOLAS),76 the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil of 1954 (MARPOL),77 and treaties dealing with the prevention of collisions at sea.78 The United Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO) came into existence in 1958.79 Responsibilities of the IMO include adopting, implementing, and amending conventions that facilitate international maritime

76 See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter SOLAS]. This treaty was motivated in large part by the Titanic disaster of 1912.
safety, efficiency in navigation and prevention of marine pollution from ships.\textsuperscript{80}

One important agency that emerged was the Maritime Law Association of the United States (USMLA), which formed the Committee on the International Law of the Sea to review and study the existing international laws that dealt with maritime piracy. In November of 1997, the USMLA made recommendations to the Comité Maritime International (CMI) that it should, in concert with the United Nations and IMB, form a working group that would be charged with developing a model national law concerning maritime piracy.\textsuperscript{81} This same group lobbied Congress to review U.S. piracy law, but there was little interest shown by Capitol Hill until after the 9/11 tragedy.\textsuperscript{82}

In 1998, the CMI formulated a Joint International Working Group on Uniformity of Law Concerning Acts of Piracy and Maritime Violence (JIWG), comprised of maritime transportation representatives, trade councils, international law enforcement agencies, and the ICC-IMB.\textsuperscript{83} The JIWG identified that the fundamental difficulty in obtaining effective measures of suppression was a lack of uniformity in national laws concerning piracy and acts of maritime violence as well as the reporting and investigation of

\textsuperscript{80} Id.
\textsuperscript{82} Id. at 1447, 1450-51.
\textsuperscript{83} Letter from Frank L. Wiswall, Jr., Chairman of the JIWG 1-3 (May 2005), http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/pdf/Acts_PiracyWP.pdf. (At its May 2005 meeting, the Executive Council approved the establishment of the Joint International Working Group, including representatives of the following participants in addition to the CMI: the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO); the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS); the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL); the International Group of P & I Clubs (IGP & I); the ICC International Maritime Bureau (ICC-IMB); the International Maritime Organization (IMO); the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF); and the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI). Those in attendance gave preliminary consideration to amendment and re-formulation of the Model National Law. Contact was also made with the Director of the Legal Bureau of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the Director of the Legal Department of the International Air Transport Association (IATA).).
incidents. The group set out to formulate a Model National Law Code dealing with piracy, especially with regards to jurisdiction and prosecution of piracy and maritime violence. The JIWG previously produced a Model National Law that the Assembly of the CMI adopted in Singapore in February 2001. The increasing frequency of hostage taking in connection with acts of piracy and maritime violence caused the CMI to consider whether the Model National Law should be "amended or re-formulated to attract wider implementation and to resolve issues of jurisdiction and prosecution of a broader range of criminal offences committed on board foreign-flag ships, some of which offences may have implications for maritime security." Any successfully implemented and universally adopted Model National Law ought to harmonize with the 1982 UNCLOS and the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) articles, and any "coalition of the willing" that combats piracy must have common diplomatic and political philosophies that include proactive cooperation, not condonation or tolerance of piracy, and a "common vocabulary" with respect to defining, preventing, and prosecuting maritime piracy, terrorism, and other related acts of violence.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) codifies piracy to constitute the following:

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84 Id. at 5.
85 Id.
87 Wiswall, supra note 83, at 2.
88 See Interview with Sam Donaldson of ABC News, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1035, 1035 (June 5, 1994); Exchange with Reporters in Crawford, Texas, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2215, 2217 (Dec. 31 2002). Note: The origin of the term "coalition of the willing" is uncertain, but as a post-1990 political phrase, President Bill Clinton used it in June 1994, in relation to possible operations against North Korea, and President George W. Bush in the intervention of Iraq in 2003.
Article 101
Definition of piracy

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
   (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
   (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

Article 102
Piracy by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied

The acts of piracy, as defined in article 101, committed by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship or aircraft.

Article 103
Definition of a pirate ship or aircraft

A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts
referred to in article 101. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act.90

Armed robbery against ships is defined in the draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (resolution A.922 (22), Annex, paragraph 2.2) as follows:

[armed robbery against ships means any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of “piracy”, directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences.91]

For statistical purposes, the IMB defines piracy and armed robbery as:

[an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act. This definition thus covers actual or attempted attacks whether the ship is berthed, at anchor or at sea. Petty thefts are excluded, unless the thieves are armed.92]

90 UNCLOS, supra note 64, at art. 101-103.
Any state may invoke extraordinary jurisdiction to arrest or detain persons or vessels on the high seas involved in piracy.93 Violence or other criminal acts committed for political ends (i.e. terrorism) under UNCLOS is not piracy.94 Also un-encompassed by UNCLOS are planned crimes committed by stowaways, even on the high seas, and “outside of mutiny any unlawful acts of violence by a government vessel against another craft are a matter of State responsibility, not the law of piracy.”95 Debate continues as to whether UNCLOS addresses what amounts to a large amount of all maritime attacks against ships and crew; that is, those vessels attacked or stolen when moored in ports, harbors, or other territorial waters.96 Continued discussion also covers whether the definitions of piracy adequately encompass the needs of the modern era and exactly which acts are considered to be illegal. Acts falling outside of UNCLOS’s narrow definition are usually referred to as “sea robbery,” “piratical acts,” or occasionally as “modern piracy.”97

93 See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 26.
94 Letter from Int’l Mar. Org., to All IMO Member States, United Nations and specialized agencies, Intergovernmental orgs., Non-governmental org. in consultative status, and Liberation movements, 3 (May 17, 2011), http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/circular_letter_3180.pdf (“Pursuant to article 101 of UNCLOS, an act of piracy requires that it be committed for private ends, such as extracting a ransom. Acts that are politically motivated, i.e. done with the objective of intimidating a population or of compelling a Government or an international organization to do, or to abstain from doing any act, will not be acts of piracy.”).
96 See Tamara R. Shie, Ports in a Storm? The Nexus Between Counterterrorism, Counterproliferation, and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, PACIFIC FORUM CSIS, Jul. 2004, at 17, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v04n04.pdf. Shie notes that the debate concerns whether “attacks are those which only occur on the high seas, as in the traditional definition imposed by UNCLOS (though in 2001 the IMO expanded the definition to include attacks in territorial waters), or if attacks to vessels in port are also included, as they are in the definition employed by the International Maritime Bureau.”
Within the meaning and effect of UNCLOS international piracy, or *piracy jure gentium*,\(^9\) remains *sui generis*, or of a class of its own, because of the truly unique jurisdictional complexities associated with international maritime crime. Courts often have difficulty determining whether the criminal law in question applies to the place where the alleged offense occurred and whether the court in question has jurisdiction to try the case.

