12-1-1949


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home. His constant rebelliousness against society has been shown through psychological study to result from earlier emotional deprivation. His impulsive aggression against the authority and restriction of his social group (symbolic of his early denying parents) may be an unconscious plea for affection and help.

Coupled with this impulsive behavior, so typical of the psychopathic personality, Dr. Bromberg views emotional immaturity as one of the major contributors to anti-social acts. The capacity to accept the realities of life, the disappointments and frustrations, the postponement of satisfactions, limitations, the abandonment of fantasy aims—these constitute some of the marks of the mature personality. Again, society's attempt to solve the problem of the offender, who so often is lacking in the above, should be directed toward the training and education of the child.

Dr. Bromberg reflects a considered optimism in his suggestions for treatment and psychotherapy. The difficulties which he recognizes do not detract from the cogency of his suggestions for attacking this social disease. One does not wipe out malaria by swatting mosquitoes.

Although the author does not always distinguish between opinion and experimental evidence, the survey seems to this reviewer to be worthy of the attention of all those seeking a deeper understanding of the etiology and psychodynamics of anti-social acts.

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The Havana Charter for the International Trade Organization accomplished two concomitant purposes: it laid down a detailed code of rules to govern trade relationships, and it set up a very specialized agency of the United Nations to serve as an instrument of continuous international cooperation.

To summarize the Charter merely attenuates the difficulties which obtained at Havana. Suffice it to say that if carried out, it will be the first time that a possibility of international economic peace could prevail. But for all its problems, behind the Charter lies a simple fact of truth; the world will be a better place to live in if all signatory nations would adopt the collective bargaining principle of labor negotiation instead of, as in the past, taking unilateral action.

Clair Wilcox, Joseph Warton Professor of Political Economy at Swarthmore College, has a background above most writers which enables him to
present the facts clearly and completely. Educated at the University of Pennsylvania, he adds to his fine academic capabilities a thorough understanding of the practical side of world trade. From 1945 to 1948 he served as director of the Office of International Policy of the Department of State. He was also Chairman of the United States Delegation at the International Trade Conference in London in 1946 and Vice Chairman of the delegations at the conference in Geneva in 1947 and Havana in 1947-48 from which the Charter resulted.

The Twenty Years Interregnum, 1919-1939, which culminated in the most disastrous conflict in world history, may safely be characterized by an economic policy of "dog eat dog." At the close of World War I, the United States and the rest of the world had the chance of organizing itself along the perhaps too idealistic ideas of President Wilson, but certain ruthless and small-minded politicians, with Machiavellian intent, succeeded in murdering the Christian principles of the world. Jingoistically, their European counterparts perpetrated the fraud of the Versailles Treaty, and at the same time paid false homage to permanent peace by organizing an impotent League of Nations doomed to defeat at its inception. Their failure to deliver their promises to Italy, their physical and moral sense of vengeance against Germany, resulted in a short decade in the establishment of two totalitarian economic states pledged to defeat any try toward economic cooperation.

The integral nationalistic policies of the 1920's were bound to end in the world disaster of the Great Depression and we, here, did our noble part in lengthening its Apocalyptical reign. At the very moment when eighteen countries under the aegis of the League of Nations, were making some headway toward tariff reductions and multilateral trade negotiations, the United States, with unadulterated inaneness, passed the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Law, which raised duties to their highest level in our tariff history. Irrevocable damage was done to our own relations with foreign nations. Reciprocity against our products immediately followed, and the trade barriers grew into pretentious heights.

Intensive economic nationalism followed for the remainder of the decade. All weapons of neo-mercantilism were brought into play: currencies were depreciated, exchanges controlled, quotas imposed and discrimination practiced through preferential systems and barter deals. A vicious spiral of restrictionism produced a further deterioration in world trade. One beacon in a world of darkness appeared, however insignificant in a panorama of flickering sparks, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements of President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull. But unilaterally we could not oppose the overwhelming pattern of paternalistic economic policies which dominated the rest of the world. The inexorable escape from this unrealistic situation was war, with its devastation
of existing economic facilities and its potent destruction of future possibilities of trade.

Today with military victory still in the balance as a result of Russia's intransigent attitude toward cooperation, we face again a challenge. In this matter of international trade policy, there are now only two alternatives—and only two—before the world. The one is a situation in which every country, acting in its own interests and without regard for the interest of others, will maintain and increasingly impose detailed administrative regulations on its foreign trade. The other is a situation in which all countries, acting in their common interest, under the terms of the Charter and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, will voluntarily agree to keep such detailed regulations within narrow bounds.

If our adherence to the Charter and the General Agreement were to be rejected by the Wherrys of the United States, it is certain that the world would be headed back toward the jungle of isolationism, economic warfare, and anarchy in trade relationships. If we do adjudge that unity is the best policy, we shall be given an opportunity, through continuing cooperation, to bring order out of chaos, to achieve a measure of stability, and to maintain economic peace. In rejection, there is a certainty of disaster; in acceptance, the possibility of deliverance from the sword of Damocles which is suspended over all our efforts toward perpetual world peace.

In conclusion, I should like to quote from Mr. Wilcox, "In my judgment the choice lies between this Charter and no Charter at all. Faced with this choice, some prefer a world in which there is no set of agreed rules to govern international trade relationships and no instrument for the settlement of economic differences. I prefer the Charter of Havana."

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Professor Pigou's *Employment and Equilibrium* is a brilliant performance in neo-classical economics and a masterpiece of theoretical analysis. The architecture of the whole work reflects the great talent of its creator. The book has logical consistency, and the author from well defined assumptions, through strict mathematical reasoning arrives at clear and precise conclusions.

The first edition of the book appeared in 1941 and it was intended to serve as an answer to Lord Keynes' *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* in which the author violently attacked the fundamental postulates of classical economics.