Discord Among Federal Courts of Appeals: The Constitutionality of Warrantless Searches of Employers' OSHA Records

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The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm may enter—the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!

William Pitt, Earl of Chatham

I. INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century has witnessed a steady increase in governmental regulatory activity, especially in the commercial context. As a result of the eagerness of federal and state governments to promote the safety of workers, businesses are constantly under the watchful

eye of governmental agencies. In carrying out their duties, agencies quite often presume the ability to enter and inspect a business' premises and operations. Such entry is designed to permit inspectors to examine the structure in which a business is housed, inspect business products, or peruse financial books and records. Indeed, this form of administrative agency inspection is "commonplace in our society." During such inspections, governmental investigative power frequently clashes with employers' fourth amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

When confronted with the issue of the constitutionality of warrantless administrative searches in the commercial context, the United States Supreme Court initially held that the fourth amendment was inapplicable. The Court overruled this line of reasoning in See v. City of Seattle, where it held that the fourth amendment's protection against warrantless searches extended to administrative searches of business premises. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., moreover, the Supreme Court specifically held the fourth amendment applicable to inspections conducted pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), through which the federal government monitors safety and health concerns. Although the Court articulated fairly strong employers' fourth amendment rights with

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4. Id.
7. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 10.2, at 629.
8. The fourth amendment reads:
   The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. In the companion cases of Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 824 (1946), and Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947), the Supreme Court upheld warrantless inspections conducted on commercial premises. One commentator has argued that the Supreme Court based each decision on a consent theory. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 10.2, at 630-31. According to his analysis, the Supreme Court did not answer the question of when a warrantless inspection was constitutionally permissible. Id.; see See, 387 U.S. at 545 n.7. For a case that upheld a warrantless administrative inspection of a home, see Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 914 (1959), overruled, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
11. Id. at 545.
respect to administrative searches in both See and Barlow's, subsequent decisions have narrowed the scope of protection for employers.\textsuperscript{15}

Governmental agencies adopt several arguments in support of their power to conduct warrantless inspections. They claim that requiring a warrant is too burdensome,\textsuperscript{16} both for the particular agency that has to procure the warrant, and for the judicial system whose overworked courts must rule on "routine applications and motions to enforce or quash the warrants."\textsuperscript{17} Agencies also argue that warrantless searches are necessary for the efficient and effective enforcement of regulatory schemes,\textsuperscript{18} and for deterring violations of applicable statutes and regulations.\textsuperscript{19} The history of the fourth amendment, the purposes served by the fourth amendment warrant requirement, and the United States Supreme Court's treatment of administrative agency inspections in See and Barlow's, however, all militate against these expediency-based arguments. While the Court has recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement in the context of administrative inspections in the commercial setting,\textsuperscript{20} the operation of the warrant requirement should not turn on the convenience of governmental agencies or the courts. The purpose of the warrant requirement is to prevent arbitrary governmental invasions through judicial intervention prior to the conduct of a search.\textsuperscript{21} Although this requirement necessitates a time consuming process, questions of burdensomeness, efficiency, and deterrence should play no part in determining the applicability of the fourth amendment.\textsuperscript{22}

Even when a search warrant is not required for administrative inspections, the judiciary can implement fourth amendment safe-

\textsuperscript{16} McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1988).
\textsuperscript{17} Id.
\textsuperscript{18} See Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997; see also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (The Supreme Court concluded that warrantless inspections were necessary for proper enforcement and effective inspection.). But see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (The Supreme Court rejected an effective enforcement argument.).
\textsuperscript{19} Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.
\textsuperscript{20} The pervasively regulated industries exception is one such exception. The Supreme Court first discussed this exception in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). For an analysis of this exception, see infra notes 120-56 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{22} Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997. But see U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909-10 (1984). In modifying the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in Leon, the Supreme Court accounted for the rule's deterrent effect. Id. However, the Court recognized that the applicability of the exclusionary rule "is 'an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated.'" Id. at 906 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 464 U.S. 213, 223, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983)).
guards both through the administrative probable cause standard and the administrative subpoena. These alternative solutions are less protective of employers' privacy interests than search warrants in the criminal law context. Their utility, however, lies in their recognition of the competing stakes—protecting employers from arbitrary governmental intrusions through judicial intervention and promoting public safety by maintaining effective enforcement of agency regulations.

Three recent federal courts of appeals cases illustrate the tensions between governmental agency investigative power and employers' fourth amendment rights. In each of these cases, United States Labor Department compliance officers attempted to conduct war-

23. For an analysis of the administrative probable cause standard, see infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text; for an analogous discussion of the administrative subpoena, see infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.

24. In order to obtain a search warrant in the criminal context, a governmental agency must satisfy a more rigorous probable cause standard than the administrative probable cause standard. In a criminal investigation, a search "undertaken to recover specific stolen or contraband goods . . . even with a warrant, is 'reasonable' only when there is 'probable cause' to believe that they will be uncovered in a particular dwelling." Camara, 387 U.S. at 535; see Note, Administrative Agency Searches Since Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Probable Cause Requirements for Nonroutine Administrative Searches, 70 GEO. L.J. 1183 (1982) (distinguishing between routine and nonroutine administrative searches and arguing for the implementation of the traditional criminal probable cause standard in the context of nonroutine searches).

The distinction between the administrative and criminal probable cause standards raises a definitional question: how is an administrative search distinct from a criminal search? In New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), the Supreme Court distinguished between "traditional police searches conducted for the gathering of criminal evidence . . . [and] administrative inspections designed to enforce regulatory statutes." Id. at 700 (citation omitted). One commentator defines administrative, or civil, searches "to include all . . . cases outside the traditional core of criminal law enforcement." Methodologies, supra note 2, at 1131 n.22. Included in this definition are "cases containing elements of both a civil and criminal nature, such as routine traffic regulation or border searches." Id. (citations omitted). In particular, border patrols "enforce criminal laws against importing illegal aliens, but their efforts also result in prevented entries without criminal penalties." Id. (citations omitted). For purposes of distinguishing between administrative and criminal searches, this Comment adopts the commentator's perspective.


26. The three cases are: (1) McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1988); (2) McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988); and (3) Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., 834 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1987).

27. A compliance officer is an Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) representative of the Labor Department. During inspections of business premises, a compliance officer's role "is to represent OSHA to the public and to carry out the policies and procedures of the agency . . . . [T]he compliance officer is an agent . . . of OSHA, and is, therefore, charged with the ensuring of a safe and healthful workplace." OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW, supra note 14, at 207.

OSHA administrators distinguish between different types of compliance officers based on the matters which they investigate. There "are two categories of inspectors: safety inspectors
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF OSHA RECORDS

rantless inspections of employers' safety and health records pursuant to OSHA regulations. These regulations required employers to keep the records on their business premises and to make them available to compliance officers. Because the employers in these cases did not abide by the compliance officers' requests, each one was cited for violating the OSHA regulations. Thus, each case presented the identical issue of whether the applicable OSHA regulations were constitutional under the fourth amendment insofar as they permitted warrantless searches of an employer's occupational safety and health records. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits invalidated the regulations, to the extent that they permitted the warrantless searches. In particular, the Sixth Circuit found the Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Burger controlling, and concluded that the applicable regulations were unconstitutional because they did not require the compliance officers to procure a search warrant or an administrative subpoena. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit rejected the employer's fourth amendment position, totally ignoring the Burger decision.

Section II of this Comment offers a summary of the history of the fourth amendment as it pertains to administrative inspections of homes and businesses. In addition to tracing the historical development of the fourth amendment, it focuses on the purposes served by the warrant requirement, and summarizes the judicial treatment of the applicability of the warrant requirement to administrative inspections. Section III scrutinizes the three recent federal courts of appeals cases, presenting the factual foundation of each case, and examining the analytic framework utilized by the courts. Section IV critiques the Fourth Circuit decision upholding the constitutionality of the OSHA regulations on the basis of several factors: the applicability of

and industrial hygiene inspectors." D. LOFGREN, DANGEROUS PREMISES: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF OSHA ENFORCEMENT 5 (1989). Safety inspectors investigate hazards "that can cause death or injury by burial or fall as a result of physical contact with machinery or electricity." Id. at 4. Industrial hygiene inspectors investigate hazards "that may cause harm through exposure to chemicals, noise, or microwave radiation." Id.

28. See infra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.7(a) (1989).
30. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 992; A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d at 725; Emerson, 834 F.2d at 996.
31. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 993; A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d at 726; Emerson, 834 F.2d at 996-97.
32. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997; Emerson, 834 F.2d at 997.
34. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 995 n.3.
35. Id. at 996-97.
the See-Barlow's rationale, the adequacy of the balancing test employed by the court, and policy concerns in today's regulatory society. Moreover, Section IV suggests that the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Burger provides a better mode of analysis than that employed by the Fourth Circuit. Section V concludes that courts should implement the Burger analytic framework in order to provide more effective judicial vigilance over administrative searches.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES: A FOURTH AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVE

The seminal principle of the fourth amendment is that, except in certain limited classes of cases, governmental officials must obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search in order for the search to be deemed reasonable and, therefore, constitutional.37 The Supreme Court has extended this principle to administrative searches in the commercial setting.38 Since the apparent expression of this determination,39 courts have upheld warrantless administrative searches by balancing governmental and individual interests.40 In McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance,41 the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of OSHA regulations permitting compliance officers to cite employers who refused to voluntarily produce safety and health records upon request. In order to thoroughly evaluate the discord among the courts, it is important to examine the history of the fourth amendment, the policies served by the search warrant, and the emergence of case law extending the fourth amendment warrant requirement to administrative searches in the commercial sphere.