Following the 1985 terror-hijacking of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, and recognizing the severe shortcomings within UNCLOS,\(^9\) the U.S. was instrumental in advancing and promulgating the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) under the auspices of the United Nations IMB.\(^1\) The SUA, which formally entered into effect in 1998, partially fills a jurisdictional gap in UNCLOS. Article 3(1) invokes a universal obligation of states to either punish or to extradite any person that commits an offense (yet not using the words “piracy”) if that person unlawfully and intentionally:

(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; or

\(^9\) See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 258 (7th ed. 1996) (*piracy jure gentium* means “piracy under international law.”).

\(^9\) *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)*, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES 1, (May 15, 2010) http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/maritime.pdf. The IMO’s official commentary noted that “[c]oncern about unlawful acts that threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews grew during the 1980s motivated states to negotiate and subsequently adopt this convention . . . . [A]fter the 1985 hijacking of the *Achille Lauro*, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 40/61 in 1985, urging States to cooperate in contributing to the elimination of causes underlying terrorism and invited the IMO to study the problem of terrorism aboard or against ships with a view to making recommendations on appropriate measures.”

\(^1\) *SUA Treaties*, U.N. INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) (The official commentary by the IMO notes that “[]n November 1985 the problem was considered by IMO’s 14th Assembly and a proposal by the United States that measures to prevent such unlawful acts should be developed by IMO was supported.”).
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or
(f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f).101

Unlike UNCLOS, SUA encompasses criminal actions committed in ports, coastal zones, or territorial waters.102 SUA makes no distinction between commercial or political motives.103 Although the SUA definition of piracy is a substantial improvement over that found in UNCLOS, critics note that it does not encompass extortion or conspiracies by port officials, even if part of a piratical enter-

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SUA also suffers from jurisdictional limitations. Once a lawful boarding has taken place (with the permission of the flag state), Article 6 of the SUA does not provide for any independent or prescriptive jurisdiction. SUA likewise denies the capturing state the right to prosecute offenders without permission of the flag state.

However, the 2005 Protocols to SUA did include, by reference to other treaties, as unlawful acts: 1) actions aimed to intimidate a population, government or international agency to take action or abstain from taking action; 2) actions against or on ships by utilizing or discharging biological or chemical weapons (BCN) or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or transporting the same; 3) using or discharging oil, LNG, or other hazardous substances in such quantity to cause injury or death; 4) using a ship as a weapon; and/or 5) transporting or utilizing software or technology that contributes to the design, manufacturer or delivery of a BCN weapon. However, there is significant confusion over Article 3 of the 2005 Protocol with regard to what constitutes persons “acting unlawfully and intentionally” with respect to “seizure of ships by force[,] acts of violence against persons on board ships[,] and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it.”

Does this Protocol refer to unlawful acts under international or national law, or both? Also, like SUA, the 2005 Protocols only bind contracting states that are a party to it. Thus far, the U.S. and 157 other nations are contracting states with respect to the 1988

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104 Africa Programme, supra note 95.
106 Id. at 2.
108 SUA Treaties, supra note 100 (“The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention also adds a new Article 3bis which states that a person commits an offence within the meaning of the Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally” committed certain enumerated acts relating to “explosive, radioactive material or BCN (biological, chemical, nuclear) weapons.”).
The U.S and 145 other nations have ratified the 1988 Protocol. Only seventeen nations, however, have ratified the 2005 Protocols. Most distressing, some of the maritime states most affected by, or involved with, piracy are non-signatories to SUA, its protocols or none of the related instruments at the time of this writing.

Furthermore, jurisdictional gaps in UNCLOS or SUA could be filled by invocation of Article 7 of the Rome Statute rendering jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute persons who engage in terroristic attacks at sea. Unfortunately, in addition to the delay and controversy apparently intrinsic to invocation of ICC jurisdiction, none of the littoral states, those closest to the seas and most affected by—or associated with—piratical activity, are contracting states to the Rome Statute.

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110 Id.

111 Id. On Sept. 25, 2008 the U.S. Senate resolved, with 2/3 of the Senators present concurring therein, to advise and consented to the ratification of the 2005 SUA Protocol (in a reservation, it declared “that it does not consider itself bound by Article 16(2) of the Convention with respect to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 2005 SUA Protocol.” A lengthy list of “understandings” also accompanied the Senate ratification of the 2005 SUA Protocol.). See S. Exec. Rep. 110-25, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2008), https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:XR7D6pArasGJ:www.foreign.senate.gov/download/?id=ADGEE8jnW2MrMm4-8enHGg9Ed5lz3l70fzZv911e3G109mWAYJBca923Z0o4exRHEgox8MC8VFH8oGoJrbVHKj_QFsKWKi8D3qXxK5pKyiGySGM97omIbSwuWc39POzdMRH8Hk7F&sig=AHIEtbRlZmtNAMJm1EMhAbbPGuAgWZ3Q&pli=1


