In this practice-oriented article the author examines the use of economic experts in antitrust cases. He analyzes several factors that influence the selection of an economist such as the various schools of economic theory related to antitrust, the time commitments counsel can expect to receive from an expert, the demands of the case, and costs. The article reviews several kinds of payment agreements and recommends which to choose, based on the individual case. The author explains ways to use the economist from before the filing of a complaint through cross-examination of the adversary's expert. Also examining counsel's preparation of the expert, the author concludes with explanations of how to use or reject the information furnished by the expert, and how counsel should exercise control over an antitrust case.
Stephen E. Nagin,
Selection, Use, and Pay of an Economist in an Antitrust Case,
35 U. MIA L. Rev.
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol35/iss2/3