A. Overview of the Fourth Amendment: The Administrative Context

The fourth amendment is rooted in both English history and the American colonial experience. In England, the judiciary recognized the limitations of the Crown’s investigatory powers in the late eighteenth century.42 Although the English courts may have been attempting to protect the property interests of the landed classes, rather than basing their decisions on any notion of individual pri-

39. Id.
40. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
41. 842 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988).
42. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 4.
vacy, these cases stand for the principle that a government has limited power to arbitrarily enter and search an individual's property. In the United States, the fourth amendment stems largely from the colonists' outrage against the writs of assistance "utilized by customs officers to enter and search buildings for smuggled goods." The ratified version of the Constitution, however, contained no declaration of individual rights. Not until George Washington became president did an amendment process to add a declaration of citizens' rights begin. This process culminated in the adoption of the first ten amendments to the Constitution.

The fourth amendment did not become a prominently litigated amendment until the federal government's criminal jurisdiction heightened—approximately one hundred years after the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Since this time, the Supreme Court has faced a difficult task in delineating the rights of individuals under the amendment. Nevertheless, the Court has acknowledged that "one governing principle, justified by history and current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a search warrant."

Courts have developed a two-tiered analysis to resolve fourth amendment questions. The first inquiry is "whether the government's conduct constitutes a search or seizure by infringing upon a

43. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 428-30 (Schwartz provides a property-type analysis of Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946)).
45. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Frank, 359 U.S. at 364 (describing the fervor with which American colonists protested the use of writs of assistance).
46. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 4.
47. For an analysis of the reasons why the framers of the Constitution did not include such a declaration and the process by which the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution, see N. LASON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 83-105 (1937).
48. Id. at 97.
49. Id. at 106.
reasonable expectation of privacy." The Supreme Court has recognized that "[a]n owner or operator of a business . . . has an expectation of privacy in commercial property, which society is prepared to consider to be reasonable." Courts have employed a case-by-case approach to determine whether in a particular instance a business owner's privacy expectation is reasonable.

The second inquiry is "if a search or seizure occurred, . . . was [it] reasonable." A governmental agency generally satisfies the reasonableness requirement by procuring a warrant based upon probable cause. In certain limited circumstances, however, the Supreme Court has not required either a warrant or probable cause. In such instances, the Court analyzes the government's action by balancing the interests of individuals and government. The Court usually adjudges a warrantless search reasonable if governmental regulatory interests outweigh individual privacy interests. This latter approach is increasingly reflected in the context of administrative searches. The justifications for this approach are two-fold. First, according to the Court, privacy interests in commercial premises are "different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home," and administrative inspections intrude minimally into such interests. Second, the public interest demands a balancing methodology.

In the administrative searches context, the Supreme Court has adopted two doctrines that facilitate agency inspections, but provide some judicial scrutiny of agency discretion. In Camara v. Municipal Court, the Court adopted the administrative probable cause standard. A governmental agency meets this standard when "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area

55. United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1990) (Courts focus on whether the business owner has made a sufficient showing of a possessory or proprietary interest in the area searched and whether he has demonstrated a sufficient nexus between his work space and the area searched.).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 337.
60. United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 193 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
62. See Methodologies, supra note 2, at 1135-38.
63. Id. at 1138-39.
64. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
65. Id. at 538-39.
inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]."  

In contrast to the criminal probable cause standard, such legislative or administrative standards do not "necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling." Moreover, in See v. City of Seattle, the Court delineated the requirements that an agency must meet when it issues a subpoena in order for it to be deemed constitutional. "[W]hen an administrative agency subpoenas corporate book or records, ... the subpoena [must] be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome."  

B. Purposes of the Warrant Requirement  

An understanding of the purposes served by the warrant requirement is essential to the proper determination of whether courts should require a warrant, or at a minimum an administrative subpoena, in the context of administrative searches of commercial premises. In a criminal investigation, a search warrant serves several purposes. First, it limits the discretionary power of a police officer in determin-

66. Id. at 538; see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978) (stating that a governmental agency may satisfy the administrative probable cause standard either on the basis of specific evidence of an existing violation or the Camara standard).

67. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535.

68. Id. at 538. Two recent OSHA cases discussed the administrative probable cause standard. See Industrial Steel Prods. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 854 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1988); Donovan v. Trinity Indus., 824 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1987).

69. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).

70. Id. at 544-45.

71. Id. at 544.

72. The procedures followed by police officers in attempting to secure and execute search warrants serves as a useful model in identifying the purposes served by a warrant. Although the following model is simplified, it is useful in identifying the policies that the warrant requirement serves.

In order to obtain a warrant, a police officer must "fill out an application which particularly describes what the authorities expect to find and where they expect to find it." C. Ducat & H. Chase, Constitutional Interpretation 1012 (4th ed. 1988). Upon completion, a magistrate evaluates the application to determine whether probable cause exists. Id. The magistrate must determine whether "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983).

In the execution of the search warrant, "officers are limited to the specific areas indicated and are not entitled to enlarge the scope of the search into a general hunt for evidence." C. Ducat & H. Chase, supra, at 1012. However, officers are allowed to seize evidence that is in plain view. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 (1963); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)). "Warrant procedures also provide that, after a search has been conducted and materials seized, a copy of the warrant . . . [must] be returned to the magistrate with an account of the evidence obtained." C. Ducat & H. Chase, supra, at 1012.
ing whether a search is appropriate. The magistrate's judgment takes the place of the policeman's judgment. Second, the warrant requirement prevents illegal searches prior to their occurrence. Because individual citizens have a personal right to privacy in their homes, injury to that right should be prevented, to the extent possible, before its occurrence:

The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.

Third, the warrant requirement prevents hindsight from coloring the probable cause determination. If the decisions of police officers were subject only to post-search judicial scrutiny, the judiciary's probable cause determinations would undoubtedly be tainted in cases when evidence of crime was found. In such situations, judges would be hard pressed not to find post-hoc probable cause, regardless of what the pre-search determination might have been.

Finally, the warrant requirement legitimizes the legal system because it limits police conduct, even when the police "act[s] for a majority with a great collective need." The warrant requirement allows police conduct to be independently scrutinized. This intervention increases public confidence in law enforcement. Without judicial intervention, the public could label police action as arbitrary, thereby threatening the integrity of the criminal justice system.

C. The United States Supreme Court's Treatment of Administrative Searches

Initially, the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment was inapplicable to administrative searches. The Court reasoned that the fourth amendment's protections extended only to searches conducted pursuant to criminal prosecutions. As governmental regulation increased dramatically, the Court began to change its position. The Court recognized the strain that surveillance placed

76. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 565.
77. Methodologies, supra note 2, at 1140.
78. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
79. See infra note 90.
on individuals' privacy rights. In Camara v. Municipal Court and See v. City of Seattle, the Court held that the fourth amendment applied to administrative searches of both homes and commercial premises, respectively.

1. HOME SEARCHES

In Frank v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that administrative searches of homes were not within the purview of the fourth amendment. The Court upheld the conviction of a homeowner who refused to allow city health inspectors to conduct a warrantless inspection of his basement in order to locate the source of rats. The health inspectors attempted the search pursuant to a city ordinance that authorized them to demand entry without a warrant. The Court justified its decision on the grounds that: (1) the regulatory inspection “touch[ed] at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections against official intrusion,” (2) the inspection was “designed to make

82. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
83. Judge Frank recognized the protection that the fourth amendment affords individuals in their homes in a powerful dissent in United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967): “A sane, decent civilized society must provide some . . . oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man’s castle.” Id. at 315-16. This language was later adopted by the Supreme Court majority in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 n.4 (1961), which held a warrantless intrusion by police officers into an apartment unit through the use of an eavesdropping device unconstitutional.
85. Id. at 373.
86. Id. at 361-62.
87. Id. at 361. The city ordinance read:

Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the day time, and if the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination, he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty Dollars.

Id. (quoting BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 12, § 120 (n.d.). The trial court found the homeowner guilty of the offense as alleged in the warrant. Id. On appeal to the Criminal Court of Baltimore, the homeowner was again found guilty in a de novo proceeding. Id. After the Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari, the homeowner appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 362.
88. Id. at 367. The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment’s due process clause. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), rev’d on other
the least possible demand on the individual occupant,"\textsuperscript{89} and (3) the public interest in maintaining health and safety demanded such an outcome.\textsuperscript{90} The \textit{Frank} holding was subsequently interpreted as carving out an exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.\textsuperscript{91}

The Supreme Court faced a similar case in \textit{Camara v. Municipal Court},\textsuperscript{92} where city inspectors cited an apartment lessee for violating the city's housing code\textsuperscript{93} because he refused to allow the inspectors to conduct a warrantless inspection of his home.\textsuperscript{94} After he was arrested and had criminal charges filed against him, the lessee sought a writ of prohibition, which a California Superior Court denied.\textsuperscript{95} The Supreme Court held the city ordinance unconstitutional insofar as it permitted warrantless inspections of the lessee's home.\textsuperscript{96} In rejecting the \textit{Frank} Court's justifications, the \textit{Camara} Court declared that "administrative searches of the [home] . . . [were] significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment."\textsuperscript{97} Moreover, the Court concluded that this regulatory system improp-

\textsuperscript{89} Frank, 359 U.S. at 367.