114 Considering the same states as identified in Endnote 112, Nigeria has, in fairness, both signed and ratified the Rome Statute. Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Thailand have signed but not ratified the Rome Statute. China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri
states were to ratify the Rome Statute, the U.S. remains a significant (and disappointing) non-party state to the Rome Statute.\\footnote{115}{Lanka and Somalia have neither signed or ratified the Rome Statute. See U.N. Secretary-General, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, (April 2011), http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2011/Treaties/list_english.pdf. The U.S. gave notice of same to the Secretary General on May 6, 2002, stating: "This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on Dec. 31, 2000. The United States requests that its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected in the depositary's status lists relating to this treaty." SeeUnited States (U.S.): Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Regarding the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (April 27, 2002), inInternational Law in Brief, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. (May 9, 2002), http://www.asil.org/ilib0506.cfm#r3.}

This is because the Rome Statute remains far from ideal. Jurisdiction under the ICC is entirely discretionary and sanctions are not available against states that ignore treaty obligations. Also, Rome does not create universal jurisdiction under customary international law norms (\textit{jus cogens}).\\footnote{116}{RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: SOURCES OF INT'L LAW §102 (1987).} Jurisdiction is limited to instances in which perpetrators or victims are nationals of a state party to the Statute.\\footnote{117}{See Rome Statute, supra note 113, at art. 12. But see The Tribunal, \textit{INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA}, http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (The Tribunal) is an independent judicial body established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Tribunal has jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, and over all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal).} Even then, jurisdiction attaches only if the criminal act in question takes place in a state party's territorial waters or aboard a vessel flagged by that state.\\footnote{118}{Rome Statute, supra note 113, at art. 12.} This leaves out the ability to prosecute arrested pirates whose crimes occurred in international waters and whose nationality is other than those involved because of the lack of international criminal jurisdiction based on the national laws of that maritime territory. Other problems arise when arrested pirates are extradited into third countries to be prosecuted. This is because the establishment of universal jurisdiction in cases of extradition would
be against the terms of the UNCLOS treaty, which states that punishment must be carried out by “the courts of the state which carried out the seizure...”

As a result of the vast area that is plagued by piracy, international maritime laws struggle to amend these issues because of uncertainties over jurisdictions and legal definitions, among many other factors. By default, or out of a lack of extant, let alone effective forum for international prosecution of piracy, nation-states are often left to trying insurgents, rogue military units, organized crime syndicates, terrorist and terrorist-sponsored groups (a/k/a “pirates”) domestically.

During the first half of 2011, piracy attacks in the Indian Ocean increased by 36%, yet as immigration law expert Jason Dzubow notes that prosecution of captured pirates remains relatively rare: “in fact, four-fifths of captured pirates are released without further ado.”

The One Earth Future Working Paper estimated that the cost of piracy prosecutions in 2010 alone was around $31 million, obtained by estimating “the cost of piracy prosecutions each year by multiplying the average cost of criminal prosecutions in ‘regional’ nations (i.e. Kenya, the Seychelles, and Yemen), North America, and Europe, by the number of prosecutions occurring in each of those respective regions[].” Surveying the nations involved in Somali pirate prosecutions over the past two years, Jurist Legal News and Research notes that Germany, Kenya, the Seychelles, South Korea,

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119 UNCLOS, supra note 64, at art. 105.

120 This article does not discuss aircraft piracy (a/k/a “skyjacking”) committed by various state and non-state actors, nor does it address cyber-piracy, such as that experienced by the U.S. during the late 1980s onward from actors within China. Professor Peter K. Yu has written about U.S.-China intellectual property disputes and the eventual, yet partial, resolution via intellectual property agreements in 1992, 1995, and 1996. Despite these agreements, Yu concluded in 2000 that intellectual property piracy remains rampant in China. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates To Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property In China In The Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 133 (2000).


122 Id.

123 Bowden et al., supra note 20, at 19.
Somaliland, Spain, Malaysia, Mauritius, the Netherlands, and Yemen have all attempted to prosecute suspected pirates, with varying degrees of success in conviction.\textsuperscript{124} Yet the de-facto Somali government reaction (given the lack of a de jure government) has been critical of the U.S. in particular for exercising jurisdiction over suspected Somali pirates and has called for piracy cases to be handled by an international tribunal.\textsuperscript{125}

At the time of this article’s writing, four piracy prosecutions in the U.S. had become the first successful prosecutions of piracy in a U.S. court since the 1820s. On November 24, 2010 five Somali men were convicted of attacking the U.S. Navy ship USS Nichols off the eastern coast of Africa.\textsuperscript{126} In January 2011, the attorneys for the convicted pirates made a request for the sentencing judge to reconsider their conviction on charges of piracy, attacking to plunder a maritime vessel and assault with a dangerous weapon.\textsuperscript{127} On November 29, 2010 a judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced Somali citizen Jama Idle Ibrahim to 30 years pursuant to his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit piracy under the law of nations and conspiracy to use a firearm during and in relation to a violent act of piracy in the Gulf of Aden against a

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merchant vessel, the MV/CEC Future, in November 2008.\textsuperscript{128} Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse, a 21 year old Somali, plead guilty in May 2010 to hostage-taking and conspiracy in the hijacking of the \textit{Maersk Alabama} in the Indian Ocean in April 2009; on Wednesday, February 16, 2011, he was sentenced to 33 years, 9 months imprisonment in U.S. Federal District Court in Manhattan, NY.\textsuperscript{129} On May 23, 2011, two Somali men plead guilty to charges of piracy for their role in hijacking a yacht, which resulted in the deaths of four Americans. The guilty pleas by Jilani Abdiali and Burhan Abdirahman Yusuf join those entered by Mohamud Hirs Issa Ali, Mohamud Salad Ali and Ali Abdi Mohamed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.\textsuperscript{130}

As announced by the U.S. Attorney in the Muse (\textit{Maersk Alabama}) case noted above, the U.S. Department of State's official position on such prosecutions has become that "the United States believes that the first option for prosecution of a piracy incident should be by the affected state(s)—the flag state or the state of nationality of the vessel's owner or crew."\textsuperscript{131} This is part of a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{130} See \textit{Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office Eastern District of Virginia, Two More Somalis Plead Guilty to Charges Relating to Piracy of Quest} (May 23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2011/05/20110523abdialiner.html. The U.S. Attorney’s Office reports that sentencing is scheduled for August 22, 2011 for Yusuf and September 6, 2011 for Abdiali. Both are expected to receive sentences of life in prison. Under the plea agreement, however, they could serve less time and eventually be deported to Somalia. There were 14 suspects indicted in connection with the attack, and others are expected to plead guilty in the near future. \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{131} \textit{United States Actions To Counter Piracy Off the Horn of Africa}, \textit{U.S. DEP’T OF STATE} (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/128540.htm.
\end{itemize}
coordinated strategy by which the U.S. “continues to urge states to ensure that they have the proper domestic legal framework to prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts.”  