\textsuperscript{90} Id. The \textit{Frank} majority embraced the principle that the fourth amendment's protections extended only to the right to be secure from warrantless searches in the criminal context. \textit{See id.} at 365. In the instant case, the health inspectors sought evidence pursuant to the city regulatory code. \textit{See id.} at 361-62. Therefore, the Court reasoned that no warrant was required. \textit{See id.} at 372-73. In his dissent, Justice Douglas took exception to such a strict reading of the fourth amendment, arguing that "the Fourth Amendment . . . has a much wider frame of reference than mere criminal prosecutions." \textit{Id.} at 377 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court later embraced Justice Douglas's position sub silentio in \textit{Camara} v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and in \textit{See v. City of Seattle}, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).

\textsuperscript{91} Camara, 387 U.S. at 529 (citing Ohio \textit{ex rel. Eaton v. Price}, 364 U.S. 263, \textit{reh'g} denied, 364 U.S. 855 (1960)).

\textsuperscript{92} 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

\textsuperscript{93} The code read:

\textit{Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code.}

\textit{Id.} at 526 (quoting SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., HOUSING CODE § 503 (n.d.)).

\textsuperscript{94} Id. at 526-27.

\textsuperscript{95} Id. at 525. The California District Court of Appeal affirmed, \textit{Camara} v. Municipal Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 128, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Ct. App. 1965). The Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing, \textit{Camara v. Municipal Court}, 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967), and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the appellate court's decision. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Camara}, 387 U.S. at 534.

\textsuperscript{97} Id.
erly left the lessee at the discretion of the city inspectors. The Court weighed the public interest by determining whether a departure from the warrant requirement was necessary. Such a departure depended on "whether the burden of obtaining a warrant [was] likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search." Because no such burden had been alleged, the Court determined that the public interest did not justify a deviation from the warrant requirement.

2. COMMERCIAL PREMISES SEARCHES

a. See and Barlow's

The Supreme Court extended the fourth amendment's protection against warrantless administrative searches to business premises in See v. City of Seattle, the companion case to Camara. The Court reversed a warehouse owner's conviction of violating a city ordinance by refusing to permit a city fire department field worker to enter and inspect the owner's locked warehouse for violations of the municipal fire code. The Court refused to leave the decision to enter and inspect a particular commercial enterprise with agency field workers and, therefore, held that governmental agencies must obtain a warrant in order to inspect "portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public." In this regard, the Court observed that "the decision to enter and inspect w[ould] not be the product of the unreviewed discretion of the enforcement officer in the field." Additionally, the Court asserted that a search of private commercial property was presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the fourth amendment limitations on the use of the administrative

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98. Id. at 532.
99. Id. at 533 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966)).
100. Id.
102. The ordinance read:
INSPECTIONS OF BUILDING AND PREMISES. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of any other ordinance concerning fire hazards.
Id. (quoting SEATTLE, WASH., FIRE CODE § 8.01.050 (n.d.)).
103. Id. at 541-42.
104. Id. at 545.
105. Id.
106. Id. (stating that the Supreme Court would not decide "whether warrants to inspect business premises may be issued only after access is refused").
107. Id. at 543.
Finally, the Court concluded that it would not limit fourth amendment protections to criminal investigations only. The Supreme Court used similar reasoning in *Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.*, where it held Section 8 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act unconstitutional. Section 8(a) empowered Labor Department field workers to conduct warrantless searches of work areas of businesses subject to the Act's provisions in order “to inspect for safety hazards and violations of OSHA regulations.” The *Barlow's* Court reasoned that the decision by a business to engage in interstate commerce did not constitute consent to future searches. Moreover, the Court concluded that a warrant would not unreasonably burden the Labor Department's enforcement arm. The Court pointed to an existing OSHA regulation that gave compliance officers the option of procuring an administrative subpoena.

108. *Id.* at 545.
109. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the distinction between criminal investigations conducted on commercial premises and those conducted on residential premises. It concluded that in previous cases it had “refused to uphold otherwise unreasonable criminal investigative searches merely because commercial rather than residential premises were the object of the police intrusions.” *Id.* at 543 (citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)). The Court then inquired into whether it should extend such protection to commercial premises when a governmental agency conducted an administrative rather than a criminal investigation. *Id.* Finding no justification for distinguishing between these investigations, the Court held the fourth amendment applicable to administrative searches of commercial premises.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1988). Section 8(a) read:

In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized—

(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer; and

(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or employee.

*Id.*
113. *Id.* at 309.
114. The Secretary of Labor argued that businesses engaged in interstate commerce have always been subjected to close supervision. *Id.* at 313-14. In essence, this argument called for the per se extension of the pervasively regulated industries exception to businesses subject to OSHA.
115. *Id.* at 314.
116. *Id.* at 316-20.
where a business owner had refused entry.\textsuperscript{117} This regulation, the Court surmised, had not inhibited OSHA's effectiveness.\textsuperscript{118} The Barlow's decision is significant not only because it reaffirmed See's general rule that governmental agencies are required to obtain a warrant prior to inspecting commercial premises, but because it held that OSHA inspections would not be exempted from that rule.\textsuperscript{119}

b. The "Pervasively Regulated Industries" Exception

Although the Supreme Court has upheld the warrant requirement for administrative searches of commercial premises, it has carved out exceptions to this rule. One such exception is the "pervasively regulated industries" exception. Under this exception, a governmental agency need not obtain a search warrant for a search of a pervasively or closely regulated industry.\textsuperscript{120} The pervasively regulated industries exception is relevant to the conflict among the federal courts of appeals. In McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance,\textsuperscript{121} the Fourth Circuit held that the justifications underlying this exception applied to the OSHA regulations permitting the Labor Department to cite employers for refusing to comply with warrantless requests for their safety and health records.\textsuperscript{122} Of course, other exceptions are applicable in the administrative inspections context. These include: (1) emergency situations,\textsuperscript{123} (2) consent,\textsuperscript{124} and (3) "where the object of the inspection is open to public view."\textsuperscript{125}

In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,\textsuperscript{126} the Supreme Court concluded that the pervasively regulated industries exception was justified by a long tradition of close governmental supervision and regulation.\textsuperscript{127} Businesses historically subject to intense regulation,
such as federally licensed sellers of alcoholic beverages, could be subjected to warrantless inspections. Since Colonnade, the Court has extended the application of the pervasively regulated industries exception to businesses that traditionally have not been subject to close governmental supervision.

In United States v. Biswell, for example, the Court applied the pervasively regulated industries exception to the firearms industry. The Court could not base its decision on the Colonnade rationale because federal regulation of interstate traffic in firearms was not as historic as regulation of the liquor industry. Rather, the Court analyzed the benefits of close governmental supervision of the firearms industry, and concluded that in order for the law to be properly enforced, warrantless searches were necessary. This law enforcement need, coupled with the minimal possibility of governmental abuse, motivated the Court to hold that the statutorily authorized warrantless inspections were reasonable under the fourth amendment.

In Donovan v. Dewey, the Court upheld warrantless inspections authorized by Section 103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. The Court expressly recognized that the length of time of governmental supervision alone would not be dispos-

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128. Id. The Supreme Court ultimately disapproved the search conducted in the case "because the statute provided that a sanction be imposed when entry was refused, and because it did not authorize entry without a warrant as an alternative." New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987).

129. See infra notes 130-51 and accompanying text.


131. Id. at 315-17. In Biswell, the firearm statute authorized "official entry during business hours into 'the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition . . . dealer . . . for the purpose of inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents required to be kept . . . and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such . . . dealer . . . at such premises.'" Id. at 311 (quoting Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1223 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1988))).

132. Id. at 315.

133. Id.

134. Id. at 317.


According to the Court in Dewey:

[The Act] provide[d] that federal mine inspectors [were] to inspect underground mines at least four times per year and surface mines at least twice a year to insure compliance with . . . standards [promulgated by the Secretary of Labor], and to make followup inspections . . . [Section 103(a) of the Act] . . . also grant[ed] mine operators "a right of entry to, upon, or through any coal or other mine" and state[d] that "no advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any person."

Dewey, 452 U.S. at 596 (footnote omitted).
itative of whether a particular business was subject to the pervasively regulated industries exception.\textsuperscript{137} Rather, the pervasiveness and regularity of governmental regulation would be the deciding factor.\textsuperscript{138} In interpreting \textit{Colonnade} and \textit{Biswell}, the Court stated:

\begin{quote}
[A] warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.\textsuperscript{139}
\end{quote}

Accordingly, an individual owning a business in a pervasively regulated industry has a reduced expectation of privacy;\textsuperscript{140} thus, federal mine inspectors did not have to obtain a search warrant to conduct inspections under the applicable statutory scheme.\textsuperscript{141} Finally, the Court concluded that the statute provided an adequate substitute for the warrant requirement,\textsuperscript{142} because it provided safeguards for mine operators,\textsuperscript{143} and, therefore, was reasonable.

More recently, in \textit{New York v. Burger},\textsuperscript{144} the Court held that police agency searches of junkyards that dismantled vehicles, conducted pursuant to state regulations,\textsuperscript{145} fell within the pervasively regulated industries exception.\textsuperscript{146} Several premises supported the Court's conclusion: (1) the junkyard industry was closely regulated by the state,\textsuperscript{147} (2) automobile dismantlers were subject to extensive regula-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[137] \textit{Dewey}, 452 U.S. at 606.
\item[138] \textit{Id}.
\item[139] \textit{Id}. at 600.
\item[140] \textit{Id}. at 599-600.
\item[141] \textit{Id}. at 606.
\item[142] The Supreme Court focused on the certainty and regularity of the Act's inspection program. \textit{Id}. at 603-05.
\item[143] The Supreme Court held that the statute provided an adequate substitute for a warrant because "the Act requires inspection of all mines and specifically defines the frequency of inspection," "the standards with which a mine operator is required to comply are all specifically set forth in the Act or . . . [in the regulations]," and "the Act provides a special mechanism for accommodating any special privacy concerns that a specific mine operator might have." \textit{Id}. at 603-04.
\item[145] The state statute provided that:
Up\n
\item[146] \textit{Id} at 604 n.1 (quoting N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a5(a) (McKinney 1986)).
\item[147] \textit{Id}. at 703.
\item[148] \textit{Id}. at 703-04.
\end{footnotes}
tion,\(^{\text{148}}\) and (3) automobile dismantlers were part of the general junkyard industry.\(^{\text{149}}\) The Court concluded that "an operator of a junkyard engaging in vehicle dismantling ha[d] a reduced expectation of privacy in this 'closely regulated' business."\(^{\text{150}}\) Therefore, the police agency did not have to obtain a search warrant in order to satisfy the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement.\(^{\text{151}}\)

These cases indicate that the basis for the pervasively regulated industries exception is not that a business owner does not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in commercial property and that, therefore, the fourth amendment is not applicable because no search has occurred.\(^{\text{152}}\) If this were the case, the fourth amendment reasonableness question would be irrelevant.\(^{\text{153}}\) On the contrary, even in this context, the Court has inquired into whether the statutory scheme was reasonable.\(^{\text{154}}\) Admittedly, the warrant requirement has a lessened application in this context.\(^{\text{155}}\) The Court, however, has recognized that expectations of privacy are at stake, albeit reduced ones.\(^{\text{156}}\)

c. The *Burger* Framework

*Burger* is valuable for its analysis of the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement. The *Burger* Court's framework is applicable in determining whether the Labor Department may, without a warrant or administrative subpoena, constitutionally cite employers who refuse to provide safety and health records upon demand. The Court first asked whether a search warrant was not required because the pervasively regulated industries exception applied.\(^{\text{157}}\) Because the exception did apply, no search warrant was necessary.\(^{\text{158}}\) With that in mind, the Court then analyzed whether the warrantless inspections

\(^{\text{148.}}\) *Id.*

\(^{\text{149.}}\) *Id.* at 703-04, 706.

\(^{\text{150.}}\) *Id.* at 707.

\(^{\text{151.}}\) The Court then concluded that the warrantless inspections were reasonable under the fourth amendment. For an extensive analysis of *Burger*, see *infra* notes 157-64 and accompanying text.

\(^{\text{152.}}\) Whether a governmental agency's conduct constitutes a search under the fourth amendment depends on a business owner's reasonable expectation of privacy. If the business owner has no reasonable expectation of privacy, the agency's conduct does not constitute a search. *See supra* notes 52-55 and accompanying text.

\(^{\text{153.}}\) The fourth amendment is only implicated if there is a search. If there is a search, a governmental agency's conduct must meet the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement. *See supra* notes 56-63 and accompanying text.

\(^{\text{154.}}\) *Burger*, 482 U.S. at 702.

\(^{\text{155.}}\) *Id.*

\(^{\text{156.}}\) *Id.*

\(^{\text{157.}}\) *Id.* at 703-08.

\(^{\text{158.}}\) *Id.* at 702.
authorized by the statutory scheme were reasonable under the fourth amendment.\textsuperscript{159} In the context of the pervasively regulated industries exception or "where the privacy interest of the owner are weakened and the government interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened,"\textsuperscript{160} governmental agencies must satisfy a three-tiered standard in order for the scheme at issue to be constitutional. The three criteria are: (1) "there must be a 'substantial' government interest that informs the regulatory scheme to which the inspection is made,"\textsuperscript{161} (2) the inspections conducted pursuant to the statute "must 'be necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme,'"\textsuperscript{162} and (3) "the regulatory statute must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the owner . . . that the search is being made pursuant to law and has a properly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers."\textsuperscript{163} The Court held that because the state's regulatory statute met all three criteria, it was reasonable under the fourth amendment.\textsuperscript{164}

### III. THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS IN CONFLICT

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have confronted the issue of the constitutionality of the OSHA regulations requiring business owners to voluntarily produce safety and health records.\textsuperscript{165} An analysis of these cases illustrates the tension existing between a business owner's constitutional

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\textsuperscript{159} Id. at 708.
\textsuperscript{160} Id. at 702. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit deemed this language as providing for an exception to the general warrant requirement rule in McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1988).
\textsuperscript{161} Burger, 482 U.S. at 702.
\textsuperscript{162} Id.
\textsuperscript{163} Id. at 703.
\textsuperscript{164} Id. at 708. The Court concluded that the statute met the first criterion because "motor vehicle theft [had] increased in the State and because the problem of theft [was] associated with the automobile junkyard industry." Id. As to the second criterion, the Court noted that "the State rationally may believe that it will reduce car theft by regulations that prevent automobile junkyards from becoming markets for stolen vehicles," id. at 709, and that warrantless inspections [were] necessary to further the statutory scheme, id. at 710 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)). Lastly, the Court determined that the statute met the third criterion because it properly notified business owners of the regularity of the searches and sufficiently limited inspectors' discretion. Id. at 711.

For a recent analysis of the three Burger factors, see Ruiz v. Commissioner of Dep't of Transp., 687 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The Ruiz court stated that it was not relying on the pervasively regulated industries exception to uphold the warrantless searches and seizures at issue. Id. at 894 n.8. It used the exception, however, to shed light on the controversy stemming from state regulations permitting warrantless stops of trucks. Id.

\textsuperscript{165} McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1988); McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988); Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., 834 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1987).
right to be free from warrantless searches and the government's discretionary power. As the following discussion will show, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits correctly concluded that the OSHA regulations were invalid to the extent that they permitted compliance officers to conduct warrantless searches. The Fourth Circuit, however, incorrectly upheld the OSHA regulations without even considering the Supreme Court's framework for testing the reasonableness of warrantless inspections set out in Burger.

A. The OSHA Regulatory Scheme

In its enactment of OSHA, Congress provided for the implementation of appropriate recordkeeping procedures by the Secretary of Labor, who was given the express authority to "prescribe regulations requiring employers to maintain accurate records of, and to make periodic reports on, work-related deaths, injuries and illnesses." Regulations promulgated pursuant to this statutory grant of authority are at issue in the three federal courts of appeals cases to be examined.

The OSHA recordkeeping regulations require employers to maintain in their business premises both a log and supplemental record of all recordable occupational injuries and illnesses. Addition-
ally, employers are required to post an annual compilation of all occupational injuries and illnesses for each of their establishments. 171

171. Id. § 1904.5. Section 1904.5 provides:

(a) Each employer shall post an annual summary of occupational injuries and illnesses for each establishment. This summary shall consist of a copy of the year's totals from the form OSHA No. 200 and the following information from that form: Calendar year covered, company Name[,] establishment name, establishment address, certification signature, title, and date. A form OSHA No. 200 shall be used in presenting the summary. If no injuries or illnesses occurred in the year, zeros must be entered on the totals line, and the form must be posted.

(b) The summary shall be completed by February 1 beginning with calendar year 1979. The summary of 1977 calendar year's occupational injuries and illnesses shall be posted on form OSHA No. 102.

(c) Each employer, or the officer or employee of the employer who supervises the preparation of the log and summary of occupational injuries and illnesses, shall certify that the annual summary of occupational injuries is true and complete. The certification shall be accomplished by affixing the signature of the employer, or the officer or employer who supervises the preparation of the annual summary of occupational injuries and illnesses, at the bottom of the last page of the log and summary or by appending a separate statement to the log and summary certifying that the summary is true and complete.

(d) (1) Each employer shall post a copy of the establishment's summary in each establishment in the same manner that notices are required to be posted under § 1903.2(a)(1) of this chapter. The summary covering the previous calendar year shall be posted no later than February 1, and shall remain in place until March 1. For employees who do not primarily report or work at a single establishment, or who do not report to any fixed establishment on a regular basis, employers shall satisfy this posting requirement by presenting or mailing a copy of the summary during the month of February of the following year to each such employee who receives pay during that month. For multi-establishment employers where operations have closed down in some establishments during the calendar year, it will not be necessary to post summaries for those establishments.

(2) A failure to post a copy of the establishment's annual summary may
Employers must satisfy this requirement even if there have been no injuries or illnesses during the preceding year. Because such records would be of minimal or no value to the Labor Department if it did not have access to them, Section 1904.7(a) of the regulations mandates that “[e]ach employer shall provide, upon request, [the safety and health] records . . ., for inspection and copying by any representative of the Secretary of Labor for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the act.” It is the constitutionality of this regulation that is in question in each of the federal cases because it does not require that compliance officers seek compulsory process. Compliance officers, however, do have the option to seek compulsory process.

B. The Factual Sequence

Each of the federal cases under review was initiated when an employee filed a complaint with the Labor Department against his or her employer resulting in the issuance of citations and assessment of penalties pursuant to sections 9 and 17 of the Act.

Id.


173. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.7(a) (1989). This Section provides:

(a) Each employer shall provide, upon request, records provided for in §§ 1904.2, 1904.4, and 1904.5, for inspection and copying by any representative of the Secretary of Labor for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the act, and by representatives of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare during any investigation under section 20(b) of the act, or by any representative of a State accorded jurisdiction for occupational safety and health inspections or for statistical compilation under sections 18 and 24 of the act.

(b) (1) The log and summary of all recordable occupational injuries and illnesses (OSHA No. 200) (the log) provided for in § 1904.2 shall, upon request, be made available by the employer to any employee, former employee, and to their representatives for examination and copying in a reasonable manner and at reasonable times. The employee, former employee, and their representatives shall have access to the log for any establishment in which the employee is or has been employed.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude employees and employee representatives from collectively bargaining to obtain access to information relating to occupational injuries and illnesses in addition to the information made available under this section.

(3) Access to the log provided under this section shall pertain to all logs retained under the requirements of § 1904.6.

Id.

For implementation purposes, the OSHA Operations Manual provides that a compliance officer shall issue a citation to employers who fail to provide safety and health records. OSHA Field Operations Man. (BNA) ch. VI(B)(8)(e) (1989).

174. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(a)-(b) (1989). Section 1903.4(d) defines compulsory process as “the institution of any appropriate action, including ex parte application for an inspection warrant or its equivalent,” id. § 1903.4(d), and establishes ex parte inspection warrants as “the preferred form of compulsory process,” id.
her respective employer. In *McLaughlin v. Kings Island,* for example, the employee filed a "health complaint alleging that fog used in a theatrical performance at the theme park [operated by Kings Island] irritated employees' eyes and upper respiratory systems." The Labor Department subsequently sent OSHA compliance officers to the respective employers' business premises to investigate the claims.

In *Brock v. Emerson Electric Co.*, when a compliance officer visited the Emerson Electric plant in response to an employee health complaint, he sought permission to inspect the workplace and to examine the company's safety and health records for the period covering 1982 through 1984. Emerson's personnel manager permitted the compliance officer to conduct a warrantless search of the workplace, but refused to allow him to inspect the requested records without a warrant or subpoena. Consequently, the Secretary of Labor issued Emerson Electric a citation for violating Section 1904.7.

Similarly in *Kings Island*, a compliance officer requested permission to examine the employer's safety and health records for the preceding three years, so he could examine the documents for hygienic and environmental problems. The compliance officer did not present either a search warrant or an administrative subpoena. Kings Island informed the compliance officer that it would permit only an inspection of the business premises and the records relevant to the scope of the employee complaint. It also indicated that it would produce no other records unless the compliance officer obtained a

176. Id. at 991-92.
177. Id.; *A.B. Chance*, 842 F.2d at 724; *Emerson*, 834 F.2d at 995.
178. 834 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1987).
179. Id. at 995.
180. Id. at 996.
181. Id. at 996.
182. *Emerson* contested the citation. *Id.* However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) vacated the citation on the ground that Emerson had a fourth amendment right to insist on a search warrant or subpoena. Secretary of Labor v. Emerson Elec. Co., 13 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1171, 1172 (O.S.H. Rev. Comm'n Mar. 18, 1987). The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) affirmed, based on its earlier holding in the *Kings Island* case. *Id.* The Secretary of Labor petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review. *Emerson*, 834 F.2d at 996.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
search warrant or some other form of legal process. In response, the Secretary of Labor cited Kings Island for not providing the records upon request.

Finally, in \textit{McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance Co.} a compliance officer requested that A.B. Chance produce its safety and health records, as well as permission to examine the machinery that an employee had cited in his health complaint. An A.B. Chance representative allowed the compliance officer to examine the machinery, but on two occasions refused to produce the records. Accordingly, the compliance officer gave notice to the company "of its violation of [... [OSHA], and regulations promulgated thereunder, particularly 29 C.F.R. § 1904.7(a)." In neither instance did the compliance officer attempt to obtain a warrant or an administrative subpoena.

C. Emerson: \textit{The Eleventh Circuit Finds the OSHA Regulations Unconstitutional}

The core of the \textit{Brock v. Emerson} decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit consisted of two inquiries addressing the constitutionality of Section 1904.7: (1) whether Emerson had a privacy interest in the OSHA safety and health records, and if so, (2) the extent of the fourth amendment protection to be given this privacy interest. Beginning with the prem-

188. Id.
189. Id. Like Emerson, Kings Island contested the citation. \textit{Id.} The ALJ granted the Labor Department's motion for summary judgment and found that Kings Island was in violation of the OSHA regulations for its failure to provide the requested records. Secretary of Labor v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 13 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1137, 1138 (O.S.H. Rev. Comm'n Mar. 18, 1987).

Kings Island subsequently petitioned the OSHRC for a review of the ALJ's holding. \textit{Id.} The OSHRC reversed the ALJ's decision, holding that Section 1904.7(a) violated the fourth amendment "to the extent that it purports to authorize an inspection of required records without a warrant or its 'equivalent.'" \textit{Id.} at 1146. Thereafter, the Secretary of Labor petitioned the Sixth Circuit for review. \textit{Kings Island}, 849 F.2d at 992.

190. 834 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988).
191. \textit{Id.}
192. \textit{Id.}
193. \textit{Id.} at 724-25.
194. \textit{Id.} at 725.
195. The Secretary of Labor sought to enforce the citation. \textit{Id.} Applying established fourth amendment analysis, \textit{see supra} notes 52-63 and accompanying text, the ALJ concluded that the fourth amendment did not require OSHA to obtain a warrant or to issue a subpoena when it desired to inspect safety and health records. Secretary of Labor v. A.B. Chance Co., 12 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1172, 1173 (O.S.H. Rev. Comm'n Mar. 18, 1987). On appeal, the OSHRC reversed, in light of its prior holding in \textit{Kings Island}. \textit{Id.} The Secretary petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review. \textit{A.B. Chance}, 834 F.2d at 725.

196. 834 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1987).
197. \textit{Id.} at 996.
ise that individuals have a protected interest in commercial property, the court observed that the pervasively regulated industries exception
did not apply to Emerson. The fact that many employers kept
safety and health records prior to the passage of OSHA supported the
argument that Emerson had an expectation of privacy in the
records. Moreover, this privacy interest was not lessened by Con-
gress' enactment of OSHA and the Labor Department's subsequent
promulgation of regulations mandating that all employers subject to
OSHA compile such records. Consequently, the court concluded
that Emerson had a privacy interest in its records.

The Eleventh Circuit then defined the contours of the protections
afforded to Emerson's privacy interest. Utilizing the Supreme
Court's analysis in See pertaining to the use of administrative subpo-
neas, the Emerson court concluded that judicial oversight in the
commercial context was indispensable to curbing the government's
discretion to invade a company's privacy. Accordingly, the court
held that an employer such as Emerson could demand that the Labor
Department "issue a subpoena and [could] seek judicial involvement
by refusing to honor the subpoena prior to its judicial enforce-
ment." Thus, the court held Section 1904.7 unconstitutional under
the fourth amendment to the extent that this regulation authorized
inspections of the records without a warrant or subpoena.

In essence, the Eleventh Circuit's decision is consistent with the
Burger framework. The Emerson court first recognized that busi-
ness owners have protected privacy interests in commercial prop-
erty, and then concluded that such interests attached to Emerson's
safety and health records. Therefore, the Emerson court surmised,
some degree of judicial intervention was necessary prior to inspection.
It is of no consequence that the court did not analyze the constitution-

198. Id. Like the conclusions reached in Barlow's and Kings Island, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that Emerson was not within the exception merely because it was within the scope
of OSHA. Id. (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1978)); see also Kings
Island, 849 F.2d at 994 (citing Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 315).
199. Emerson, 834 F.2d at 994.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
204. Emerson, 834 F.2d at 997.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. For a discussion of Burger's analysis of the reasonableness requirement, see supra notes
157-64 and accompanying text.
208. Emerson, 834 F.2d at 996.
209. Id. at 996-97.
ality of the OSHA regulations, assuming that the Labor Department could establish decreased privacy expectations. Because the court concluded that Emerson retained its privacy interests in the records and that some sort of judicial intervention was required, the court did not have to reach that constitutional issue.