For example, in the instance of Kenya, an affected state which may continue to be unable to prosecute suspected offenders captured by the United States, the United States has a Memorandum of Understanding “to facilitate the transfer of the suspected pirates to Kenya for prosecution in [the Kenyan] courts” and the U.S. States is “exploring similar arrangements with other states to handle cases when affected states are unable to prosecute pirates.”

The increasing intensity of patrolling pirate infested waters around the globe, including but not limited to Somalia, will likely lead to continued successful capturing of pirates or sea-robbers to be brought to formal trial. The challenge then arises as to where these pirates should be prosecuted. Alternatives include either domestic prosecution under the laws criminalizing acts of piracy (or other available U.S. criminal statutes) in U.S. Federal District Court (or other competent U.S. court then extant or yet-to-be created), or rendition back to the state of citizenship or regional partner states, or rendition to the ICC. Professor Milena Sterio has noted that rendition of pirates to the ICC would be viewed, at a minimum, as executive recognition of the ICC by the U.S.—a politically undesirable result—in the event it ever transfers captured pirates to so-called regional

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132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Navy 5th Fleet Public Affairs, USS Ashland Captures Pirates (Apr. 10, 2010), http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=52519. This is in contrast to other acts of piracy which have been brought before U.S. courts. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008). Born in Houston and a resident of Northern Virginia, Ali was charged with conspiracy to assassinate the president, providing material support to al Qaeda, conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, and other associated crimes. The jury trial took place in November 2005. On November 22, 2005, after deliberating for two and a half days, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict on all counts. On March 29, 2006, Ali was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his crime. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction but overturned the sentence on the grounds that the prior Court had deviated from federal sentencing guidelines, which call for life in prison. Judge Lee resentenced Ali to life in prison. Id.
partner states, emulating what the U.K. does, for instance, with transfer to Kenya for prosecution. Under UNCLOS, Sterio notes,

[T]he legality of this type of transfer is dubious, as only the capturing state has jurisdiction over caught pirates, and receiving states, like Kenya, do not. Moreover, domestic statutes implementing UNCLOS do not always allow for universal jurisdiction. The U.S. statute that implemented UNCLOS allows the U.S. to prosecute pirates, although the U.S. is the capturing nation and has jurisdiction to prosecute under UNCLOS, only if pirates somehow acted against American interests.

This dilemma has arisen as a result of provisions stated by the UNCLOS, which has posed enough problems on securing jurisdiction over suspected pirates that the U.N. Security Council attempted to address them through further new provisions in 2009. These provisions adopted resolutions that would confer maritime powers not granted in UNCLOS to member states in order to allow them to conduct antipiracy operations in Somali waters and to facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates. Herein the resolutions bypass current UNCLOS provisions because of the higher power conferred upon the United Nations Security Council when it “acts in the interest of international peace and security.” Although this expands jurisdictional power over pirates and fills some of the gaps left by the SUA, it does not solve all state sovereignty issues, but rather it imposes limited, if any, obligations on states to delegate

136 Id.
authority over pirates, and should be further revised to enhance prosecutorial powers.

Towards that end, the U.N. Security Council decided to urgently consider the establishment of specialized Somali courts to try suspected pirates both in Somalia and in the region, including an "extraterritorial Somali specialized anti-piracy court" by adopting resolution 1976 (2011) on April 11, 2011. Reports indicate that the unrecognized independent region of Somaliland has opened a maximum security prison for pirates in August 2011, yet piracy trials cannot be held in Somalia because the country has lacked a functioning legal system since the ouster of Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991. The prison, refurbished by a USD $1.5 million grant from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), is currently only housing prisoners tried in Somalia, a currently seeming impossibility. The UNODC has also announced in May 2010 that Seychelles was to create a UN-supported center to accept and try pirates captured by the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) off the coast of Somalia and surrounding areas. The UNODC also indicated that future prisons may be opened in Puntland as well as several more in Somaliland.

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141 Id.
143 McGregor, supra note 140.
In Sunil Agarwal’s estimate, these territorial and extra-territorial tribunals are at best a “practical and concrete, albeit half-step, towards developing the effective prosecution mechanisms to combat Somali piracy.”\textsuperscript{146} The resolution Agarwal discusses, sponsored by Russia, calls for the creation of piracy courts outside of Somalia and cooperation among countries in combating the piracy problem.\textsuperscript{147} Russian Ambassador to the U.N., Vitaly Churkin, stated that the resolution was the “first practical step in the direction of creating an effective judicial mechanism, one capable of a credible, reliable solution to the problem of bringing pirates to justice.”\textsuperscript{148} Ambassador Churkin further asserted:

The worsening situation with piracy off the coast of Somalia requires the international community to adopt qualitatively new measures to combat it. Today we've taken a big step ahead in fighting piracy. The resolution adopted upon our initiative contains a wide array of qualitatively new measures aimed at establishing the necessary conditions for more effectively counteracting the pirates.\textsuperscript{149}

So, given the ambiguity and the lack of cohesion of international standards, what is possible through existent, as well as “qualitatively new” measures under domestic (U.S.) criminal law, and the laws of other nations that are capable (and willing) to prosecute pirates? One answer is prosecution under laws sanctioning terrorism. For instance, the U.S. Code contains a definition of terrorism—to include maritime activities—embedded in its requirement that Annual Country reports on Terrorism be submitted


\textsuperscript{148} Id.

\textsuperscript{149} Id.
by the Secretary of State to Congress every year. According to Title 22, Chapter 38, Section 2656f(d):

(d) Definitions

As used in this section—

(1) the term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than 1 country;

(2) the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents;

(3) the term “terrorist group” means any group, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism;

(4) the terms “territory” and “territory of the country” mean the land, waters, and airspace of the country; and

(5) the terms “terrorist sanctuary” and “sanctuary” mean an area in the territory of the country—

(A) that is used by a terrorist or terrorist organization—

(i) to carry out terrorist activities, including training, fundraising, financing, and recruitment; or

(ii) as a transit point; and

(B) the government of which expressly consents to, or with knowledge, allows, tolerates, or disregards such use of its territory and is not subject to a determination under—

(i) section 2405(j)(1)(A) of the Appendix to title 50;

(ii) section 2371(a) of this title; or

(iii) section 2780(d) of this title.150

As for domestic prosecution, Title 18 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 113B, Section 2332b(g)(5) sets forth the “Federal crime of terrorism” as an offense that:

(A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct; and

(B) is a violation of [any one of several dozen sections of Titles 18, 42, or 49].

IV. FROM PIRATE TO PROSECUTED CRIMINAL: POLITICAL CAPITAL AND RESOURCES BROUGHT TO BEAR

Practical challenges attendant to bringing captured pirates to trial prove most daunting. In addition to basic issues of criminal jurisdiction, any criminal prosecution of pirates also involves significant political and resource commitments. These commitments include witness travel costs, visas, evidence preservation, and any attendant diplomatic questions involving rendition or extradition. Costs associated with even a simple criminal prosecution could easily exceed millions of dollars. Obviously because of these limitations, when U.S. or other coalition maritime forces actually intervene to stop observed armed attacks on private vessels, they immediately cease fire and passively standoff once pirate vessels break contact with their intended targets. As recently as 2008, the British Foreign Office advised the Royal Navy to avoid detaining pirates of certain nationalities in view of the possibility that pirates may actually invoke claims for asylum under British law if their country of origin is known to use torture or allow execution as judicial punishment. Charles Glass wrote of the sentiments of International Maritime Bureau Captain Pottengal Mukundun: “there are hardly any cases

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where these attackers are arrested and brought to trial. Piracy is a high-profit, low-risk activity."

Illustrative of this high-profit, low-risk paradigm is the 1999 incident involving the Indian Navy's recapture of the merchant vessel *Alondra Rainbow*. Upon re-capture, it was determined that the vessel was owned by a Japanese corporation, flagged in Panama, and crewed largely by Filipinos. While the initial pirate attack and seizure occurred off Indonesia, the ship also traversed the Sri Lankan coastline before being disabled by gunfire in Indian waters. Because of the multiple legal interests, nationalities, and obligations under domestic and international law, the first piracy prosecution in India's history required the cooperation of the IMB, Sri Lanka, Indian Justice and Marine Ministries, the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard, the private insurers, and Japanese government. After several years of delay, the pirate gang was finally brought to trial and prosecuted in 2003 under questionable provisions of India's pre-independence Penal Code. Although the pirates were in fact found guilty, despite the use of deadly force, casting adrift of crew, and attempted scuttling, the trial court imposed sentences no greater than seven years imprisonment. Subsequently, despite the best efforts of the Indian prosecutors, the prisoners were freed and deported to Indonesia only two years after dismissal of the case by the Mumbai High Court of Appeals. As a result of this very complex litigation,

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157 See id.

158 Id.

and the growing reality of piracy threats to Indian maritime interests, the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to work with Parliament at the time of this article’s writing to draft a new “bill [that] seeks to define piracy, the people who can be termed as pirates, the courts of law which would be trying these pirates and the quantum of punishment to be given to the apprehended sea brigands.”

Until laws and courts exist to expedite piracy prosecutions, India’s official stance towards piracy prosecutions is “inclined to support the establishment of a special chamber within the national jurisdiction of a State or States in the region, with UN participation [since this] option is considered suitable besides being cost effective, as it would strengthen the existing jurisdiction with the established procedures.”

In an earlier piracy incident, complicated by third-party nation interference bordering on complicity, we can study the 1998 case of the Petro Ranger, an oil tanker registered in Singapore that was hijacked off the coast of Malaysia. The pirates re-painted and renamed the ship the Wilby and flew Honduran colors. Following an IMB Piracy Alert, the ship was identified, detained, and escorted to the port of Hankou by the Chinese Coast Guard. Although Chinese authorities did release the ship to its original owners, they retained about half the total fuel on board as “evidence.” Also, perhaps to avoid questions about collusion by port authorities, the pirates themselves were arrested, confined for a year but released without prosecution, and returned to Indonesia despite a formal request for extradition by Singapore.


Id.


Id.

Id.

Id.

Glass, supra note 154, at 4.
Coastal states also understandably resist the deployment of foreign warships in or even near territorial waters. Indonesia in particular has a long history of sensitivity to the transit of foreign military vessels through seas that they consider to be an “imagined bridge” between nations, such as the Malacca strait and other important navigable waters. Littoral states are also quite sensitive to interdictions or inspections by warships of another state, even if to rescue hostages or recover stolen property.

Under UNCLOS and long-standing customary international law, the high seas are not subject to the sovereignty of any state. In this respect, all actions on the high seas must be exercised with scrupulous regard to the rights of other states in the exercise of their sovereign vessels and citizens thereon. Except by special convention, or in time of war, interference by a military vessel with a commercial vessel engaged in lawful transit on the high seas is unlawful and violates the sovereignty of the flag state of the vessel in question. Even when pirates are engaged by military or coastal vessels in international waters, under 11(3) of UNCLOS, there is no right of hot pursuit when pirates enter the territorial waters of another state allowing an easy escape.