D. Kings Island: The Sixth Circuit Aligns with the Eleventh Circuit

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in McLaughlin v. Kings Island,210 also utilized the holding of See in determining whether the OSHA regulations were constitutional to the extent that they permitted warrantless searches of employers' safety and health records.211 As discussed earlier,212 See held that absent the existence of an exception, governmental agencies must obtain a warrant in order for a search of commercial premises to be deemed reasonable.213 Because the Sixth Circuit found that an exception did not exist,214 the Labor Department had to establish that Kings Island had a decreased privacy expectation overshadowed by governmental regulatory interests in order to prevail on the merits.215

The Labor Department argued that Kings Island had a minimal expectation of privacy in the requested records because such records were required to be maintained and produced by law.216 In addressing this argument, the Sixth Circuit employed a two-fold mode of analysis. The court first admitted that other courts had repeatedly upheld access to records based on the government's request for them.217 It noted, however, that in those prior cases some judicial intervention was present prior to the search.218 Whether or not a war-

210. 849 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1988).
211. Id. at 993.
212. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
213. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)). Like the See Court, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that an administrative subpoena may be adequate in certain circumstances. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 993 (citing See, 387 U.S. at 544-45).
214. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 994-96. The Labor Department conceded that the pervasively regulated industries exception was inapplicable. Id. at 994. It acknowledged that the exception was limited and that "industries affected by OSHA are not by definition pervasively regulated." Id.
215. Id. at 994.
216. Id. at 995.
217. Id.
218. Id.
rant was ultimately required was not dispositive of the issue in those cases because the presence of the judiciary prevented arbitrary decisionmaking by agency field workers.\(^{219}\) In contrast, *Kings Island* did "not involve a contested search warrant . . . ; an administrative subpoena . . . ; access by injunction or court order . . . ; a pervasively regulated industry . . . ; a regulatory reporting requirement . . . ; or access pursuant to any consent order or contract with the federal government."\(^{220}\) Rather, what transpired was "an unannounced inspection accompanied by an arbitrary and discretionary demand to inspect company records not only as they relate[d] to a specific [employee health] complaint, but for hygienic and environmental problems in general."\(^{221}\) Such a governmental intrusion could not be constitutional because it was contrary both to the rule established in *See*\(^{222}\) and to the policies served by a search warrant.\(^{223}\)

The court then focused on whether an employer had a privacy expectation in records required by regulation to be maintained.\(^{224}\) In this regard, the Sixth Circuit expressly concurred with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in *Emerson*, and held that employers have recognizable privacy interests in OSHA safety and health records even though employers are required to maintain them.\(^{225}\) The court recognized that an employer may keep the safety and health records for any number of business reasons, including preserving the lives and health of employees, raising the labor force's morale, and obtaining lower insurance rates.\(^{226}\) As such, the records were not of interest solely to the Labor Department; nor were they public property.\(^{227}\) Therefore, the court reasoned that Kings Island had a privacy interest in its records that should be protected by judicial oversight through either a search warrant or an administrative subpoena.\(^{228}\)

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219. *See* id.
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. Id.
222. For a discussion of *See* v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1987), see *supra* notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
223. For a discussion of the purposes served by a search warrant, see *supra* notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
224. *Kings Island*, 849 F.2d at 995.
225. Id. (citing *Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co.*, 834 F.2d 994, 994 (11th Cir. 1987)).
228. Id. at 996.
In discussing the need for a warrant or an administrative subpoena, the Sixth Circuit adopted a reasoning similar to that used by the Supreme Court in *Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.*\(^{229}\) It noted that although the fourth amendment limited the Labor Department's ability to obtain documents, requiring at least an administrative subpoena would not impose unreasonable burdens on the Labor Department's enforcement arm.\(^{230}\) Under the OSHA regulations, a compliance officer had the option of choosing whether to obtain an administrative subpoena or to perform a warrantless search.\(^{231}\) Inconsistent results could obtain under this procedure because the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement would apply only when the compliance officer chose to obtain a subpoena.\(^{232}\) These concerns, coupled with the need to define the scope of the search and to afford employers notice and an opportunity to be heard,\(^{233}\) led the Sixth Circuit to hold that judicial oversight was necessary before OSHA could demand production of the safety and health records.\(^{234}\)

Utilizing the framework of *New York v. Burger*,\(^{235}\) the Sixth Circuit assumed that the Labor Department could establish that Kings Island had a reduced expectation of privacy in its safety and health records.\(^{236}\) Next, it considered whether the OSHA regulatory scheme satisfied *Burger*’s three-tiered reasonableness test.\(^{237}\) Because the regulatory scheme failed the second and third criteria of the test, the Sixth Circuit held that the regulations permitting the warrantless searches were unconstitutional.\(^{238}\) As to the second criterion, the Labor Department contended that requiring a warrant or a subpoena for the production of the safety and health records would be burdensome on both the agency and the federal courts.\(^{239}\) Following the Supreme Court’s lead in *Camara*, the Sixth Circuit demanded that the Labor Department demonstrate that warrantless searches were necessary for the reasonable enforcement of OSHA.\(^{240}\) The Labor Depart-

\(^{229}\) 436 U.S. 307 (1978). For a discussion of Barlow's, see *supra* notes 110-19 and accompanying text.

\(^{230}\) *Kings Island*, 849 F.2d at 997.

\(^{231}\) *Id.*

\(^{232}\) *Id.* at 996.

\(^{233}\) *Id.*

\(^{234}\) *Id.* at 997.

\(^{235}\) 482 U.S. 691 (1987). For a discussion of *Burger*, see *supra* notes 144-64 and accompanying text.

\(^{236}\) *Kings Island*, 849 F.2d at 996.

\(^{237}\) *Id.*

\(^{238}\) *Id.*

\(^{239}\) *Id.* at 997.

\(^{240}\) *Id.*
ment was unable to do so.241

Regarding the third criterion of the Burger test, the Labor Department alleged that the OSHA regulations adequately limited compliance officer discretion, and protected employers' privacy interests.242 For instance, the regulations granted employers procedural safeguards, and the Labor Department could not impose monetary penalties for failure to provide records until the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission affirmed the reasonableness of the citation.243

The Sixth Circuit countered this argument, however, by invoking the language from Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.244 that "a provision authorizing warrantless administrative inspections 'devolves almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers,' "245 which contravenes the purposes served by a warrant.246 Here, the OSHA regulations required an employer like Kings Island to refuse to produce the records and then to defend itself after receiving a citation.247 These "after the fact" procedures conflicted with a business owner's fourth amendment rights because the judiciary could not evaluate the reasonableness of the compliance officer's demand until the harm had been done.248

In sum, the Sixth Circuit held that even if the Labor Department had established King Island's reduced expectation of privacy, the OSHA regulations in question were unreasonable under the fourth amendment.249 The Labor Department could neither establish that the warrantless inspections were essential to furthering the regulatory scheme, or that the regulatory scheme provided an adequate substitute for a search warrant. In essence, the regulatory scheme was unreasonable because it did not safeguard the policies served by a search warrant.

E. A.B. Chance: The Fourth Circuit Takes a Different Route

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in McLaughlin v. A.B. Chance250 confronted the constitutionality of the

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
245. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997 (quoting Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 323).
246. For a discussion of the purposes served by a search warrant, see supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 998.
250. 842 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1988).
OSHA regulations with an analytic framework similar to that of the Eleventh Circuit's *Emerson* decision. Although it began its analytic trek with the familiar inquiry of whether A.B. Chance had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the OSHA records, the Fourth Circuit reached a result contrary to that of the Eleventh Circuit.

After recognizing the general rule that a warrant is required for administrative searches of business premises, the Fourth Circuit disclosed that in certain circumstances a regulatory scheme authorizing warrantless searches may adequately protect a business owner's privacy expectations. Such a regulatory scheme must meet the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard to be constitutional. Rejecting A.B. Chance's argument that a search warrant was required in this context because A.B. Chance was not engaged in a pervasively regulated industry, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the rationale of the pervasively regulated industries exception was applicable. Because OSHA required the records to be kept, business owners were on notice that such records might be examined and, therefore, their expectation of privacy was diminished.

In determining whether the OSHA regulatory scheme was reasonable under the fourth amendment, the Fourth Circuit balanced "the need to search against the invasion which the search entail[ed]." The Fourth Circuit first considered the Labor Department's need to conduct warrantless searches for safety and health records; and pointed to congressional intent to support the position that a strong enforcement scheme was necessary to fulfill OSHA's purposes. To this extent, "the keeping of records by employers to show all industrial accidents, injuries, and illnesses occurring at the work place is a reasonable and necessary requirement in order for the Act to be properly administered and enforced." In sum, the Labor Department's need to search was a compelling one.

The court concluded that the invasion which the warrantless

251. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
252. *A.B. Chance*, 842 F.2d at 726.
254. *Id.* at 727 (quoting *Gallaher v. City of Huntington*, 759 F.2d 1155, 1159 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting *Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner*, 721 F.2d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir. 1983))).
255. *Id.* (quoting *Gallaher*, 759 F.2d at 1159 (quoting *Camara v. Municipal Court*, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967))).
256. *Id.*
257. *Id.*
258. *Id.*
259. *Id.*
260. *Id.* (citing 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988)).
261. *Id.*
search occasioned was minimal.262 The court enunciated five justifications for this conclusion. First, a compliance officer’s request for the records did not place an inordinate burden on A.B. Chance.263 The company only needed to physically produce the records, which it already should have compiled.264 This sort of an invasion was, therefore quite minimal.265

Second, A.B. Chance had a minimal privacy expectation in the records requested.266 Pursuant to OSHA regulations, A.B. Chance was required to post “an annual summary of occupational injuries and illnesses, which . . . consist[ed] of a copy of the year’s totals from form No. 200 . . . in a conspicuous place . . . where notices to employees [were] customarily posted.”267 Since this information was accessible to anyone viewing A.B. Chance’s bulletin board, the Fourth Circuit determined that A.B. Chance had a negligible expectation of privacy in the records.268

Third, a compliance officer’s request for the production of the records was not unreasonable.269 The compliance officer was on the business premises as a result of an employee health complaint. The court surmised that it was not unreasonable for the officer to request that A.B. Chance produce the records while he was on the premises because the information they contained could have related to the allegations in the health complaint,270 and, in any event, the regulation required the employer to keep this information.271

Fourth, the Labor Department did not arbitrarily decide to search A.B. Chance’s records.272 Invoking Barlow’s, A.B. Chance argued that allowing the warrantless search would devolve too much discretion on compliance officers.273 However, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Barlow’s by positing that A.B. Chance had been selected for search as result of an employee health complaint—not because of “whim, caprice, or any arbitrary method.”274