UNCLOS does preserve the right of states to suppress piracy and prosecute piracy in international waters but, unlike previous customary law, Article 107 of UNCLOS strictly limits anti-piracy activities to “warships or military aircraft.” Conversely, whenever a foreign warship is lawfully within the internal waters of another state (i.e. by invitation or innocent passage), the ship retains sovereign immunity from local jurisdiction within the reserved exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state.

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168 See id.
170 UNCLOS, *supra* note 64, at art. 111.
171 *Id.* at art. 105.
172 *Id.* at art. 107.
173 *Id.* at art. 32; *see also* Gilbert Charles Gidel, *Le Droit International Public de la Mer* 236 (Topos Verlag ed., 1932).
Warships may not be boarded, detained, or searched. The only lawful non-belligerent sanctions available to a coastal state regarding the conduct of a foreign warship are diplomatic protest or expulsion from territorial waters. Although commercial interests (and France) have repeatedly proposed the creation of multinational maritime forces under UN control to deal with pirates, these proposals are usually rejected immediately by both Malaysia and Indonesia. Professor John Mo has identified that a strong complicating factor in this cooperation happens to be the unsettled territorial claims among China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei, and naval patrols in the South China Sea, involving the Spratly Islands (Nasha Islands), the Pratas archipelago (Dongsha Islands), the Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha Islands), and Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands). At the same time, Mo claims that the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and China fear Japan’s enforcement activities in deterring piracy as “re-emerging Japanese militarism.”

V. PRESCRIPTION BEFORE PROSECUTION: PREVENTING FAILING OR FAILED STATES FROM BECOMING FULFILLED PIRATOCRACIES

Donna Nincic’s research has indicated, “being a failed state (at least as measured by the Failed State Index) is a necessary, though

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174 See UNCLOS, supra note 64, at art. 32.
175 Id. at art. 30.
177 Id. at 350.
not sufficient condition for maritime piracy." Nincic also found precursor conditions to piracy which include presence “in an area where merchant shipping concentrates; either in the vicinity of a major sea-lane of communication, or important hub ports.” Finally, she found that maritime piracy is “more likely to occur when the state has lost some control over the legitimate means of violence in society; i.e., where armed militias, para-military gangs and the like are able to operate with near impunity.”

The latter assertion is especially logical, since diminished, pre-occupied, or corrupt naval and coastal forces are incapable of stemming criminal acts at sea. Even the IMB acknowledged that only the U.S. and other Western nations with modern navies seem capable of controlling pirates in hotspots such as Indonesia, Somalia and West Africa. In a remarkable case of strange bedfellows, in November 2007, the U.S. Navy actually came to the direct assistance of a North Korean cargo vessel MV Dai Hong Dan, which had been attacked and subsequently boarded by pirates of Somalia. In another intervention in April 2008, French special-operations forces recaptured the luxury sailing yacht Le Ponant taken in the Red Sea. The hijackers, apparently acting with complete impunity sailed the vessel into the Somali port of Eyl from which they demanded a large ransom to free the crew. In an ensuing rescue following delivery of the ransom by the ships owners, six pirates were captured and taken.
to France for prosecution. Eight other pirates were pursued and killed on shore by attack helicopters as they attempted to escape.

Yet even when authorities in one region increase pressure on maritime criminals, piratical activity simply moves closer to shore, towards areas with less enforcement activity, or increases in violence. For example, when piratical activity decreased in Malaysia and Bangladesh in 2007, attacks off Nigeria and Somalia tripled. In June 2007, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) requested “urgent help” from Western navies to protect shipping off the Somali coast. After the U.S. called for a “Regional Maritime Security Initiative” in 2004, multilateral maritime security initiatives were introduced in the Malacca Strait between 2004 and 2007. Since that time, in general, the number of piracy incidents has been falling in the Malacca Strait since 2005, “largely as a result of a number of countermeasures introduced by the three littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.”

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187 Id.
188 Id.
190 UN Relief At French Help Against Somali Pirates, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS (September 26, 2007), http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g8aw97BGHluPnq1d3drKCIMQ.
191 Catherine Zara Raymond, Piracy And Armed Robbery In The Malacca Strait — A Problem Solved? 62 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV., 31, 35 (Summer 2009), available at http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7835607e-388c-4e70-baf1-b00e9fb443f1/Piracy-and-Armed-Robbery-in-the-Malacca-Strait--A-. The IMO has lauded regional anti-piracy operation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Piracy and armed robbery against ships, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, http://www.imo.org/ourwork/security/piracyarmedrobbery/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (RECAAP), which concluded in November 2004 by 16 countries in Asia, and includes the RECAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) for facilitating the sharing of piracy-related information, is a good example of successful regional cooperation which IMO seeks to replicate elsewhere.”
192 Raymond, supra note 191, at 32.
Emerging states, not just failed states, lag far behind the West in port security and vessel identification systems.\textsuperscript{193} Illustrative is the recent saga of the \textit{An Yue Jiang}, a Chinese merchant ship allegedly carrying ammunition and small arms destined for landlocked Zimbabwe. Upon discovering the nature of the cargo, a group of southern African nations coordinated efforts to monitor that ship’s movements and prevent unloading of the cargo.\textsuperscript{194} After air and sea patrols lost track of the vessel, the South African government acknowledged their capacity to track and monitor vessels at sea was essentially “non-existent.”\textsuperscript{195} The \textit{An Yue Jiang} incident also highlights a failure of compliance by non-Western coastal states with amendments to the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) relating to implementation of a unified long-range identification and tracking system (LRIT) capable of identifying merchant vessels over 300 tons displacement up to 1500km at sea.\textsuperscript{196}

Another potential factor in increased predation is the general prohibition on the use of small arms or weapons capable of deadly force on commercial vessels for self-defense. Sea-going vessels virtually never carry arms for self-defense.\textsuperscript{197} This situation is primarily attributable to severe penal and customs laws against weapons possession in almost all maritime states. Insurers and ships owners also view the liability risk associated with armed defense as exceeding the risk of loss of the vessel itself. Even were armed force a viable option, increased technologies have resulted in much smaller ships crews often out-numbered by potential borders. Merchant sailors are not trained to use firearms and coordinating a ship’s defense with crews speaking three different languages also might


\textsuperscript{195} Id.