The final justification centered around the Fourth Circuit’s cri-

262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 727-28.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 728.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
274. Id.
tique of the Emerson holding.\textsuperscript{275} The Fourth Circuit alleged that the Eleventh Circuit failed to address the question of whether the company's expectation of privacy was reasonable and to engage in a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of the regulatory scheme.\textsuperscript{276} Regarding the reasonableness of the company's expectation of privacy, the Fourth Circuit reiterated its argument concerning the posting of an annual summary of injuries and determined that there was "no reason to conclude that an employer's privacy expectation in the forms, or in the information contained thereon, [was] greater at the time OSHA requested the documents, than it [was] at the time the annual summary [was] posted."\textsuperscript{277} In response to the Eleventh Circuit's argument that many employers kept such records prior to OSHA's enactment, the Fourth Circuit argued that there was no indication that A.B. Chance kept such records\textsuperscript{278} and that, in any event, "by promulgating the record requirement, OSHA cannot be deemed to have created a privacy interest in the information contained on the forms."\textsuperscript{279}

Concerning the failure of the Eleventh Circuit to implement a balancing test, the Fourth Circuit argued that the Emerson court did not address the limitations on the compliance officer's discretion.\textsuperscript{280} The compliance officer could only request two types of forms without a warrant.\textsuperscript{281} Moreover, the Fourth Circuit concluded that in order to make such a request, the compliance officer "must be on the employer's premises as a result of an employee's health or safety complaint before he may require production of the forms . . . without a warrant."\textsuperscript{282} Because of this judicial condition, the Fourth Circuit implied that the compliance officer's discretion was limited and ulti-

\textsuperscript{275} Id.
\textsuperscript{276} Id. This allegation may be misplaced. In fact, as previously noted, the Eleventh Circuit began its inquiry into the constitutionality of the OSHA regulations with the question of whether the employer had an expectation of privacy in the records. Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., 834 F.2d 994, 996 (11th Cir. 1987). Arguably, the court made its determination from the reasonableness perspective. Concerning the balancing test issue, the Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth Circuit employed different methodologies. The Eleventh Circuit's methodology paralleled the Supreme Court's in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). The Fourth Circuit's methodology was consistent with the methodology that courts frequently have employed in the administrative searches context. See Methodologies, supra note 2, at 1129-33. As will be argued, the Fourth Circuit's approach was incorrect because it was inconsistent with See and did not account for the three-tiered Burger reasonableness test. See infra notes 285-90 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{277} A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d at 728.
\textsuperscript{278} Id.
\textsuperscript{279} Id.
\textsuperscript{280} Id.
\textsuperscript{281} Id.
\textsuperscript{282} Id.
mately held that the regulatory scheme was reasonable under the fourth amendment. Therefore, A.B. Chance could be cited for not voluntarily producing the records.

IV. Resolution Under the Fourth Amendment

The judicial treatment of administrative searches in the commercial context indicates that business owners have privacy interests that are protected by the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court has established that a search warrant or an administrative subpoena is necessary for an administrative search to be held reasonable and, therefore, constitutional under the fourth amendment. Where the Supreme Court has recognized the pervasively regulated industries exception, it has inquired into whether the statutory scheme permitting the warrantless searches was reasonable. In essence, the issue is whether the policies served by a search warrant are safeguarded by the statutory scheme.

The preceding Section disclosed the Fourth Circuit's legal analysis in A.B. Chance, where it upheld the OSHA regulations permitting warrantless searches of employer safety and health records. As a result, the Labor Department could cite A.B. Chance for violating OSHA when it did not produce the records upon a compliance officer's request. This Comment argues that the A.B. Chance holding was incorrect in light of the precedent established by See and Barlow's, the Fourth Circuit's use of a balancing test, and prevailing public policy concerns. Accordingly, an alternate mode of resolving these issues is presented based on the Sixth Circuit's use of the New York v. Burger decision.

A. A Critique of the Fourth Circuit's Rationale in A.B. Chance

The Fourth Circuit employed a balancing test in holding that the OSHA regulations permitting warrantless searches of employers' safety and health records satisfied the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement. The court's holding permitted OSHA compli-

283. Id. at 728-29.
284. Id.
285. See supra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 250-84 and accompanying text.
291. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d at 727-29.
ance officers to cite employers who did not voluntarily produce the requested records. This Comment critiques the A.B. Chance court's analytic framework on the aforementioned grounds.

First, See and Barlow's both support the principle that a warrant is required for administrative searches of commercial premises to be deemed reasonable under the fourth amendment. These cases recognize the need to interpose a judicial organ between businessmen and agency fieldworkers. The Fourth Circuit disregarded these precedents in holding that an employer cannot demand that a compliance officer present a warrant or an administrative subpoena. Even though it referred briefly to the See general rule, the Fourth Circuit concluded that A.B. Chance had a minimal expectation of privacy in its safety and health records. The court then implemented its balancing test. This approach defies the See principle that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.

Although See and Barlow's involved premises inspections rather than records inspections, A.B. Chance should not be distinguished on this basis. The compliance officer presumably would examine the safety and health records on the company’s nonpublic premises. Courts have been sensitive to these types of on-site inspections. Like premises inspections, such on-site records inspections “invade[] corporate privacy and can disrupt the workplace . . . may . . . result in significant . . . costs [, and] . . . will in some cases enable regulators to discover plain view evidence against a firm.” Admittedly, the plain view evidence argument may not be applicable here because an A.B. Chance representative consented to an inspection of machinery. Nevertheless, his consent extended only to the premises inspection, not to the records inspection. Moreover, the applicable OSHA regulations do not limit the compliance officer’s discretion. A compliance officer conceivably may limit his request to the scope of the employee’s complaint, or may demand a broad production of

292. See supra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
294. A.B. Chance, 842 F.2d at 726.
295. Id. at 726-27.
298. New Orleans Public Service, 734 F.2d at 228.
299. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
records as occurred in *Kings Island*. The *Barlow's* decision confronted this type of discretion in the OSHA premises inspection context. Thus, the protections afforded by *Barlow's* should apply in this context.

The Fourth Circuit's conclusion regarding A.B. Chance's expectation of privacy contravenes the conclusions of both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. As the Sixth Circuit explained, employers may keep these records for a variety of purposes. Further, many employers maintained safety and health records prior to the enactment of OSHA, when the Labor Department would have had to procure a warrant to obtain the records. The enactment of the recordkeeping requirements should not remove any privacy interests in the records. If the contrary were true, employers' personal rights under the fourth amendment would be derivative of agency decisions requiring the recordkeeping of particular information. Such agency discretion conflicts with both *See* and *Barlow's* and with the policies served by a search warrant.

An employer's expectation of privacy should not diminish because he is required to post an annual summary of on-site injuries and illnesses. This information is available only to those viewing an employer's bulletin board. The employer has not made the information publicly available because only those individuals with access to the premises are privy to such information. Moreover, if governmental agencies could remove a business owner's expectation of privacy in his safety and health records or any other records containing documented information by requiring the business owner to post a summary of that information, business owners would be subject to the arbitrary discretion of compliance officers specifically, and the executive branch in general—a result historically condemned.

If *A.B. Chance* had involved a regulatory scheme that required the employer to present documentation to a governmental agency on a regular basis, then the Fourth Circuit's holding would be correct. The government's request for information would have been routine and courts have recognized that "a uniform statutory or regulatory

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301. See *supra* notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
303. Id. at 321-22.
304. See *supra* notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
306. See *supra* notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
307. The arbitrary discretion of executive officers was condemned in England in the late eighteenth century. *See supra* note 42 and accompanying text.
308. *Emerson*, 834 F.2d at 996 n.2 (citing California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974)).
reporting requirement satisfies the Fourth Amendment concern regarding the potential for arbitrary invasions of privacy.\textsuperscript{309} For example, the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") search of a bank president's office, even though the president also used the office for his law practice.\textsuperscript{310} The FDIC conducted the warrantless search as the receiver of the bank, pursuant to its statutory "duty to marshal the Bank's assets and to wind up its affairs."\textsuperscript{311} The Second Circuit upheld the search, inter alia, because bank records are subject to routine FDIC examination.\textsuperscript{312} The Supreme Court used similar reasoning in \textit{California Bankers Association v. Schultz},\textsuperscript{313} to uphold the constitutionality of the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.\textsuperscript{314} In contrast, as the Eleventh Circuit recognized, the OSHA compliance officers' requests for the safety and health records involved "discretionary and potentially arbitrary requests for document inspection."\textsuperscript{315} In such cases, courts should be wary of granting field workers unbridled discretion. Requiring a warrant permits judicial oversight and does not impose unreasonable burdens on the Labor Department because an employee's complaint ordinarily furnishes probable cause for the issuance of a warrant.\textsuperscript{316}

Second, in implementing a balancing test, the Fourth Circuit did not adequately address the fourth amendment warrant requirement. It accepted the Labor Department's decision, as exemplified by the OSHA regulations in question, that warrantless searches were necessary and then conducted a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of the regulatory scheme.\textsuperscript{317} In effect, such an analysis "permits legislators and administrators to redefine reasonableness at will,"\textsuperscript{318} and transforms the \textit{See} presumption that warrantless searches are unreasonable into the exception, and the exception into the general rule. A truer approach to the general warrant requirement rule would require the Labor Department to demonstrate that the employers

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{309} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{310} United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990), aff'd, 696 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
\item \textsuperscript{311} \textit{Chuang}, 696 F. Supp. at 914 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1988); and Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hatmaker, 756 F.2d 34, 36 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985)).
\item \textsuperscript{312} \textit{Chuang}, 897 F.2d at 650.
\item \textsuperscript{313} 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
\item \textsuperscript{315} Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., 834 F.2d 994, 996 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987).
\item \textsuperscript{316} D. LOFGREN, supra note 27, at 200.
\item \textsuperscript{317} \textit{See} supra note 259 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{318} Methodologies, supra note 2, at 1139.
\end{itemize}
have reduced expectations of privacy in the records and that the regulatory scheme is reasonable under the fourth amendment. Such an approach would not only safeguard See's principle that warrantless searches of commercial premises are presumptively unreasonable, but would also reconfirm the principle that "[l]aw enforcement . . . should work within bounds set by the Fourth Amendment, not vice versa." The Fourth Circuit's utilization of a balancing test is also questionable as precedent. Balancing tests are vague and unpredictable. Although the Fourth Circuit's test addressed such factors as congressional intent, the invasion which the search entailed, the company's expectation of privacy, and the discretion of the compliance officer, its review of these factors provides little objective guidance for other courts, especially in comparison to Burger's three-tiered test. The Burger test not only provides more objective guidance, but also allows courts to consider fully both the interests of businessmen and governmental agencies.

Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's conclusions are questionable. The Fourth Circuit declared that Congress intended a strong enforcement scheme. While this may have been the case, it does not necessarily follow that warrantless searches are required for the enforcement of OSHA. Such a conclusion conflicts with the Supreme Court's analysis in Barlow's. In Barlow's, the Court remained "unconvinced . . . that requiring warrants to inspect [would] impose serious burdens on the [OSHA] inspection scheme or the courts, [would] prevent inspections to enforce the statute, or [would] make them less effective." Although there may be factual differences between Barlow's and A.B. Chance, these differences were not sufficient for either the Sixth or Eleventh Circuit to distinguish Barlow's. The distinctions between the investigations in Barlow's and A.B. Chance reflect that OSHA will not be seriously burdened with regard

319. See United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stressing that in the context of criminal cases, the relevant precedent establishes that a warrantless search is presumptively unconstitutional and that the government bears the burden of proving that a particular exception applies).
320. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
321. Methodologies, supra note 2, at 1139 n.61.
322. Cf. id. at 1137 (arguing that courts "have resorted to a more flexible and less rule-bound 'balancing' methodology in civil cases" and that courts are increasingly implementing this approach in the criminal context).
to inspections of safety and health records. In *Barlow's*, the compliance officer sought to investigate safety hazards. Requiring a search warrant in that context could inhibit OSHA's enforcement more than by requiring a warrant in the records context. Arguably, in the records context there is less chance of an employer tampering with the records while a compliance officer obtains a search warrant because employers must post an annual summary of the workplace injuries and illnesses. Supporting this conclusion is the Sixth Circuit's observation that the Labor Department was "not concerned that employers [would] alter or destroy the records upon being given notice and a hearing."

The final criticism of *A.B. Chance* centers around policy concerns in today's regulatory society. If courts do not require that an administrative agency obtain a search warrant, or at least permit an employer to demand an administrative subpoena, a business enterprise could be subject to a number of searches from different agencies without having the opportunity for judicial review. For example, pursuant to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), the Labor Department conducts investigations of I-9 verification forms that employers are required to maintain. IRCA gives the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Labor Department unrestricted access to the verification forms. Under the Fourth Circuit's approach, the Labor Department conceivably could enter upon a business owner's premises to investigate an employee health complaint and make a warrantless request for the employer's safety and health records. In addition, the compliance officer could make a warrantless request for the I-9 forms. In such a setting, where an employer could be subject to a number of investigations, judicial review is even more necessary. The Fourth Circuit's approach, however, potentially enhances warrantless searches not only by the Labor Department, but also by other governmental agencies. Such searches contradict the purposes served by a search warrant, the principles enunciated in *See*, and the decisions of the

330. See *McDonald*, *supra* note 297, at 428.
331. See *supra* notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
332. See *supra* notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT IN EMERSON\textsuperscript{333} AND THE SIXTH CIRCUIT IN KINGS ISLAND.\textsuperscript{334}

**B. Implementation of the Burger Framework**

In contrast to the Sixth Circuit's mode of analysis in *Kings Island*, the Fourth Circuit does not invoke, or even mention, the *Burger*\textsuperscript{335} holding. The *Burger* analytic framework is useful for evaluating whether warrantless administrative searches are constitutional under the fourth amendment. It recognizes the general rule that a search warrant is required for administrative searches,\textsuperscript{336} but also acknowledges that exceptions exist.\textsuperscript{337} If a governmental agency can demonstrate reduced privacy expectations, its warrantless inspection may be constitutional if it meets the three-tiered *Burger* reasonableness test.\textsuperscript{338}

No exceptions to the warrant requirement exist in *A.B. Chance*. In *Kings Island*, the Labor Department conceded that the pervasively regulated industries exception did not apply.\textsuperscript{339} The Eleventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in *Emerson*.\textsuperscript{340} This exception is limited,\textsuperscript{341} and the Supreme Court has interpreted it to apply only to particular industries.\textsuperscript{342} As the *Barlow's* Court recognized, OSHA potentially applies to all businesses rather than to a particular industry, such as the liquor industry or the firearms industry.\textsuperscript{343} Thus, the Court concluded that businesses subject to OSHA's reach were not per se within the pervasively regulated industries exception.\textsuperscript{344} Using a similar rationale, a district court concluded that the exception did not apply to federal government employees when it determined the constitutionality of a drug testing program.\textsuperscript{345}

The alleged underlying rationale of this exception does not justify

\textsuperscript{333} See supra notes 196-209 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{334} See supra notes 210-49 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{335} 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
\textsuperscript{336} See id. at 699-702.
\textsuperscript{337} Id. at 702.
\textsuperscript{338} Id. at 702-03.
\textsuperscript{339} McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1988).
\textsuperscript{340} Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., 834 F.2d 994, 996 (11th Cir. 1987).
\textsuperscript{342} See supra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{344} Id.
the determination that warrantless searches are constitutional in the context of compliance officer searches of employers' safety and health records. If it did, it would undermine the Barlow's Court's conclusion that businesses subject to OSHA are not by definition within the pervasively regulated industries exception. Additionally, an increase in the scope of the exception would result, as is already evident in several Supreme Court decisions. Such a process would ultimately lead to the exceptions' engulfing of the general warrant requirement rule.

Additionally, an employer's privacy interests in safety and health records is not diminished in light of the Labor Department's regulatory interests. Business owners not only have expectations of privacy in safety and health records, but also in their business premises. Such expectations should not diminish as a result of the promulgation of recordkeeping requirements.

The Burger framework focuses on the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement. Even if the Labor Department could establish that one of the preceding exceptions applied, the statutorily authorized searches need to satisfy the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement. Applying the three-tiered Burger reasonableness test, the OSHA regulatory scheme is unreasonable under the fourth amendment. While the Labor Department could establish a substantial governmental interest to support the need to regulate commercial enterprises, it cannot maintain, as the Sixth Circuit noted, either that warrantless searches are essential to furthering the OSHA regulatory scheme or that the regulatory framework provides an adequate substitute for a warrant. Regarding the former, the Supreme Court's finding in Barlow's that OSHA's effectiveness would not be undermined if warrants were required in order to conduct safety inspections is equally applicable here. As to the latter, the statute does not provide for any type of judicial oversight prior to the conduct of a search. Only "after the fact" judicial review is provided, which most certainly contravenes the precedent established by See and Barlow's—that judicial intervention is necessary to prevent unbridled

346. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 314.
347. See supra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
350. Id. at 702-03.
353. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
354. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997.
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF OSHA RECORDS

governmental discretion.355

V. CONCLUSION

In today's regulatory society, employers' fourth amendment rights often conflict with governmental agencies' authority to conduct warrantless administrative searches. The judicially recognized rule is that a search warrant is necessary for a search to be reasonable. Courts, however, have recognized exceptions to this rule.

Although governmental agencies may have valid reasons to conduct warrantless searches, courts must be wary of rubber stamping agency decisions to conduct such searches without analyzing both agency concerns and the personal rights of businessmen. The Fourth Circuit held that the OSHA regulations requiring voluntary production of employers' safety and health records were constitutional, even though they permitted warrantless searches.356 This holding conflicts with the decisions of the Eleventh357 and Sixth358 Circuits. An analysis of the Sixth Circuit's decision discloses that using the Burger analytic framework permits courts to respect the general warrant requirement rule. Using this framework is preferable to having a court defer to an agency decision that warrantless searches are necessary and then conduct a balancing test. The Burger approach provides added judicial vigilance during this era of governmental regulation—an era when our constitutional rights increasingly appear to be in jeopardy.

CARLOS B. CASTILLO

355. In a hearing subsequent to the three cases under consideration, an Occupational Safety and Health Commission Administrative Law Judge vacated a citation issued to an employer who refused to provide a compliance officer with safety and health records, allegedly in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1904.7 (1989). Secretary of Labor v. Hern Iron Works, Inc., 14 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1446 (O.S.H. Rev. Comm'n Dec. 2, 1989). The judge concluded "that 29 CFR 1904.7 is constitutionally invalid insofar as it purports to authorize an inspection of required records without a warrant or its equivalent, such as an employer's consent." Id.
358. Kings Island, 849 F.2d at 997.