\textsuperscript{196} SOLAS, supra note 76.

present obstacles to effective self-defense, even were it lawfully authorized. Licensed, armed guards are available in some instances but costs are high and logistics complicated. Furthermore, there may be as much risk from un-vetted local security as from actual pirates.

To prevent attacks or boarding, ships captains rely upon increased speed, maneuvering, water hoses, sound cannons or newer passive systems such as electrified boarding nets, alarm systems, or lubricant foams. Most often, in order to protect the lives and safety of their crews, shipping companies usually request naval forces to stand-off while they negotiate for weeks or even months with pirate hostage-takers. In November 2007, the U.S. Navy actually served as intermediary between a group of particularly violent Somali pirates and owners of the *Ching Fong Hwa 168*, a Taiwanese fishing vessel. “We continue to talk with the pirates regularly, encouraging them to leave ships,” noted a Navy spokesperson from 5th Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain.

So-called Private Security Companies (PSCs), also known as Private Military Firms (PMFs), usually headquartered in Europe or the U.S. also offer anti-piracy consulting and other services. There are however significant gaps between what PSCs may claim in marketing materials as opposed to the actual end services they are capable of providing. Most legitimate PSCs limit services to deterrence or vigilance training, background checks, hostage negotiations, recovery investigations, or general risk assessment. Employment of armed guards on merchant ships, or the use of private armed escort vessels is exceedingly rare. Privately employed and armed security personnel face substantial risks of arrest and detention as mercenaries or even terrorists, especially in Asian waters, and face opposition by the U.N. over concerns of accountability and effi-

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Desperate ships owners have proposed the creation of small multinational military forces under license from the United Nations. Meanwhile, a robust multinational task force for military counter-piracy operations under the auspices of two Combined Task Forces (CTFs), CTF-150 and 151, conduct Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, with regular rotation of command over these CTFs among partner navies, and augmentation with Special Operations Forces as required.\(^{202}\)


\(^{202}\) Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/150/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). Countries presently contributing to CTF-150 include Republic of Korea, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Pakistan, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Other nations who have participated include Australia, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and Turkey. CTF 151 is a multinational task force established in January 2009 to conduct counter-piracy operations under a mission-based mandate throughout the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) area of responsibility to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. CTF 151 has been commanded by the U.S. Navy, the Korean Navy and the Turkish Navy, See Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/151/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). For one of the most successful uses of Special Operations Forces in counter-terrorism/counterpiracy operations, contemporaneous with the writing of this article, see e.g. Ariel Zirulnick, SEAL Team 6: Somalia rescue illustrates new US military strategy, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.
VI. POTENTIAL WAYS AHEAD IN PREVENTING AND CHALLENGING PIRATIONAL THREATS

In view of the complex nature of the maritime piracy, as well as its demonstrated threat to national, regional, and international security, effective confrontation requires global engagement; a willingness to reach consensus-based integrated deterrence strategies, and an active prosecution regime. Amendments to SUA should focus on more robust inspections of ships and crews, the recognition of a limited right of “hot pursuit,” and broadened definitions of both piracy and maritime terrorism. Although recently the SUA amended the definition of piracy, it did not extend the scope of international jurisdiction. Accordingly, the United States has repeatedly sought to amend SUA to allow warships automatic permission to board foreign flagged vessels where the flag state fails to respond to the requesting state’s request within a certain number of hours. An international ship’s registration process must be implemented in order to eliminate non-transparent convenience flagging. Biometric credentials and passports could address the current blight of fraudulent documentation. A United Nations ‘Maritime Ombudsman’ agency under IMO control or the United Nations International Labor Office (ILO) could intervene when requested to address concerns about detained crews or the lack of due-process or transparency for those charged with maritime criminal offenses.

Towards these important ends, the United States must move forward and accept its responsibilities as (although not aspiring to be) the world’s only remaining super-power and leading maritime state. This includes, inter alia, the ratification of UNCLOS and, with reservations if necessary, the Rome Statute. UNCLOS and Rome Statute ratification will also facilitate a leadership role for the United States in negotiating multilateral instruments and more effective international cooperation.
international regimes that can address maritime terrorism, in addition to the U.S.'s own efforts to apprehend pirates and prosecute them under domestic U.S. laws. In the forefront there must be clear and consistent domestic criminalization and extradition agreements in accordance with the 2005 Protocols and SUA Convention. Taking the diplomatic lead in this area would also facilitate the formation of an effective multinational U.N. maritime force capable of clearing sea-lanes of pirates, sea robbers, and terrorists. The United States' vast intelligence capabilities and unique technologies, such as unmanned reconnaissance aircraft (armed or un-armed), could provide much needed leverage for a multinational force and greatly reducing associated costs, especially in Africa where technical resources (and political will) to effectuate needed changes are limited.

As noted, prosecution of extra-territorial piratical acts against U.S.-flagged ships or involving U.S. citizens is possible under various U.S. federal piracy or expansive anti-terrorism legislation.206 Also, there are successful models of inter-agency and international maritime cooperation. Specifically, Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) involved in counter-drug interdiction operations have worked directly with Central and South American states in the Gulf of Mexico, South Atlantic, and Pacific since 1989.207 Based upon these


207 See, e.g., Evan Munsing & Christopher J. Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success, INST. FOR NAT’L STRATEGIC STUDIES (June 2011), http://www.ndu.edu/insn/docuploaded/Strat%20Perspectives%20%205%20_Lamb-Munsing.pdf ("Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–South) is well known within the U.S. Government as the “gold standard” for interagency cooperation and intelligence fusion, despite its preference for keeping a low profile and giving other agencies the credit for its successes. It is often cited as a model for whole-of-government problem-solving in the literature on
success models, similar counter-piracy arrangements with partners in Asia and Africa could yield immediate and positive results, especially if criminal jurisdiction issues can also be resolved.

Perhaps of equal importance, dealing with the piracy problem in turn lessens the opportunities for pirates and terror groups to leverage maritime crime and violence towards political ends, especially with regards to the hijacking of weapons and items which may be employed as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Any progress in this area also reduces the possibility for regional and worldwide devastation. A 2006 RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy report notes a so-called “dirty-bomb” explosion from within an uninspected cargo container presents “the greatest combination of likelihood and expected economic harm.” Ships filled with explosives could also destroy densely populated urban areas, critical infrastructures, or be scuttled in maritime choke points such as the Malacca or Hormuz straits. Additionally, in regards to WMD control, failed or weak states will face increasing economic and diplomatic pressure to deal with their own criminal elements and general lack of maritime transparency.

In May of 2003, the United States, along with ten coalition partners, founded the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). That number has now grown to eighteen with sixty others agreeing to cooperate in interdiction strategies. The PSI has no unique legal authority; its interdiction principles state that all activities are to be “consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international interagency collaboration, and other national security organizations have tried to copy its approach and successes.”).


Id. Those other original member states include Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See Shie, supra note 96, at 23 (noting the addition of Canada, Singapore, Norway, Denmark, and Turkey in Dec. 2003, and the Czech Republic and Russia in 2004).
law and frameworks.”211 The PSI seeks to “involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land.”212 The PSI also “seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”213

The PSI’s principal goals are:

1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern[;] . . .

2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts[;]

3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international laws and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments[;]

4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks[;]214

212 PSI Statement, supra note 209.
213 PSI Statement, supra note 209.
214 Id.
Successful PSI cooperation has included not only plenary sessions and maritime training exercises, but also at least one mission conducted by PSI nations in October 2003. Eben Kaplan of the Council on Foreign Relations credited the PSI (along with other groups investigating proliferation) for intercepting the German-owned BBC China, because it diverted the ship to the port of Taranto, Italy from its voyage from Dubai to Libya. The BBC China was found to be carrying nuclear centrifuge parts for Libya’s nascent nuclear program. Kaplan noted that “[t]he seizure helped unravel the Khan network and was a major factor in negotiating the forfeiture of Libya’s WMD programs.”

Robert G. Joseph, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, exhorted the assembled PSI nations at a June 2006 PSI meeting to:

First: Think innovatively. Undertake a review of your laws and how they can be strengthened to deny the proliferation of WMD and missile-related shipments and services that support proliferation from or through your states;

Second: Enforce aggressively. Develop a regularized interagency mechanism in your government to review enforcement data and share information on possible interdictions of shipments, personnel, funds, and other services that aid in proliferation; and

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215 Shie, supra note 96, at 17.
216 Kaplan, supra note 211.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. (Note that the “Khan Network” is not to be confused with the “Aga Khan Development Network” (AKDN) that was and is a group of development agencies with mandates ranging from health and education to architecture, culture, and other endeavors. This quote refers to Abdul Qadeer Khan, the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and deterrence program, who then established an administrative proliferation network weapons allegedly to North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya.).
Third: Engage regularly. Commit to active outreach and to host and participate in PSI exercises in your region and beyond.\textsuperscript{220}

Not by might alone, but also by the "power of the purse," Joseph described how PSI members and all those nations pursuing counter proliferation might develop "tools to interdict payments between proliferators and their suppliers."\textsuperscript{221} For instance, U.S. Executive Order 13382\textsuperscript{222} aims to "freeze[e] the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters, and isolat[e] them financially[ ,]" so that "[d]esignations under E.O. 13382 prohibit all transactions between the designees and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction."\textsuperscript{223}

VII. CONCLUSION

As piracy has evolved, modern threats have required modern approaches. There still exists an abiding calculus of right and might used since time immemorial to combat piracy. Future approaches to preventing and combating piracy will, as always, require the sword—competent military forces to protect both maritime boundaries and prevent smuggling and piracy—in addition to the power of the pen—laws and policies concluded and enforced by competent governments.\textsuperscript{224} The maritime community has increased its


\textsuperscript{221} Id. (Joseph noted how the U.S. had put in place a “new Executive Order, which prohibits U.S. persons from doing business with entities designated because of their proliferation activities.”).


\textsuperscript{224} See, e.g., Navy is India’s Sword and Shield at Sea, INDO-ASIAN NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 17, 2004), http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/news_archive/aug_04_militarynavy.pdf. The authors also assert that competent air and land forces can and will be required to operate in joint (multiple branches of military service), combined (multinational) and interagency (multiple departments of the executive branch) operations. Id.
awareness of this situation, but the international legal community, as a whole, is in disarray with respect to effective and contemporary sets of laws and rules. Maritime incidents have changed the complexion of the situation and gaps in efforts to restrain maritime acts of violence have been exposed.

A solution to the continuing challenge of applying international laws to both international and national problems of piracy and maritime terrorism must also address the disparities in capabilities which remain between the nations with established and competent navies and littoral nations. Significant gaps that remain both in maritime law and international jurisdiction will have to be amended by new legislation, improvement in the provisions of maritime conventions, and in the future, domestication of criminalizing piracy to more effectively combat this age old problem.

Because nations with modern navies have capabilities of controlling piracy, while emerging nations and failed states struggle to contain violence, the U.S. can employ a full range of sophisticated technologies, multidisciplinary capabilities, as well as overwhelming force to “overmatch” piratical threats. The U.S. judicial system has proven experience in effectively and swiftly applying domestic (if not international) laws to try cases of terrorism and piracy in all forms. Wherever possible, looking beyond national shores and maritime zones, the U.S. and other nations afflicted by maritime piracy, criminality, and terrorist activities must also act in bilateral/multilateral capacities to prevent future conflicts and piracy challenges. Towards those ends, there is much merit to extending current international agreements, and implementing effective powers to prosecute maritime criminals under present and future international conventions. This focus on expanding the responsibilities and the rights of maritime nations to freedom of navigation will decrease rogue power and momentum, if not eliminating this international scourge of piracy entirely.